Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1942

The Development of China's Monetary System.
Cheng-se Tseo
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Tseo, Cheng-se, "The Development of China's Monetary System." (1942). LSU Historical Dissertations and
Theses. 7858.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/7858

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

MANUSCRIPT THESES
Unpublished theses submitted Tor the master!s and doctorTs
degrees and deposited in the Louisiana State University Library
are available Tor inspection.
rights of the author.

Use of any thesis is limited by the

Bibliographical references may be noted, but

passages may not be copied unless the author has given permission.
Credit must be given in subsequent written or published work.
A library which borrm s this thesis for use by its clientele
is expected to make sure that the borrower is aware of the above
restrictions.
LOUISIANA. STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

119-a

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S MONBTAHY SYSTEM

A Dissertation
Submitted to th© Graduate Faculty of th©
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of th©
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Th© Department of Economics

by
Cheng-se Tseo
B. S., Central Political Institute, Nanking, China, 1933
M* S-, Louisiana. Stat© University, 1939
June, 1942

UMI Number: DP69236

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI
Dissertation Publishing

UMI DP69236
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1346

ACJQfOm&KMEBT

The candidate wishes to acknowledge his appreciation for the help
given him by the various members of the Faculty of th© College of Com
merce of Louisiana State University*

Dr* James B* Trent, Dean of the

College of Commerce, has supervised the work and offered many valuable
suggestions*

Dr* Harlan L* MoCraoken, head of the Department of Eco

nomics, and Dr. Robert W* Bradbury, Director of the Division of Latin
American Relations, have read the manuscript and given many helpful
criticisms*

Dr. Theodore H. Farris, Professor of Economics, has also

given great assistance*

Dr. Stanley W* Preston, Professor of Business

Administration, has aided the candidate in overcoming his difficulties
with the English language*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter
I

Fag©

THE B S m O J M E N T Of CHINA’S MONETARY S Y S W PRIOR TO 1896 •

1

Copper Money •
. . . . . . . . . . .
Silver Money •
Paper Money •
Gold in C h i n a ..........................................
II

III

17

7
12
22
27

THE BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATIOK AROUND 1898
* *
Governmental Finance * •
. . . . . . . .
Public Debt
.....................
Foreign Trade # • • * • » • • • • • • • ..............
State of Affaire with the Western Powers and within China
The Monetary Situation
Copper Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Silver Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . .
Paper Money
China’s Banking around 1898 • • « . • * • • « » • • • •
Shansi Banks
Hative Banks
.........
Foreign Banks . . . .......... . . . . . . . . . . .
Others • « .......................

32
32
36
3?
39
44
44
50
65
66
66
6T
69
70

THE CURRENCY REFORM OF CHINA'S GOVERMIENT m > IMPORTANT
PROPOSALS OF THE REFORM (BEFORE 1910) . . . . . . . . .

77

Factors Leading to the Preliminary proposals..........
Proposals before 1900
Condition of 1900 and after •
Currency Reform of China’s Government . . . . . . . . .
Merits of the Gold Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77
77
80
88
121

THE MONETARY SITUATION BETWEEN 1911-1928 AND THE PROPOSALS
.................
FOR CURRENCY REFORM

126

The Currency Situation from 1911 to 1928 . . . . . . . .
126
Situation of the Silver Dollar . . . . . . . . . . . .
127
Situation of the Paper Money . . . . . . . . . . . . .
129
The Capper Cents
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
130
Situation of the Subsidiary Silver Coins * . * . * • »
132
Monetary Policies of China’s Government and the Advo
cates of Currency Reform •
134
G* Vissoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
134
W. A» Roest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . 143
Hsu Un-yuan
143
S. R. Wage! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
The Banking Situation and Demands for Positive Currency
Reform
............................................. 160

ill

Chapter
V

Page

THE MONETARY REFORM AFTER 1928 AND THE MANAGED CURRENCY
REFORM ..........
Monetary Policies and Currency Reform before 1936 • * •
Creation of the Central Bank of China • • • • • • • *
Central Mint at Shanghai * • • • • » • • • « * . * » • ' »
Abol istenant of "Likin” * * * * * * . « , « . * * * • * • •
Establishment of the Customs Gold Unit * • « • » • • •
Abolishment of the "Tael” • • * • » » • ' » • • • • •
Rationalisation of Silver • * • • • • • • • • • * • » *
Silver Situation in 1934 « • • « » • < > « < » * » « • « *
Causes Leading to Nationalization * • . * * * « . * ♦
Process of Nationalisation * • » • • • • • « • * • « *
The Managed Currency
Summary « • * » « • * • • »
» • » « . » «

¥1

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . •

.........

A P P E N D I C E S .................... * ..........
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIOGRAPHY

176
176
176
180
182
184
138
192
192
200
206
216
223
226

. * ■.

............

248
258

.....................

Iv

. . . . . . .

266

ABSTMGT
This study Is designed to present a complete picture of the de
velopment of China's monetary system from about 1122 .8* C* to 1957
A* D*

However, th© main emphasis is on the recent development from

about 1851 to 1S37• Therefore, the background of th® country around
1898, th© important creation of th© Government after 1898, and th©
important proposals for currency reform, between 1895 and 1928 are
traced in much greater detail than for earlier periods*
The materials used are, in the main, col leeted from the govern
mental documents in this country, th© periodicals, and the books in
the English language, sine© ther® is a lack of the original Shines©
materials*
Generally speaking, China, in the early period, had once used
cowries, pearls, gems, and other articles as money, but she maintained
th© system of copper coins for several thousand years*

Th© Chow

dynasty (1122 to 220 B* C*) first coined and the Tan dynasty (A* B*
618-917) improved th© round copper cash*

The Tang copper coins re

mained th© standard of coinage for many succeeding centuries until
around 1900, when the m o d e m copper cents took their place*
Even though silver was used a® money as early as the days of th©
Ssia dynasty (2205-1818 B. C*;, silver was not recognized as legal
tender for th© payment of taxes until 1055 A* D, by the government of
the Sung dynasty*

After a considerable amount of silver bullion and

foreign silver dollars had flowed into ^hina from Europe and Mexico
after the nineteenth century, silver cam® into general us® as money
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sid® by side with} copper coins * The Chinese started to coin their o*sa
silver dollars at the Canton Mint in 1889*

later on several provincial

mints began to tuna out their owi local dollars*
The first Chinese paper money, governmental notes, m s issued under
the reign of Emperor Hien-tsun (A* B* 8G6-82Xj of the Tang dynasty*
Later on each dynasty used paper money to finance m r or in times of
extreme financial difficulty*

Luring the last few decades of the Tslng

dynasty (A* D* 1644*1911) native batiks, firms, and foreign banks issued
notes freely*
Bnminted gold was used in china as early as 1818 B* C* and gradually
came to be used as a storage of value and as one of the minor mediums
of exchange *

But gold coin as a national currency has never yet been

adopted in China*
China* s monetary system after 1851 ran into serious difficulty*
In the years around 1898 it became worse*

The taels, the unit of silver,

were counted differently, depending o r places, business, and tradition*
The seme was true regarding the "purity" of silver*
dollars circulated by weight and discount*

Th© foreign

The Chines© provincial

dollar, with different appearance, circulated by weight Instead of face
value*

Copper cash, worn and new, genuine and counterfeit, was accepted

by the people*

An un-uniform currency system had been existing in

China at that time*
China's political and social condition around 1898 had added more
confusion to the complicated monetary situation*

For instance, China's

government was inefficient and decentralized, both from the standpoint
of organisation and personnel*

The financial difficulty forced China’s

local governments to abuse the currency policy, and the huge amount of
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foreign g©14 loans directly exhausted the financial sources and in
directly pat China In a position that w s dependent on foreign help
to reform her currency system.
Under the serious condition, China’s government from year to
year took: various steps to reform the currency system*
reasons these steps were unsuccessful*

For various

For instance, a movement of

preliminary monetary reform to unify China’s currency occurred in
1395*

From 1901 to 1904 some rain attempts were made to Improve the

existing situation-

The "Ten Peculations" and th© Act of "coinage of

Taels" of 1905 were never put into effect*

The "Ecgulatiens for the

National Coinage” and th© supplementary articles of 1910 helped very
little*

The coinage of the Tuan Shl-kai dollar was the only tangible

result of the "Bat ione.1 Currency Hegulotions" of 1914*

In 1918,

although th© "Regulations of gold currency motes” were granted, they
had never been put into act*

From 1918 to 1928, a period of ten

years, under the series of civil wars, both government and monetary
reform virtually ceased*
From 1895 to 1928 th© proposals devised either by China’s officers
or by foreign experts piled mountain high, but non© of them had ever
been put Into act*
After 1928, under China’s mew National Government, the situation
took a turn for th© better*

For instance, in 1928 a Central Bank was

set up; in 1950 the system of "Custom Gold Unit** was established; the
abolishment of th® Haikwan tael began in 1930 and was completed in
19331 the Central Mint m s created at Shanghai in 19331 th© "tael”
system ■was entirely abolished in 1953; and China’s standard dollar was
coined in the Central Mint In 1933*

These were the steps necessary for
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the completion of a uniform natioml-monetary system*
On November 5, 1935, as a result of the changed condition of the
international standard, the intensified world depression and th©
critical situation caused by raising the price of silver in the world
market, the Chinese government announced the abandonment of th© silver
standard and set up a managed currency system*

Under th© managed

currency system all silver in China was nationalised and th© banknotes
of the government banks were made full legal tender*

For the purpose*,

©f foreign, exchange, the Central Bank of China pegged the prioe of
the Chinese standard dollar at th© fixed price of the British Sterling
and th© American dollar*

This new currency policy of China *s brought

her into closer and more intimate contact with th© m o d e m economic
world*

CHAPTER I
TBS DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S MONETARY SYSTEM PRIOR TO 1898
I* Chines® Background— China, through her scaas four thousand
years’ history, was a monarchy*
power*

The Emperor enjoyed th© sovereign

Hie powers were neither enumerated nor residual*

They were

rested In him as the sovereign throughout th© various dynasties*
The origin of the Chines© ran© remains one of the unsolved prob
lems of history*

It m s said that the Chinese r&oe earn© from some

where in Western Asia and settled near the hanks of the Yellow River*
From generation to generation they moved southward down the area of
the Yangtse River and the Pearl River and developed into one of the
countries with the oldest culture in the world*
Chinese historians begin their story with th© age of the Five
Rules (6* C. 2852-2205), bust the detailed record in Chinese history
can only be traced to the Chow dynasty (B* C • IX22-220) •

This dynasty

was established in B. C* 1122 and lasted for nine centuries*

Through

out the whole period China under an Emperor m s really ruled by the
feudal chieftains*

During this period lived th© famous scholars,

Confucius* Mencius, Laotss* Hotse, and others who set up the founda
tion of every branch of the political* philosophic* and other doctrines*
At th® close of th© Chow dynasty, the Emperor Shih Huang-ti (th©
founder of* the Tsin dynasty— B» C* 220-206) abolished th© federal system
of th© Chow dynasty in order to centralise th® power in the central
government and divided th© whole country into thirty-six provinces*
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Ha attempted to destroy the ancient literature in order to weaken the
conservative influence*

He also built the famous Great Wall to prevent

the Inroads of the Northern Barbarians*
The Han dynasty (B* C* 206-A* D* 251) extended the boundaries of
the Empire much more*

Its education system m s bant on the preserva

tion of olassioism, and turned away from the study of nature*

Owing

to the influence of governmental policies th© farmers occupied the
second place of honor only next to the scholars and the mercantile
class was next to the laborer*

This was probably one of the important

reasons why commerce was not extended on a larger scale in the past in
China*
At the close of th© Han dynasty, there was a period of civil war
fought by the Three Kingdoms*

The Three Kingdoms and th© Chin dynasty,

tinder which there was & long struggle between the Chinese and the North
ern Barbarians, lasted from A* D* 251 to A* D* 618*
Under the Tang dynasty (A* D* 618-907), the I&npir© was once more
united and the country entered a period of great prosperity*

The civil

service examination system took on a form which lasted until the over
throw of the Mane hue dynasty in 1911, and officials were recruited from
the successful candidates*

The Empire was still further enlarged and

the extent of China proper became approximately what it is at th©
present day*
At the close of the Tang dynasty cam© another period of internal
disorder under the five minor dynasties, Liang, Tang, Chin, Han, and
Chow, lasting from 907 to 960 A* X>*
The Sung dynasty (A* D® 960—1230) followed th© Chow*

During th©

8
earlier period (about 960*1126} of this dynasty, peace and unity existed
in tbs whole country*

But at tbs last period (1127*1230) the K i m or

the "Golden Hearda11 occupied the north of China, and the Sung Emperors
ruled over only the south*

During the Sung dynasty there lived a well-

known social reformer, Wang An-shih, who was the prims minister and who
nade soias significant proposals in regard to the nationalisation of
commerce, governmental loans to farmers, income tax, and compulsory
enrollment of militia*

The unpopularity and failure of hie plan were

due to the deep-rooted conservatism of China at that tine*
After the Sung dynasty, the Tuan or Mongol dynasty (A* D* 12801363) was established*

Owing to the invasion of Russia, Hungary, and

Poland by the Mongols, the mutual introduction of civilisation and
the Journeys of travelers and merchants were undertaken on a consider
able scale • Among the earliest visitors of whom we have authentic
records were the Polos, especially Marco Polo*
The Ming dynasty (A* 0* 1368-1644) assumed the throne left by
the Mongol dynasty*

The oivil-service examinat ions were revised and

the government of China assumed the form which it held up to the time
of the Revolution in 1911*

The Emperor had the appointment of the six

boards of administration, and of the viceroys and governors of the
provinces*

All officials in the provinces down to the district

magistrate were appointed by the central government*

Th© provinces

were free to administer their local affairs in detail, provided that
they paid the necessary tribute and followed the general policy of the
central administration*

In the village communities, however, the

village elder or wtlpaoB was appointed with and by the advice and
consent of the villagers, represented them In all official and govern-
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menta1 affairs* and was the channel of communioation between the offi

cials and the Tillages.
During the Ming dynasty, adventurers and merchants from Europe
began to com® by the new sea route (through the Indian sea) recently
discovered, instead of by the former overland routes (across the Himara
Mountains and Tibet)•
Owing to a rebellion in China caused by internal dissension*
M&nchus* who earns from the northeastern provinces of China* captured
Peking and established th© Tsing dynasty (1644*1911)*

In the Tsing

dynasty the Inner Cabinet of the Central Government* the old Council
of State* was charged with the discussion of state affairs* the promul
gation of imperial orders* and the conduct of great ceremonials attended
by the Emperor.

The Military Counoil primarily was created for the dis

cussion of military affairs.

The important departments of the Central

Government were the six boards* one of which was the Board of Revenue.
Each board was presided ever by two presidents* one Chinese and one
Hanohu* each with the same authority.
Zn the Board of Revenue (Hu-Pu) there were seven! bureaus and
committees.

However* the re was no special office to take care of the

imperial currency policy*

Subordinate to the Imperial Government were

the provincial governmente* each with & governor at its head.
governors were subject to the will of the Emperor.

The

The heads or the

imperial governmental departments made the laws which the governors
wore bound to obey.

The governors were appointed by th© Emperor and

remained in service unless relieved by promotion* retirement, etc*
Besides th© governors* there were th® Executive Department* and the
Judicial Department and the Circuit Governor appointed by the Contra!

Government to eo-operate with or assist governors•
The head of the local ga vermnent was the Magistrates seam of who®
were appointed on the nomination of the governor * some of whom were
selected by the Department of Civil Service*

After the expiration of

a ter® of ten years the magistrate was usually promoted) otherwise he
remained in service as long as conditions did not arise* such as pro*
motion* retirement* etc*
The searching for new markets and opportunity for colonisation of
new areas by European countries after the industrial revolution brought
China into more frequent contact with the rest of the world* and made
more friendly commercial relationships with the outside necessary*
It was in the year 1793* in the reign of Kien-lung of the Tsing dynasty*
that the first commercial mission to Peking* then the capital of China*
was sent by King George 111 of England *

A consent was officially

granted for carrying cm trade at Canton by British merchants*

Fro®

then on constant friction arose between the British merchants and the
provincial officials of China*

Finally the first war between China

and Great Britain* known as the "Opium War*** occurred in 1841-42*

A

second war occurred in 1856-60 between China on one side and France and
Great Britain on the other*

The anti-foreign spirit manifested itself

in Tientsin in 1870 and on the borders of Yunnan in 1376*

In 1884 a

war broke out with France over a dispute in regard to Tonkin*

The

results of these wars were the signature of unequal treaties* the
opening of the trade ports* and ceding of territories*

As a conse

quence of the Sin©-Japanese War (1894-95), China gave up Korea*
Formes a and the Pescadores Islands* and opened more trade ports*

Realising China*s weakness, a policy of further aggression m s pursued
by the Western Powers*

In 1697 Germany seised Kiaoehow, Russia forced

the Chinese Government to lease Port Arthur, Great Britain obtained
the lease of Weih&iwei and Frame that of Kwanehow*
demand fhr Sanman Bay in Chekiang in 1698*

Italy put in a

It began to look as if the

partition of China mere ins Tit able*
Awakensd by the strength that Japan had acquired by adopting
western education and military science, and alarmed by the dangers of
partition, a band of young reformers persuaded tbs Emperor Kw&ngshu to
issue the famous reform edicts of 1396*

Bub the Empress Dowager by a

coup d 9etat seised the government, put th© reformers ^to flight, insti
tuted a reign of terror, and restored the conservative regime*
XX* Survey of Chinese Monetary System prior to 1898— According to
the record of the development of China's currency, several instruments,
which were or are employed by other countries in the world, had been
adopted in China within the past four thousand years*

Generally speak

ing, even though in the early period of China's history people had once
used eewries, pearls, gems, and other articles as a medium of exchange,
copper coins had formed the principal instrument of circulation in
China for thousands of years*

Until the ©lose of th© Tsing dynasty

and the beginning of the Republic of China, copper still played an
important part in China's monetary system*
Silver money had existed in China as ©arly as the days of the Hsia
dynasty (2205-1818 5* C.), but it was not until a considerable amount
of silver

foreign silver dollars flowed into China through th©

channel of foreign trade from Europe end Mexico, that silver cam©
into general use as a medium of exchange*

Later the improvement of

Chittft’s trad®, both interregional and international, from year to year
naturally led to the result that silver money gradually took the plae©
of copper money as the standard of curreney.
As to paper money, an invention of the Chinese people, the first
Chinese governmental notes of record were issued under the reign of
Saparor Hi on-1 sun. (A* B* 806-821) of th© Tang dynasty*

Later e&eh

dynasty used paper money to a great extent for the purpose of financing
ear or in the time of financial difficulties, but seldom during normal
peace time*

During the last fee decades of the Tsing dynasty, some

native banks, firms and foreign banks used to issue notes % neverthe
less* they were limited in extent to & local area*
Cold standard, car the use of gold coin as a national currency,
never has occurred in China in the past, though gold coin has been
circulated for short periods by some of the local governments*
Apart from the above brief statement, more detailed information
regarding each type of money and the development of its us® is still
needed for the purpose of understanding the monetary situation of
China up to the year 1898*

A* Copper Money
As to the origin of metallic money in China, several records
show different dates.

In th© Historical Heoord® of Ssu-Ma Chien, it

is stated that the media of exchange of th© Emperor Shun (3255 B* C*)
and of the Hsia dynasty (3205-1818 B* G.) were three kinds of metals
yellow (gold), whit© (silver), and red (oopper).

The author of the

Pen Tsao Kang Mu maintains that the origin of money in China was the
casting of Pi by the Emperor Yu, who ruled 2205-2197 B* C*

Mr* Ma Tuan

s
Lin, in his well-known Wen Helen Tung Kao (polished in A* 0* 1321)
maintained that money first o e m

into existquo a during th© reign of

Tai Hao, vis*, from 296& B* G* onwards*

According to Terrien da

Laeouperi© (Catalogs© of Chines© Coins, London, 1392) the first at
tempt to introduce metallic cuarreuoy in ancient China dates back to
about 1100 B* C*

From these sources, any one of wfrioh is considered

an authority in its field, it appears probable that China was the
first of all the countries in the world to create a metallic currency.
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There Is no doubt that Hi® copper coins, either round or in other
shapes, were very popular and have been used for a long time in China«
Through their development for some four thousand years, a great variety
of them issued from dynasty to dynasty are described in several books*
"It is probable that no nation has had & greater variety of coinage
than China, as the total number of Imperial* State, and private issues
g
amounts to about ten thousand*"
Therefore only the important ones
will be described here*
The original metallic ourrency of ancient China appeared at first
as articles of utility, such as spade money, primitive ornaments, and
rings, and was by natural growth gradually transformed into inscribed
copper money*

la China’s currency development the Invention of the

inscribed money was Hie first progress in her money system*

The first

round coins with inscription were turned out under the rule of Cheng
Wang (1315-1079 B. C.), of the Chow dynasty*
dates back to 600 B* C.

The inscribed spade money

Th® Pu money mad® its first appearance 476 B<* C«

^sTiCann7 Tte> Currenoioa of China, 1926, Shanghai, p. 673*
2J. H. 8* Lockhart, The Stewart Lockhart Collection of Chinese
Copper Coins, Shanghai, 19115, p. iv*
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The introduction of inscribed knife money dates back to 680 B. 0.
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th©

round mousy, although it did not gain a© ©xtonjslv® a circulation as th©
others (pu, knife, and spade money), flourished during the feudal era
in China under the Chow dynasty, ’’most probably because it m s in appear*”
u s e more fiduciary than th© latter, whose shapes were those of imple
ments of daily use*

Various attempts to promote use of th© round money

proved unsuccessful.**4

The detail regarding the ”Purt will be found in

"Catalogue of Chinese Coins*”

The second step in the development of

China's currency was mad© by the first Smporor ©f the Tsin dynasty

sag, second king of th© Tohow dynasty, by th© advice of Tai
Kung of Ts*i, established in 1032 9* G» (it is Bamboo Armais; accord
ing to common scheme it is 1103 B« C*) certain rules for currency, and
enacted that metallic pieces should henceforth be exchangeable accord
ing to their weight**#*Tbe rules were put in force in th© seventh cen
tury (B* C* 686-646) by th© Duke Hu an of Ts’i (Shantung), then Leader
Prince of the Chinese States, acting under th© advice of th© celebrated
Kwan-tse, his Prim© Minister* These rules led gradually to the habit
of easting regular shapes and siees of constant weights* It is supposed
that the spade-money was issued by the State of Ts’i*
It is supposed with great probability that the Weight Mosey was
the regular outcome of the laws enacted by the Leader Prince of the
Chinese States, circa B* C. 680* The Weight Mosey was found under the
ground of these towns all of which had been included within the old
states of Wei and Tchao which arose in 403 B* C*, on th© ruins of the
former state of Tsen*
The Pu Money was in circulation, for a long period, v Lk *, from the
sixth to th© third centuiy 3* C*, inclusive..» .The shapes of th© Pu
Money are distinguished by th© squareness, roundness, or sharpness of
the lower double parts, or th© roundness of th© upper sides* These
characteristic a form a convenient means of classification*
The intro duot ion of the Knif© Money in th® state of Ts’i coterminous
with Shantung peninsula, is attributed, in a rather legendary way, to th®
following circumstances, circa 680 B* C* On the eve of an expedition,
idie soldiers of the Duke Tfwan, of Ts’i, proved dissatisfied with the
stringent regulations on weights and money which had previously been
enacted by the Prime Minister Kwan-tse* Thsir General, afraid of their
being disloyal, granted to them the authorisation of making us® of their
metal knives for barter* The people were delighted with the innovation,
which was giving them a more convenient medium of exchange, and adopted
it eagerly* (Terrien be Lacouperie, Catalogue of Chines© Coins, London,
1892, pp. 4, 18, 31, 213*)
*Ibid*, p. 319*
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which succeeded 13a© Chow dynasty in the control of China*

1© prohibited

tbs us© of oowries* tortoise-shells, pearls, gems and tin for currency
purposes*

A new and more convenient; bronze coinage* Inscribed "Ban-

liang” (meaning half a tael^ in weight) in round pieces with a square
hole* was introduced instead*

Th© issues of th© "half-tael* or "Baa

lisms* coins must have been very large since they were by no means un
common in th© market a few years ago*

Under th® Western Hen dynasty—

206 B* C* to A* D* 24 (the early part of th® Han dynasty) th© "Ban
Xiang currency in circulation had* through excessive debasement* been
deteriorated to such on extent* that it was decided by the authorities
to withdraw all the metallic cur rone y from e iroulation* in order to
replace it by a uniform coin*

In 113 B. C* the famous Wu-tschu cash

(5/24 of a tael) was created*

They remained in circulation* side by

side with all other Issues* for upwards of 700 years*

The Wu-tsohu

oash cams to an end at the beginning of th® Tang dynasty (A* D» 618)*
Another change was made by the Tang dynasty (A* D. 018-607) which began
the issue of the coins inscribed in square modern character a#

Further

more, the coins issued by th© Tang dynasty were inscribed with th® title
of the ruling Emperor*

The type persisted through th© Sung dynasty

(A* B* 960-1126}* varied by occasional Issues of coins of larger si as,
but generally were of standard size*

These issues also were made in

sufficient quantities for th® needs of the people*

Th© Southern Sung

dynasty (A. X>« 1127-1280) and th© Golden Tartars (A# D* 1116-1234} which
then controlled Korthem China Issued fiew coins; and the Tuan dynasty*

®Th© *taelff of th© Han dynasty is about th© sixth of th® tael in
the close period of the Tsing dynasty. (Terrien Do Laoouperie, Cata
logue of Chinese Coins* London* 1892, pp. xlii-xliii)
'
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"th© Mongols (A* D. 1260-1366), issued still smaller quantiti©s of th©
copper coins, because they mainly issued fiduciary paper money.

After

the Yuan dynasty, the Ming dynasty then came Into power (A* D. 13681642) and under the early rulers were one® compelled to continue th®
paper issues and put out-some is sties of copper token coinage.

But

■later the finances were restored to a normal condition and th® cur
rency established on a sound basis.

For two and a half centuries th©

Ming Government kept the people fully supplied with circulating media
of standard sis© and weight.
When the Manchus came to the throne, they continued to adopt the
financial and monetary systems of th© Mngs.

The earliest issues of

coinage by the first Mamohu Emperor, Shen-ohih (A. D» 1644-1661), bore
inscriptions only in Chinos®, the first issues having on the rovers®
only the mint name, the second having in addition th® value on©
thousandth of a tael of si Ivor.

Toward th© end of his reign th® coin®

bore th© saint name in Chines© and Manchu*

His successor Kang-hi (A. D.

1662-1722) continued the bi-lingual inscriptions through the whole of
his reign, but toward th© end of the reign the two mints at Peking,
those of the Board of Revenue (fiu-pu) and th© Board of Works (Kung-pu),
issued coins bearing on th© reverse the mint name and the word, ^cur
rency" in Manchu only.

Th© coins of Yung-ohmg (A. H. 1723-1736) are

inscribed on th© obverse in Chines® awd on the rovers© in Manohu only,
and this practice continued to the end of th® dynasty.

**it is in this

reign that the coinage of China may be considered to have reached it®
highest point, in size and weight, in quality of metal and in elegance
of inscriptions previous dynasties and previous reigns had ©quailed it

It
in some one or more of these qualities, but not in the combination of
all*

The Sh«i~chih coins wor® generally 0*95 to 1*05 inches and those

of Kang-hi 1*00 to 1*10 inches in diameter, mad© of a rich light-brown
bronse*"^

Later under the reigns of Ohien-lung (1735-1795), Ghia-

ching (1795-1820), end T&o-Kuang (1820-1860), the cash coins issued
were inferior to the issue of the previous reigns, both in si 2 0 and
In weigit*

Bub the currency system was still of normal shape*

From

1851, when the Taiping rebellion broles out, the money situation gradu
ally got out of control*

Later (1898) the series of conflicts within

the country and with foreign countries made the confusion much more
serious•

B* Silver
1* History of China *s Silva r--In the Book of History it is stated
that during the Hsia dynasty (B* C« 2205-18X8) silver overflowed from
the hills*

Silver with gold and copper wore used as money as early a®

the dynasties of Hsia and Bhang,

S

It is safe to say that silver was

known to exist in China as a medium of payment nearly four thousand
years ago*

But silver became the main instrument of exchange and

standard of value in China only during the past century*

Owing to th©

small quantities of silver produced within the borders of old China,
its uses were rathe r limited during th© early years*

For instance, in

the Tang dynasty Chines© native silver was found in several locali
ties*

But during the three centuries of the Tang dynasty, the produce

®H* B • Morse, “Currency in China* '* Journal of the orth-China
Branch of the Boyal Asiatic Society, ShaugKaT7~Vol» 38, XsUS’, pi 7*
^Eduard torn. The Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p. 352.
®Wen Pin Wei, Th© Currency Problem in China, 1914, p* 2*
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of Chinsse silver m a s s was not more than the fifteenth part of th®
amount of silver now reoeivad from foreign ©amitries by China in on©
year*

9
Furthermore the working; of silver mines in China was always sub

ject to permission from the Emperor*
often withdrawn again*

Such permission was granted* but

For ins tan®©, in X44D9 1520* and X584 a general

prohibition of silver mining was declared for the country; in 1463*
1473* 1511 and 1568 partial interdiets were declared in certain
provisoes*

In 1430 the mines in Yunnan proviso© were reopened*

1556 the government encouraged silver mining*

In

In fact th© silver

deposits in China were not capable of contributing any appreciable
proportion of the country1® silver requirements* and the hopelessly
small quantities of silver produced were obtained mostly as a by
product from the refinery of lead or sine*
Silver coins occurred in early years in China at many different
times*

But for several reasons they were never widely distributed

and continued for a considerable period*

For instance*

In ths fourth year of the period Yuen-show (119 B* 0*) in
Han dynasty & currency of whits metal and deer-skin was mad©*.**
The whlte-metaL currency consisted of three types of pieces of a
different sis® and form, made of tin and silver melted together,
and of a nominal value, far beyond the intrinsic *
The end of this medal-like currency was sad* They were coun
terfeited on a great scale by th© people* Their value diminished
rapidly, th® Emperor ceased to issue them, and before th© end of
a year after they had boen first omitted, they were no more ac
cepted in circulation.

^J* Edkixis, Chinese Currency, Shanghai, 1901, p* 52.
•^Terries D© Lacouperi©, Catalogue of Chines© Coins, London, 1892,
pp. 556-359*
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At the end of the West Han dynasty, Wang Mang in A. B* 10 brought
about radical changes in thecurrency*
the standard currency of the

He suppressed 'th© Wu-tohu oash,

Han dynasty,and replaced it by new

monies in gold, silver, tortoise-shells, cowries and copper.

The

silver currency was made in unit® of a liu, having a weight of eight
liangs, and their value varied according to the purity of the motsd * ^
The silver coins went out of
after A* S>* 26*

favor at th©end of Wang Maag *s reign,

From then until about A. D. 1183, during the reign of

Hiao-tsung, the second Emperor of the Southern Sung dynasty, China
misted silver coins again*

There were five kinds weighing 1, 2, 8, B,

and 10 taels respectively, each tael passing for 2,000 cash*

They

could be used as official and commercial currency, and served equally
as metallic reserve for the paper notes*

12

After three year® * trial

the coinage of silver in China was abandoned, and it remained dormant
for about eight centuries*
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Th© abandonment of the coins mentioned

above was due to clipping and counter fitting by some people, and to
the manufacture of inferior imitation coins by others.

In A. B. 1200

an edict declared that the co ins referred to would cease to b© legal
14
tender*
nA silver coin, an exact model of the cash of th® reign,
was issued during the reign of the Ming Emperor ftanil (A* D. 15Y3~
1619), but this was probably a mint sport, much like th© English
silver pennies issued to-day*

„16

^ I b i d ., p. 381.
B. Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, London,
1913, pp. 143-44*
Kama, The Currencies of China, 1926, Shanghai, p. 176.
^ I b i d ., p. 237.
16H# 0 # Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, London,
1913, p. 144.
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Besides these meationed above* there were several local silver
coins round in China within the past two centuries.

In Tibet (on© of

the Chinese provinces)* silver coins were minted in 1793# by order of
the Chinese Government representation.

These coins were directed to

be east of pure syoee silver in two denominations;
i.e.# l/lQ and 5/100 of one tael.

1 chien and 6 fen#

In Hsin-kiang (Chines© Turksstan)

tael coins of silver were minted In Urumchi in denominations of one
tael* five* four# three* two and one m e © coins.

As early as 1335 in

Fukien province there was an attempt to produce a silver coin for cir
culation in that provisos.

It was said to have weighed 617 grains.

One side showed the image of the God of Longevity and an Inscription
denoting that it was a cake of pure silver weighing seven mace and two

candareenc (that is# 0.72 kuping tael) and that It had been oast during
the reign of Tao-kwang (1820-1850).

At the same time another silver

coin was issued for the purpose of paying the troops stationed in
Fukien and Formosa.

The coin bore the inscription *pur® silver for

current use from tbs Changohcw Commissariat; seven mao©* two oandareens •*

At that time China had no dollar piece of her own* all such

coins circulating in the ports being of foreign origin.

16

These local

issues had no important Influence on Chizia*s monetary system.

It was

not until 1887 that the first attempt to establish a mint with proper
organisation end machinery was made at Canton.

This will be considered

in detail later.
As to the inflow of silver Into China* It may be said general ly
vg

—

£. Kami# The Currency of China# Shanghai# 1926* p. 238; and
S. R. Wagel* Chinese CurrenoyHm d Banks* Shanghai, 1915* p. 64.
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that before the opening of maritime trade with European©,, silver came
from India, Burma and so forth, after maritime trad© from Europe and
America*

As early as ”000 A* D* gold and silver were in circulation

about Canton*

Tribute and commerce from Cochin China and Cambodian

cities brought silver to China, as it was produced abundantly in
17
Burma and was a familiar circulating medium in India*”

After a con

siderable amount of silver flowed in, through the channels of commerce
and from contributions from local to the central government * it gradu
ally spread over the country*

In 1035 silver was recognised as legal

tender for the payment of taxes in a decree under the Sung dynasty
which provided that "Fukien, Kwang-tung and Kwangsl provinces might
send silver, and Chekiang could contribute silk, while most portions
of the empire could pay in copper cash*"^
Silver in China became a general medium of exchange after
1225 A* D., when it became sufficiently plentiful in North China to
displace the paper money of the Golden Tartars*

Probably ”four-

19
fifths" of the silver "came from Western Asia*”

The opening of

maritime trade with Europeans, first with the Portuguese in 1517,
then the Spaniards in 1575, and later on with other countries, brought
in large quantities of foreign silver, mostly Spanish pieces of eight,
generally spoken of as "pesos" or "Carolus dollars*”

"This Spanish

coin, made from silver taken from the mines of Mexico and Peru and
generally minted at Mexico city or Potose, was the coin that the

^Toloatt Williams, "Silver in China," Armais of the American
Academy, May 1897, p* 45.
% M d * , p. 46*
19Ibid*, p. 48*
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Yank®* sailing ships carried to the Far East in th© trad® that laid
9fV

the basis of many a Eew England fortune «75
After Mexico won its independence, the Carolus dollar was no
longer coined; "but it remained the only coin widely us®d in whole
sale business in China until the 1850*s» when it was replaced by the
new dollar of the Republic of Mexico9 known as *eagl® dollar* from the
21
figure of an eagle holding a snake in its mouth* u

It had enjoyed

prestige among many other foreign dollars circulating in China, since
the passing of the Carolus dollar*

A detailed discussion regarding

the foreign coins in China will be found in the following pages*
low the questions should be considered?
China?

T0iy does silver flow into

How much silver has already flowed into China?

the first question, three main causes oan be noted?

In answer to

(1) In the early

years of foreign trade, even as late as 1880, China’s exports of tea
and silk were always more than the imports of foreign goods*
balance was, in most cases, paid in silver*

The

In the latter half of the

nineteenth century the balance of trad® was uniformly unfavorable to
China*

Owing to political and. other causes, China started to borrow

heavily from foreign countries; therefor® export of silver became un
necessary in spite of the le.rg© increase of imports over exports*
(2) The sums spent on the construction of railways, ©to*, were obtained
by borrowing from foreigners, and the sums invested by foreigners in
business have settled the unfavorable balance to no less extent*

W* Fetter, "China and the Flow of Silver,T? Geographical
Review, Vol. 26, Jan*, 1926, p* 34*
^Ibid*, p. 34*
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(3) Another point is that a stuc^y of th© statistics of trad© retums
will show that the larger portion of the exports of treasure from
China goes in gold* ©speoi&lly leaf gold*2S
In answer to the second qu© sti on, there is no available informa
tion, even in the form of estimates* beo&use before th® development of
maritime trad© no official record had been left regarding silver
which flowed across the borders*

After th® beginning of maritime

trade* even "down to the second half of th® nineteenth, century* the
actual amount of silver imported can only be estimated*

’’With the

establishment of the Imperial Maritime Customs* imports and exports
of silver were regularly checked and tabulated*

But a certain amount

of treasure has always escaped Customs notice* so that the actual
23
movement has been greater than that recorded*"

Some incomplete

figures are cited here in order to throw li^ht on th© importation of
silver into China.

Mr* 15* B« Morse estimated that the total importa

tion of silver into China from 1700 to 1830 was not less than |600*000*000*

With the expansion of th© opium trad® th® favorable balance

disappeared because of the large quantity-of opium imported*

In 1837*

shortly before the opium war, opium constituted 5? per cent of th©
total value of th© imports at Canton*

While there are no aoourat®

figures available immediately after th® opium war, Sir Robert Ciffen
held that there was an excess of imports over exports of' silver in
China*

This excess was of ii6*300*000 in 1877* the largest balance of

th© twenty-sovan years h© studied®^

Mr* C* &» Remer estimated and put

*Z3. R. Wagel, Chinese Currency and Banking* Shanghai* 1915* pp.
45-46._
^°Tang* Leang-le, China9e Row Currency System* Shanghai, 1936, p. 97*
2 % e n Pin $io, ”The Currency Problem in China*’1 1914* p. 35*
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180,000,000 Haikwan taels as the total amount of silver imported into
China from 1871 to 1898*^®
2* Foreign Coins in China— ‘Tbs replacement of th® irregular pieces
of silver of different purity and the heavier copper coins by the
machine-made silver coins of regular appearance and uniform touch is
■fee natural tendency in the history of social development of nations*
Since China did not have her own silver coins before 1890, she had a
great deal of trouble in using oopper coins and piece® of silver^ with
the development of domestic and foreign trade the inflow and prevalence
of foreign silver coins and the coining of her own silver were logical
results*

It is said that the Portuguese and th® Spaniards brought dol

lars into China as early as -the seventeenth century*

But according to

one record, it was the Carolus (Spanish) dollar, also called the "Pillar"
dollar, that first came to China*

For many years this was the only

foreign coin accepted by th® Chinese in th© eighteenth eentury— even
up to the early decades of th© nineteenth oentuiy*

the introduction

of the foreign dollar was also mad© easier by th© fact that Canton was
the central seaport open to th© foreign trad® for nearly a century after
1757*

During the succeeding decades these coins cosmianded a premium of

30 or even 40 per cent* over their bullion value, until the Mexican
dollar flowed in and took their place a© the coin widely used In whole
sale business in China about 1854*

The Mexican dollar, known as th®

"eagle dollar,'1 began to be coined in 1824, and in a few decades was
the most widely used coin in th© world#

It reached China in 1854, when

£• Remer, The Foreign Trad© of China, 1928, pp* 222-23*
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the shortage of Carolus dollars (the minting of which had ceased in
Mexico about thirty years previously) in China was being keenly felt*
og
The Mexioan dollars spread rapidly in the country.
Many other foreign
dollars have circulated in China, but non© since th© passing of the
Carolus dollar has ever enjoy©d th® prestige or the popularity of the
Mexican dollar.

Among th® other foreign dollars the United States of

America in 1873 authorized a "trade dollar" for us® in the Far East,
especially in China*
action*

The French, British, and Japanese took similar

The American trad© dollar containing a weight of 378 grains

of pure silver as compared with 3??4 grains of pur® silver contained
in the Mexican dollar, gained wide cirdulation in the principal Chinese
trade ports.

27

It soon became a serious rival to the Mexican dollar.

Later on the serious decline in the price of silver (©specially in
1877) reached such a point that the silver in a trad© dollar was vjorth
not only less than a gold dollar, but also less than th© depreciated
paper dollars of th© United States.

As a consequence, large numbers

of th© trade dollars moved back to America.

28

Besides th© decline of

the price of silver, another cause leading to the disappearance of th©
American trad© dollar is that the superior weight of th© Amerioan trad©
dollar, as compared with th© Mexican, induced th© people of the Orient
to melt it.

29

It was said that the total amount presented for redemption

26«3y. X911 the number of Mexican dollars circulating In China had
reached some 500 millions, and th© liang of silver, as a unit, was begin
ning to disappear." (Tang, Leong-1®, China’s Hew Currency System, Shang
hai, 1936, p. 23)
~
~
~
~
^"Nearly 30,000,000 pieces had gone to China." (Hall Carothors,
Fractional Money, Hew York, 1930, p. 280.
^ A . V s a t t And res, "The End of the Mexican Dollar," Quarterly
Journal of Economics. May 1904, pp. 329-331.
E. Kann, The Currency of Hhirn, 1928, p. 300.
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Aggregated. 7,689*036 dollars, and th© balance of the entire amount
produced in the United States, vi a
turned to the homeland.

128,276,888, has never been re-

SO

The French authorities, after Jndo-China became a French colony
in 1362, decided to strike their own silver dollars with a view to dis
placing th© Mexican and the American trade dollars.

From 1886 to 1898

on© kind of the Saigon dollar containing 378 grains of pure silver was
issued to a sum of more than 13,000,000 Saigon piastres.

Owing to

their superiority over the Mexican dollars, they were cither hoarded
or melted down*

In 1895 smother Saigon piastre containing 375 grains

of pur© silver was struck.

Between A. B* 1895 and 1903 over 55 million

dollars of the new series were struck*

The Yunnan province of China

has adopted it as part of its medium of circulation*
Th© Japanese Government *s Mint at Osaka, by a law of May 10, 1871,
started to coin the "Yen4* which were 374 Z/b grains of pure silver*
Owing to th© inferior weight of the yen, th© Mexioan dollar still con
tinued to circulate freely throughout Japan*

In consequence the

Japanese Government raised th© weight of th© silver yen from 374 2/6
to 378 grains in order to make it harmonize with, th© American trade
dollar*

But in 1878, Japan discontinued th© heavier trade yen and

reverted to the production of the lighter coin.
be legal tender throughout Japan*

This latter was to

Between 1871 and 1897 more than 166

million silver yen were produced, of which over 110 millions had been
shipped abroad.

Gradually it had succeeded in ousting the Mexican

dollar from Japan and in becoming its serious competitor in th© prin
cipal ports of China, Korea, French Indo-China and Siam.
^°Ibid.,~p. 301*

As to the British trads dollar * in 'A. I>* 1866 it was coined la
Hongkoqg*

Its contents of pur© silver were three grains less than the

standard of th© Mexican dollar*

For this reason it circulated in China

only at a discount•

In 1868 Hongkong authorities sold th© entire

machinery to Japan*

Altogether only 2,000,000 British dollars were

struck at Hongkong*

In 1896 th© British Government authorised th©

Mints of Bomb8^* and Calcutta to mint British dollars*

Mint

Th© new coin

gained wide circulation In the Straits Settlements, Hongkong, ©to.
It oireulatsd in certain ports of South China and Uorth Cina*

But it

was sewer current in Shanghai*
Other foreign coins, such as the Spanish Philippine dollar of
1897, Austrian Maria Theresia Thaler of 1781, Bolivian, Chilean and
Peruvian dollars, ©to*, have at times been found in circulation in
China*

But they had played minor parts in that theater*

C. Paper Money
The employment of paper or th© skin of animals as one kind of
implementing medium In China goes back for many years*

According to

the historical record, in the reign of Wu-ti (119 B. C®) of th© Han
dynasty, th© printed squares of deer skin worth 400,000 cash ©piece
were issued*

For the deer-skin pieces feudal princes and noblemen

had to pay 400,000 copper cash, as they were compelled to wear them
as badges of honor, without which entrance to Court and audience by the
gmperor could not be obtained*

31

Thus they were just a sort of token

or badge made in view of a narrower circulation*

3 1 D* Laoouperi©, Catalogue of Chinese Coins, London, 1892, p*
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The earliest period in which paper money is known to have been
issued is about 806 A* D*

The causes that led to th© adoption of the

paper money seres
(l) In the latter part of the 8th. century and also in the
beginning of the 9th. oentujy coinage m s irregular. Th© supply
of cash was insufficient due to want of mstal to coin with as
also the very slow process of minting* (II) Th© iron coins in
Szechuan were very inconvenient on account of th© weight. People
soon found that some method must b© adopted. The authorities
wer© approached and an understanding was arrived at that the
government office would give a certificate of deposit in ex
change for coins, and that such certificate should have the same
value as mosey**..An ancient Chinese historian said that "Because
the merchants could travel or carry on trade relations is distant
places with light equipment, this new currency cam© to be called
the flying money*32
The Emperor Hien-tsung (A* P. 806*821) on account of th© scarcity
of cash, in about A* B* 821 issued an edict prohibiting th© manufacture
of copper utensilsj and, to provide for th© monetary stringency, opened
offices at the Capital at which merchants could deposit their coin*
receiving in exchange government notes called ^bonds'* or "flying
money*j th© offices represented the different provinces, and th© notes
were redeemable at the proper provincial Capital*33
The next occasion on which paper began to have currency value was
in 960 A* B.

In the Sung dynasty which adopted the system of "flying

money* these notes, which wer© Issued by th® provincial offices in the
Capital and redeemed in the proper provinces, beoams generally current
and very popular, and the Government of the Sung dynasty began to make
issues expressly for general circulation*

Th© Government made every

**S. R. Wage 1P Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 1915, p* 63.
^ E * 8* Morse, "Currency in China," Journal of the Morth-Chlna
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. $8, 19067 p. 18} J. Edwins,
Chine se~urreno y , 1961, p<T~251 aid S. E* Wagal, Chinese Currency and
Banking, 191S, p . 63*
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effort to secure these notes against depreciation.

According to

Mr* M& Tuan-lin, the amount in actual circulation at any period
during the early years of the Sung dynasty never exceeded 2,830,000
Kuan (the Kuan being nominally worth 1,000 cash)*

These notes were

called in Chinese nPi©n-ohienn (as the term denotes ’’convenient
money") * ^
The later period of the Sung dynasty (from th© reign of the Kao*
tsung in 1130 A* B* till the conquest of the whole country by the
Mongols) saw China divided into two partes

the Sung Court holding th©

Southern part and the Chin Tartars ruling over th© North*

They were

constantly at war with each other and both of them had to issue in
controvertible paper money for the purpose of revenue*
The Kuan-tse or Frontier Bills were is sued by the Southern Sung
dynasty to pay the troops stationed on the frontier*

These bills had

to be forced into circulation and consequently were heavily discounted.
Besides the Frontier Bills the Government also issued tea notes,
grain notes, and silk notes, exchangeable for tea, grain, and silk*
In 1159 the Government invented th© Hui-tz© in order to replace
all other notes in ciroul©tion*

Th© Hul-ts® of several denominations

were again practically forced on the people*
In about 1263 A* P. th© Hui-tse was everywhere utterly discredited?
so th© Government revived the Kuan-t z© which were of two denominations-silver

copper*

About sixteen years after th© revival of th© Kusm-

t*©, the Southern Sung dynasty cam© to an end*

R. Wagel, Chinas© Currency said Banking, p. St.
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The Chin Tartars ruled Barthern China and issued several kind® of
cash notes of both the large and the small denominations for use in
both 11large paymente" and ”small, payments,*

But the currency of th©

Chin Tartars was better controlled and centralised than that of their
neighbors.
After the Mongols completely conquered all of China in 1279 and
set up the Tuan dynasty (1279-1567) they repudiated both the "Chao*
of the Chins and all th© paper currency of th© Southern Sungs.

But

the Tuans continued their own issue and In 1287 the new series of
35
Government notes called the Pao-Chao of Chin-Yuan
were issued.
These notes were of eleven denominations from 5 to 2*000 cash.

In

1309 the Chin-ta-ohao was issued with denominations from 2 cash to
2 taels of silver.

During the reign of Jen-tsung (1312-1321) there

interesting account of the paper currency of the Tuan dynasty
by Marco Polo Is quoted as follows!
•.The thin rind between the bark and the interior wood is taken*
and from It cards are formed like those of paper, all bl&ok. He then
causes them to be cut into pieces, and each is declared worth respec
tively half a liver, a silver grosso Venice, and so on to th© value of
10 Bezants. All these cards are stamped with his seal, and many are
fabricated that they buy all the treasures in th© world. He makes all
his payments in them, and circulates them through the kingdoms and
provinces over which he holds dominion* and none dares to refuse them
under pain of death. All the nations under his st|ay (such as Persia,
Russia, and almost all provinces of China) receiv© and pay this money
for their merchandise, gold, silver, and precious stones, and whatever
they tram port, buy or sell* The merchants often bring to him goods
worth 400,000 Bepants, and he pays them, all In thsse cards, which they
willingly accept, because they can raak© purchases with them throughout
the whole Empire..•.When any of the cards are torn or spoiled, the
owner Garries them to the place whence they wor© issued and receives
fresh ones, with a reduction of 3 per eent....If a man wishes gold or
silver to make plate, girdles, or other ornaments, he goes to th©
office, carrying a sufficient number of cards, and gives thorn in pay
ment for the quantity which he requires. This Is the reason why the
Khan (Emperor of th® Yuan dynasty) has more treasure than any other
lord in the World....* (Wen Pin Wei, The Currency Problem in China,
1914, Columbia University., p. 26)
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was an over issue of notes*

Not including th® issues of Kiao-cha©

(1260)* & total issue of irredeemable paper money in sixty-four of
the first seventy years of Mongol rule amounting to 47,611,276 ting
or 2,580,565,800 taels nominal f&oe value was made, the tael being
always taken as equivalent to 1,000 cash*
When the Ming, dynasty was establishing its power in the country,
it followed th© example of its predecessors and repudiated all the paper
currency that was issued during the reigns of the Mongols*

Later on

the first Ming Emperor found himself confronted by great financial dif
ficulties and was compelled t© resort to the paper currency system of
his predecessors*

Notes were issued by th© Government, while at the

same time steps were taken to place the country's finances on a sound
basis*

ffilh the help of an inflow of more silver through the channel

of foreign trade, the credit of the Government was reinstated*
among the people there was no confidence in paper money*

But

In the fol

lowing reigns of the Ming dynasty efforts were often made to reestab
lish paper currency} but practically everyone of them failed*
In the early period of the Tsing dynasty the paper is buss had been
tried*

At last they were condemned*

It was not until the financial

straits grew acute on account of the Taiplng Rebellion (1880-1864) and
the general unsatisfactory economic situation that an attempt was made
to resuscitate the issue of paper money.

It was during the troubled

times of Mem-fing (1851—1861) when the issue of tokon coins, iron
coins, and the issue of paper money— nominally redeemable but in prac
tice never redeemed— was made*

Notes issued in this time to the value

of 1, 3, 6, 10, arri 50 taels In silver, and also paper worth 500, 1000,

n
1500 and 2000 in e&sh, war© forced into circulation about 1356*

After

fir# years the notes depreciated very heavily and circulated at only
three or four per oent* of th© face value * Th® Government was unable
to redeem them, and as a matter of fact practically repudiated these
notes*

6« Gold In China
Chinese people, like people of other countries, understood and
appreciated the superior feat\res of gold*

The endeavors of people to

extract the precious metal from Chinese soil continued for many thousand
years, but all attempts to find appreciable quantities resolved themsolvoa into merely false ambitions*

Recently the adoption of scien

tific mining, methods was not capable of altering the disappointing
results*

Therefore from one source the following conclusions as to

the production of gold were reached*
It is not at all unlikely that the early settlers in China had
better returns from the same occupations (of washing gold) because
the gold had accumulated in the river sands through countless ages
before their arrival* The gold-washers of to-day, with probably
very few local exceptions, earn less than the lowest wages which
they ean get for ordinary labour, and take to that occupation in
those seasons only when there is the least demand for field work*
We can therefore safely conclude that (with those few exceptions)
the greater the yield in gold, the greater will be the poverty of
any one province*
Gold was never declared legal tender in China*

Bit gold, umalnted,

was recognized in China as early as 1816 B* C« as a measure of values
and subsequently as a suitable medium for circulation,^

Its use as

such did not influ©nee copper cash from remaining th© principal eur~
*6S. K*nn, Th* Currsnoien of China, Shanghai. 1926. t'« 118.
57V. aopra, p.
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rency; but gold was occasionally employed in setticausixfc of largo pay
ments*
While gold coins war© nover actually issued for circulation through
out the entire dominion of China, sine© 1850 th© following gold coins
have been struck for circulation in a certain area and for certain
periodst
1* the tael gold coins of the Taiping Rebellion, xrainsorlbedj
2* the Turkestan gold tilla is sued by the Mohammedan Rebellion
and which bore the Mohammedan year 1292 on both sides, which means A* D.
1874*
In China gold Is a favored form of investment because besides its
favorable features, such as not deteriorating in substance, never losing
its value through change of fashion, being easily hidden in case of
danger, and offering the possibility of a chance to sell at a profit
(in China gold is an article of trade toe and subject to wide fluctua
tions in price), gold is a very preferable ornament;, ©specially from
the viewpoint of Chinese ladies*
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The principal forms in which gold money usually is found in China
are*
1* Chinese minor gold coins (such as Turkestan gold tilla)}
2* Foreign gold coins;
5* Jewelry;
^"Chinese jewellry made from gold is as nearly as possible 1,000
fine and very soft* Like gold bars and gold leaves, gold ornaments
(rings, bangles, bracelets, ©to*) bear th© inscription '•bsu-tsu* meaning
pure gold, and have the name of the gold smith's shop embossed*•••They
are acquired with the knowledge of their Intrinsic value and because they
are easily hoarded in case of danger and quickly pawned or sold in the
hour of need* The usual gold ornaments in China are purchased and sold
by weight, the fineness being uniform end known* (£* Kenn, The 6urrenelea of China, Shanghai, 1926* p. 56)

m
4* Gold dust from the gold washers;
5* Gold leaves (at Canton gold leaves near 1,000 fine are Bad©*
Th© purpose for which gold in this shape is produeed is chiefly to
enable people with small Beans to acquire gold in moderate quanti
ties and to enable them to hide it conveniently or to carry it un39
noticed on the person)§
6* Gold bars (gold in the shape of bars plays a most important
role in China*

Gold bars have become of enormous importance to the

financial markets in China, notably to those of Shanghai*

They are

sold for actual deliveiy by Chines© holders to banks, ■who will buy,
. 40
whenever the parity permits it, for export abroad)*
The transactions in gold bar in China, ©specially in Shanghai
(vhere the Shanghai Gold Stock Exchange, Ltd* Is located) are taking
place with one of the following objects in views
1* Speculation (purely with the idea of either receiving or paying
differences on the date due);
2* As a hedge against the fluctuations of foreign currencies con
tracted for forward delivery;
3* As a hedge against goods to be imported or exported in gold
currency, for whieh exchange has not been fixed with a bonk;
4* To deliver the gold bars with the idea of having these shipped
abroad*
As to the value of the gold, in the Han dynasty gold was cheap,
due In large part to the fact that Buddhist image worship had not then
created a demand for this metal*

In th© Tang dynasty on© unit of gold

Kami, The Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p* 32*
^Ibid*, p. 40*

m
was worth 10 unit9 of silver or 1,000 units of copper.^

Bven to A* 0*

1375 gold was still mentioned as ten times the value of silver*

In the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the silver price of gold in China
followed the fluctuation of the silver price of gold In the world market*
During the last period of the eighteentiftsuad nineteenth centuries the
silver price of gold in China gradually went up*
times the prioe of silver*

The following table shows the tendency of

the appreciation of gold from 1892 to 1900s
1892
1893
1895
1897
1897
1898
1899
1900

June
Mar.
May
Aug*
Jan.
June
May

In 1892 gold was 25*3
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25*3 (i.e., gold was at 25*5 times the prioe
25.3
of silver)
27.4
35.5
36.5
39.5
37.8
36.7
36. 8

According to the quotations of the London market for forty years,
beginning with 1833, the average price of bar silver remained at about
60 pence per standard ounce*

From 1874 to 1893 the average price was

50 pence per standard ounce*

From 1893 the tendency of the gold price
A4
of silver in London is shown as follows 1 ~
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898

average
11
"
"
tt
K

35 9/4.6
28 15/16
29 13/16
30 13/16
27 9/16
26 15/16

Concerning China's foreign trad© in gold, gold exported from China
was much more than gold imported by her from foreign countries*

From

4iy> iafr<l> p# 48#

^ I n 1782 gold varied its price according to quality between 1§|
and 20 times that of th© same amount of silver*
(j. Edkins, Chinese
Currency. Shanghai, 1901, p. 83).
*&Xbid., p* 83.
^Annual Report of the Director of the Mint (U. S.), 1939, p. 86.

ai

1688 to 1899 alone tor not exports of gold roootod 76 millions of
Saikw&n taels of silwr*
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M* Bratter, Sllrer Market Dictionary9 p® 18®

C M F S m XI

THE BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION AROUND 1808

I* Th® Governmental Finance— Th© reign of the Tsing dynasty (16441911) oan be divided, on th© basis of the nature of the financial situa
tion, into two periods*

The period from 1644 to 1893 may be called

normal, because the revenues of governments were generally sufficient
to meet the expenditures in a systematic manner.

The period from 1894

until the end of the Tsing dynasty Is abnormal in the sense that the
government was forced to increase expenditures at the same time that
revenue from taxation remained constant*

The government deficit was

occasioned mostly by borrowing from foreign countries*
Among all classes of expenditures, the military stood In the first
rank*

Next cams the expenditures for civil administration*

Third, the

Emperor and his family were extravagant and thus were a great consumer
of public revenues*

The Board of Revenue made the permanent appropria

tions, according to the order of importance, for various functions*
addition there were extraordinary and unimportant outlays*

In

The finan

cial difficulty in China after 1893 arose from the huge expenditures
which increased to more than the permanent appropriations and also
from the annual payment of the interest and principal on foreign loans.
The public revenues provided to meet th © appropriations were con
etrolled partly by central and partly by local officials* First, th©
land tax, which was levied in every province, was divided into two parts*
One part of it was dedueted by the magistrate for the district expendi
tures and was called the reserve fundi the other part which was collected
32

u
by the magistrate and required to be sent to the Executive Department
in the provincial capital, was known as the transport fund*

Owing to

the fact that the land tax maintained the district (Hsian) magistracy,
supported the prefecture administration, nourished the circuit governor,
and fed the provincial authorities, only a fraction of th© land tax was
1

returned to the Central Government*

All other sources of revenues,

such as salt royalties, maritime customs duties end regular customs
duties, were national in character and were administered by special
officers under the supervision of th© governor.

These revenues, together

with the transport fund of the land tax, constituted the available re*
sources for meeting both national and provincial appropriations*

As soon

as the appropriations had been approved by the Emperor, those provinces
whose revenues exceeded thsir expenditures were required to transport
their surplus revenue8 to Peking or to provinces in less fortunate circuastanoes*

2

The land tax was paid both in money and in produce, mostly rice*
Th© officers and troops in th© different provinces received a part of
thsir pay out of the collected produce of their respective provinces,
while those in Peking were entitled to get their respective partial
payments in produce from th© Central Government which received the
produce from certain great producing provinces*

The quantity to be

supplied by any particular province was legally prescribed, and no
----- T--------

C* 8* Li, Central and Local 1*inaneo in China, Columbia University,
1922, p* 56*
^S* K. Chon, "The System of Taxation in China in the Tsing Dynasty,
1644-1911,** 1914, p. 35*
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deduction oar commutation of money was permitted*

{This system was eon*

tinusd until 1901 when the legal quantity of produce had been commuted
to money in order to save the extravagant cost of canal transportation*)
Owing to the existing conditions in China* such as the loose supervision
of the Central Government over the local collection of the land tax and
the system of appropriations of transfer funds* the revenue from th®
land tax was inelastic from the viewpoint of meeting the increasing expeudituree of the Central Government*

But In the financial history of

China* the land tax played an important role*

For instance* before the

creation of the maritime customs duties and the wli-k±nw duties in the
middle of the nineteenth century* the land tax formed two-thirds or
store of the whole revenue; while in the last few years before the SinoJ&p&nese War (1894), it supplied about three—eights of th© total amount
of the annual return*

3

Generally speaking, in China the production and distribution of
salt is an inherited occupation and is monopolistic*
is very productive*
revenue*

The tax on salt

It yields almost one-fourth of the annual tax

The "salt gabelle" is levied at eveiy stage from production to

consumption*

Only licensed merchants may deal in salt or handle it and

then only within limited and prescribed areas*

But ths possibility of

increasing the productivity of the tax for the government is very slight*
In the first place* the demand for salt is inelastic*

Second, in China

ths smuggling problem* due to the salt tax* ims very serious*

An in

crease in the rate* while keeping the production quota at the same
figure* would only Induce more smuggling*

"

*lbld*, p, 68*

On the other hand* it is
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impossible to increase the production quotas for the additional salt
could not he disposed of because of the comp© tit ion of th© smugglers*^
In China* the regular customs were a general excise tax on userchandise and go back to the early history of China*
as far baok as the Chow dynasty, B. C* 1122-220.)

(They originated
During th© Tsing

dynasty custom-houses were established on the seaboard* on rivers, inland
water-ways, land routes and land frontiers*

They are called the regular

customs in order to distinguish them from the maritime customs*

The com*

modities carried by steamers pay their duties to the Maritime Customs,
while commodities carried by sailing ships are taxed by th© Regular Cus
toms.

The regular customs were used to discourage the development of

internal industries and internal trade, because commodities carried by
the sailing ships were always native products and subject to the double
taxation of several successive regular customs*

Goods carried by steam

ers and paying duty to the Maritime Customs once and for all were mostly
import goods*
Another important tax* though a bad one, was the ”ii-kin.n

It

originated in 1850 when the Taiping Rebellion broke out, and from that
time one city after another in the Kiang-su Province, the most produc
tive of the provinces, fell into the hands of the rebels*

The govern

ment, therefore, could not levy the land tax in that province*

This

drove the authorities to devise a new form of taxation which is the
^H-kin*"

The "li-kin* contribution is a contribution of one-thousandth

of one tael of silver charged as a transit duty on th© value of goods*
During the period 1354 to 1874, it was adopted by th© eighteen provinces

4Ibid*, pp. 73-90*
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of China proper, end Feng-tien end Ki-rin in Manchuria.

It has remained

since the Taiping Rebellion as a local tax levied for the purposes of
loo&l improvements.
provinces.

The administration of the "li-kinu belongs to the

E&oh province establishes a chief collection bureau at its

capital, a number of branch bureaus at the principal cities, and a
number of stations*

Later on the rates of ^li-kin” (which lost Its

original meaning) differ from province to province and from time to
time*
Looking over the whole financial system, it is obvious that almost
all the revenue came from indirect taxes, and the whole system of taxa
tion was inelastic*

The administration of finances, especially on the

collection of taxes, was against the principles of efficiency and eco
nomy in the science of public finance*

Owing to the fact that the in

elastic revenue could not meet the expansive expenditures, China1s
governments were later on forced to seek foreign loans and to issue
token coins*
II* Public Debt— All public debts are, to a great extent, of modem
origin in China*

Before 1842, owing to the smallness of military ex

penditures, tie system of accumulating reserves, and the practical balance
of expenditures and revenue, ths Chinese Government did not try to resort
to public loans as a means of meeting her financial diffioulties*

Begin

ning in 1865 China started to employ foreign loans to a considerable
extent, and in 1894, because of the Sino-Japanese War, she attempted
for the first time to float a domestic loan*

This loan, known as "the

Merchants Loan11 of 1894, yielded only 11,020,000 taels (Ku-ping or
Treasury)*

The bad administration of the loan and the absenoe of a money

$7
market mere responsible for the failure of ths domestic loan*®

As a

result of the inelasticity of the tax system, th© urgent need of fund®
and the difficulty of making a domestic loan, the Chines© Government
resorted to foreign loans .

From 1864 to 189S more than twelve foreign

loans nere received by Chins.9a Government*

Several of them were used

for the purpose of miscellaneous expenditures and for building rail***
mays, while some of them wore military loans*

Most of these loans were

promoted and arrayed through French, Hussiaa, British, and German diplo
mats at Peking, then the Capital of China*

Almost all of these were

gold loans,® bearing an interest rate of from six to fifteen per cent*
and secured by customs revenue (since 1842 the administration of Chinese
customs revenue mas practically under the British control)*

As an im

portant condition of the railway loans, the foreign lenders also used to
demand the right of sending the chief accountant and the chief engineer
to participate in the administration of the railway*

7

III* Foreign Trade— The Portuguese and Spanish were the first among
the Suropean countries to establish trade relations with the Chinese
after the start of the sixteenth century*

8

Despite the growing competi-

®F. E. Huang, Public Debts in China (Studies in History, Economics
and Public Law, Vol. LXXXY, Ho* 17 pV !&)•
®The payment of interest and the repayment of th® principle of these
loans mas customarily expressed in tern of foreign currency which was at
that time based upon the gold standard*
detailed table containing the foreignloans to China before 1898
is shown in Hr* F* B. Huang's Public Debts in China(cited above),
Appendix, pp. @2-96*
®Varian Fry in his War in China says i "As early as the fourth cen
tury B. C. ths ancient Greeks were receiving raw silk from China, and
weaving It into luxurious and immensely expensive cloth..*.But when the
first European, sailors of modern, times showed up at the port of Canton,
in Southern China* in 1516*.•*w (p. 6).
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tioa between the nations, major activity did not appear in historical
records until the years of 1715, 1343, and 1370*

The Bast India Com-

pany of England started to establish a factory in Canton In Southern
China in 1715*

Since that time the merchants of other nations ©stab-

lished factories from time to time in the port of Canton*

®Until 1834

the two groups of traders at Canton, one a group of Westerners and the
other & group of Chinese, -were the sole msans not only of trade but of
communications in general between China and the countries of Europe and
America.**
pired*

In 1834 the charter of the British Bast India Company ex

The British Govornioent had refused to renew it and attempted

to put its relations with China upon a m w basis*
accomplished little.

But the attempts

The Opium War of 1843 opened a new ©ra in the

Chinese commercial and diplomatic record, between China and the Western
Powers*
The development of the diplomatic relations between China and the
Western Powers will be described in the following pages.

This section

is designed exclusively to treat of the foreign trade of China*
Prior to 1870 China*s foreign trage was simple and small in amount.
The foreign countries wanted Chinese silk, tea, and other go ods and paid
for them at first with silver and later with opium.

As to China *s

foreign trade of this period, "China wanted Western goods less than
the West wanted Chinese goods.

»1 Q

After 1871 it may be said that the

Chinese people began g e m rally to use & few Western products.

But the

general course of the foreign trade of China until 1884 was still about

®C. P. Remer, Ths Foreign Trade of China, p. 2*
10Ibid., p. 28.

11
t&e saw© from th® viewpoint of th© total trad© of th© country«

With

th© year 1885, an Increase in th© total of foreign tr&do began and this
increase oontinu©d until th® close of 1898,

It was 153*2 million Haikwan

taels in 1885 and 368-6 million Haikwan taels in 1898,

12

This inoreaa©

of foreign trade was steady with no unusual and notable changes*, and th®
increase in imports was at a more rapid rate than the inoreas© in ex
ports • During this period, the excess of merchandise imports formed an
unfavorable balance in China's international payments*
XT* Ths State of Affairs with the Western Powers and within Chinas

Am With the Western Powers
In 1834 th© charter of the British S&st India Company expired*

The

British Government had refused to renew it end attempted to put Its
relations with China upon a new basis*

In the ©am© year three nsuperin

tendents" of British trade arrived In China to pursue th© new British
policy.

In 1842, as a result of the Opium War, the Chinese Government

was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking with Britain.

From then on,

either as a result of the war or by th© operation of th® so-called
**most-favored nation" clause, a series of unequal treaties was made
between the Chinese Government and the Western Powers*

The important

ones are the following*
1844 Treaty of Wanghia with the United States of Americas
1844 Treaty of Whampoa with Frances
1845 Exchange of notes with Belgium granting her th® right to trad®
under the procedure established by the existing treaties;
1847 Treaty with Sweden and Norways
1858 Treaties of Tientsin with the United State®, Russia, Groat
Britain, and France;
1861 Treaty with Prussia for herself and the members of th® Gorman
Zollverelnj
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1362 Treaty with Portugal, ratifioation refused by the Chinese
Government ;
1368 Treaty with Denmark;
1363 Treaty with the Netherlands;
1864 Treaty with Spain
1363 Treaty with Belgium
1366 Treaty with Italy;
186? Treaty with Austria-Hungary 1
1871 Treaty with Japan
These treaties determined the broad outline® of the relations of
China with other nations*

Among the important things in these treaties,

the more significant ones ares
1* Extraterritoriality— Th© principle of extraterritoriality was
implied is the provisions of the Treaty of Nanking (1842) with Britain*
By the twenty—first article of the Treaty of W&nghia with the United
States in 1844, the principle was clearly stated that citizens of foreign
countries who commit any crime in China shall be subject to, tried and
punished only by the Consul or oiher public functionary of Hie foreign
country thereto authorised according to the laws of th© foreign country*
The extraterritorial jurisdiction that has been granted to the
treaty powers in their treaties with China and th® operation of the
so-called "most favored nation" clause i® exercised by ©very foreign
country*

It has delayed th© development of national sovereignty and

has had a bad result on th© unification of th© currency and banking
systems of China*
2* Treaty ports and others— In the "Treaty ports," the foreign
merchants have th© right to trade and residence*

In addition to this,

there are certain places that have been ceded outright to foreign
powers*

These places are Hongkong, Macau, and others.

Th#r© are

certain leased areas which are foreign territory for tho duration of

the lease, such as Kiaochow, Dai ran, &wang-chomnua ®nd Weihaiwoi«
There are Gonoaasioxis whiah ar© areas undar the control of a single
power#

There are international settlements such as that in Shanghai#

These had a very bad influence on the unification of th© currency
systems by hiding of counterfeit coinage in these areas*
3* The tarif f— Article Ten of the Treaty of leaking (1842) with
Great Britain provided that China was to establish a fair and regular
tariff of export and import customs and other duties, which tariff
13
"shall be publicly notified and promulgated for general information#1*
This tariff was proclaimed at Hongkong in 1843*

It was upon th© general

principle of a five per cent* ad valorem duty upon both imports and
exports» According to th® treaty China *& administrative powezs over
the customs duties were surrendered to the British*
The systoR of commuted transit dues (another of the by-products
of unequal treaties) gave to foreign merchants the right to send im
ported goods to any inland city in China upon th© payment of a single
charge end to bring Chinese produce which is to be exported from any
city in China to a port upon th© payment of a single oharge• As th©
result of the system, the foreign goods have been subjected to a smaller
amount of taxation than Chinese gpods transported from place to place
within th© country and subjected to several internal taxes of Chines©
local governments*
Here it is worth while to mention the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1896)
with Japan, in Article 6 of which it is provided*

*Japanese subjects

shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing Industries in all
the open cities, towns, and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to
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import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only th© stipulated
duties thereon***
The rights granted to the Japanese by th© operation of th© mostfavored-nation ©Ians®, contained in

th® treaties between China and

the other powers, become immediately available to the nationals of
those powers*

China.fs international situation during the years im

mediately after the close of th.® Japanese War (1895)

r® characterised

by such unrestrained foreign aggression that the partition of China and
14
the break-up of China ware freely predicted.”

B. Within China

During th® Tsing dynasty (1644-1911), when Chian Lung’s power
(1756-1796) was at its height, China was one of the sup rams countries
in the world in wealth, area, population and fighting strength*

Unfor-

tunately his successors failed to improve the internal affairs and
defense against the foreign aggressors*

From 1842 to 1898 a series of

rebellions and famines within the country and the defeat by foreign
aggressors resulted in the end of the dynasty.

The events occurring

within this period, particularly the ‘Pulping Rebellion (1350-1864)
had devastated a dozen province s.

Trie Taiping Rebellion only had

directly killed in battle by massacre and f'amina twenty millions of
human beings; it had reduced the country to extreme) poverty, and had
brought th© dynasty near extinction*

Th© great famine of 1877 to 1878

checked th© progress of restoration and reconstruction.

It is estimated

that no less than nine suad a. half million deaths were due to the famine
alone•
iW T p .

72.
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Is 1888 "the Yellow River broke Its banks and flooded nearly the
whole of Homan province.
lions*

The loss of life Is estimated at two mil

During the winter of 1892-1893 and th© year 1894, the -whole

of northern China suffered from drought and famine®
is estimated at one million.

The loss of life

Th® Mohammedan Hebei lion (1894-18955 in

•fee province of Kansu oost th® lives of about a quarter of a million.
By this time Turkestan had regained its Independence, Japan had taken
the Loochoo Islands, the French had made their position secure in IndoChina, the British had assumed a like position in Burma, and Russia was
fighting for Korea and the Hanohu*
During the period of the Taiping Rebellion the Emperor of China
was Hsian Feng (1850-1861).

He died immediately after th© time (1861)

when the troops of England and France took his capital and burned his
palace*

In fact, fro® that time on th© executive control of China’s

government passed into the hard s of fee Empress Dowager.

In th© period

fr&m 1889 to 1898 the young emperor, Ku&ag-hsu (1875-1908) took over
the actual government.
1895*

China was defeated In the Sino-Japaneee war In

During the years 1895-1898 a reform party led by a group of young

Chinese from Southern. China succeeded in bringing the young emperor,
Kuang-hsu, under their influence*
edicts in 1898.

Th© result m e a succession of reform

In the eame year the

press Dowager brought fee reform

movement to a close by making th® emperor a prisoner in th© palace*
After 1898 th© Empress Dowager actually assumed authority of fee govern
ment again until she died in 1908.
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V* Th® Monetary Situation!

A. Copper Money
The status of oopper money about 1898 in China was as follows3
1* Token coins in Peking (the Capital)*—About 1898 a kind of token
coin was circulating in Peking, then th© Capital*

The token coins cir

culated in Peking only and were constantly fluctuating in value*

This

bad situation was later one of th© main causes which led to the movement
of th© old oopper cash reform*
The origin of these token coins goes back to the Taiping Rebellion
(1851-1864)*

At that time, the Central Government faced serious diffi

culties, among which was a shortage of copper cash owing to greatly
reduced government revenues and to tbs imp os sib1 1 ity of obtaining suf
ficient supplies of copper, especially from Yunnan province which is
located in the far southwest of China*

The Treasury of th© Central

Government had to issue token coins for the first time in China *s his
tory*
100

,

They were cast in the following denomination's
200

, 500, and

1 ,0 0 0

5# $, 10, 30, 50,

cash*

Besides the shortage of th© supplies of new copper, the existing
cash became scarce for the following reasons

”Th® cash shops on account

of the higb price of copper ©specially at Tientsin have disposed of
large quantities (heavier cash) to surreptitious coiners, who have made
IS
them into small cash of inferior value*”

Th© surreptitious coiners

operating in the foreign concession of Tientsin have boon safely out
of the control of th© Chines® Government and secretly shipped th©

J* Edkins, Chineze Currency, Shanghai, 1901, p® 48.
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inferior cash into the interior*

Another cause responsible for th©

scareity of cash was ihe hoarding of th® copper cash*

When th© price

of oopper oash rises, and silver is falling, the temptation to hoard
copper cash is great*

The rich men used to receiv© their rents and

interests in cash, and pay out in silver, and th© poor attempted th©
reverse*
The idea of using token coins was strange to the Chinese people*
The several denominations of th© token coins soon disappeared from cir
culation*

Only the 10 cash coin survived and became the principal

medium of circulation in Peking till 1898 and after

nT@t the 10

cash piece was never accepted there at its inscribed value, but instead
at its intrinsic worth, which is subjected to constant fluctuation®*"

17

Zm lAdk of uniformity of oopper cash— Oopper cash coins were,
around the year 1898, circulating in different weights, finesses, and
designs•
The causes which led to the lack of uniformity are several*

From

ancient times until the close of th© nineteenth century China maintained
the crude practice of casting the coins in moulds*

It was easy to obtain

a copy of the mould and for a clever counterfeiter^® to go on making
exact copies of the government's coins*

The crude casting and the coun

terfeiting to a great extent were th® main causes of the lack of uni
formity in China's currency system during th© time*
Ths circulation of different forms of cash issued by different
ldjg# Kaon, Th© Currencies of China, 1926, Shanghai, p « 385*
*?Ibid*
H* Stewart Lockhart, The Stewart Lockhart Collection of
Chinese Copper Coins. Shanghai,"" m ^ T p T I C
—
—
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dyn&stie s and by different reigns within the same dynasty was another
cause of the lack of uniformity •

Du® both to physic al depreciation and

different weights used in different regions, there existed some differ
ence between cash of different regions in both quality and weight*

The

oopper ooin ims made to weigh one tenth of a tael by the Tang dynasty,
and made in value one thousandth (1 11} of & tael of silver*

During

the first reign of the Tsing dynasty the weight of oopper cash was l/lO
tael, afterwards raised to 126/1,000 tael*

Under Kang-shl (A* D* 1684)

of the Teing dynasty the weight was again reduced to l/lQ tael, to be
again raised in A* D* 1702 to 14/100 tael, and again reduced to 12/100
tael*

This continued to be the weight: through the reign of Yung-cheng

and Into the beginning of the reign of Chion-lung {A* D. 1736), when it
was again made l/lQ tael*

The cash, coins of the period of Chi&-ching -

(1795*1820 A* D.) were of light weight, but ordinarily were well minted*
In the following reign, Tao-kw&ng (A* D* 1820*1880), th® rough crude
Issues of the mints made their first appearance*

According to record,

coins oast In the mints in some provinces weigh S/lOO tael and some
still weigh

5 /l 0 0

tael*

In explaining this situation of degeneration

Mr* H* B* Morse says 1
During this long reign of sixty years degeneration made progress,
in appearance and in quality, and in th© size and weight of the
coins 3 the Government was still vigoroits, with no sign of dry rot,
and we may assume that it was the struggle between the mints and
the illegal me Iter down of too-full weight coins, end that, to keep
the currency from the melting crucible, the mints were driven to
reduce the intrinsic value more and more •

*^H* B# Morse, ’’Currency in China,” The Journal of N* C* B* of
B. A* 8 *, Vol* 38, 1906, p . 9.
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Another o&use leading to lack of uniformity was that th© cash
mints wore not under th© control and m&nageijsnt of on® uniform central
authority*

From 1644 a few mints were set up in Peking and some im

portant provinces*

Gradually (till 1862) the number of mints increased

to some thirty-eight, owing to the poor transportation and the high cost
of carrying the heavy cash, operated in twenty-two different provinces
and cities*

20

Still another cause was the practice of accepting counterfeit coins*
Almost always after the reign of Tao-kuang (1820-1850) counterfeit coins
were accepted without question and the Government hardly mad® any suc
cessful attempt to cheek this practice.

The result usually has been an

inflation of prices in proportion to the extent of the activity of coun
terfeiters.^
5* The fluctuating exchange~rat© between cash and silver tael— How
such copper cash can people change for a tael of syce© silver or how
such silver can be changed into a sum of 1*000 copper cash?

To this

question, around the year 1898, the possible answer was that th© fluc
tuating change-rate was circulating from place to place and from time to
time.

From "the following brief description one can get soma idea of

the formation of this situation*
Sarly in the Tang dynasty a trimetallic system (although gold
formed no part of the currency) was introduced*

The relative value of

each by weight was:

^Th© detail of the mints are shown in th© Appendix of Mr* Kami *s
The Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p® 430.
^ W o n Pin-woi, "Th® Currency Problem in China," Columbia Univ.,
1914, p. 31s and S. R, ftegal, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai,
p« 41 *
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1 gold * 10 silver s 1,000 oopper
The copper coin of this system was made to weigh one tenth of a tael of
copper, making it in value "1 II,” one thousandth of a tael of silver.
Later on the rati© was theoretically held to by the rulers*

But in

fact th© ratio of one tael of silver to one thousand of cash coins fluc
tuated from year to year*

"Attempts were made, however, from time to

time to regulate the value of a tael at a thousand times that of the cash
coins it was found impossible to bring about such regulation as th© exchange between the oash and ihe tael depended very largely and generally
upon their values as metals in th© marks t.**22
could be founds

Many valuable examples

In A* I). 1726 on© tael of silver was equal to 900

copper cash in Shansi.

In 1741 in Shansi a tael was just 860 cash*

Even in 1851 by the Regulations of the Board of Revenue * it appears that
the tael of silver was exchanged for a thousand oash in Peking, but for
twelve hundred cash in Yunnan, because copper is that province was
cheaper.

During the years 1840 to 1880 silver was in great demand for

paying for imported opium (from Groat Britain) in particular.

Mr. Huang

Chio—tss said in 1858 In a memorial that opium was th© chief cause of
th® rise of the value of silver from 1,000 oash a tael to 1,800 cash a
tael*

23
Another fluctuation of the price of the cash cam® from th® differ

ent quantity of the cash reckoning.

As Mr* Morsesays i

22Ibid., p. 41.
Joseph Edkins, Chines© Currency, Shanghai, 1901, pp. 67-69*

Cash are strang on strips, In rolls of 100, of afoieh 10 go to
the string or ”ti©o," or "chiean,n formerly called Kuan*..•Th©
moaey-changers have always charged for their trouble in stringing,
sad for the cost of the string. This charge is made by deducting
one, or tow, or three, or four cash from each hundred,•.with the
result that the tiao of 1,000 oash contains in one place 970 and
in another place 980 actual coins* the full tiao passing however
for 1,000 cash.
In the Berth {Chili, Shantung province) one cash counts for two.
The pries of an article being there quoted at 100 cash, you hand
over 50 coins, at 2 tiao you give what in the South constitutes 1
tiao, Th© same rule of deduction holds her® too, and th© tiao
nominally 1,000 and nominally—actual ly of 980 cash contains ac
tually 490 coins.
Still another fluctuation of the price of the cash comes from the
different quality of the oash itself.

In the beginning of th© twentieth

century one could still find in actual circulation copper cash, th©
origin of which dates back a thousand years; and some of which, made
by counterfeiters, were bad in both sis© and quality,

Th© money-changers

classified and strung oash into different kinds of tiao, and traded with
people using different prices of silver.
This Viral of complicated situation prevented the development of
internal commerce, and added an unfair burden on ignorant people to a
25
great extent•

But it must be admitted that until 1398, none of th©

Chinas© government authorities attempted to derive profits from coinage,

26

2*h , B, Morse, Currency in China, 1905, pp* 15-17,
25*If & Ran comes into a shop one day when 93 cash constitute a
hundred, and of these 95 oash 70 per cent, should consist of large oash
and 50 per cent* small oash, end he makes a 29 cash purchase, he will
readily spend an hour or so arguing with the shopkeeper as to what 70
per cent* of 93 per cent, of 29 is; and sine® th© Chines© h&ve no actual
system of reckoning on paper, it must all be calculated with the ubiqui
tous suan pan, or ”abacua"Is there any wonder, then, seeing that a hundred cash are not a
hundred, nryi a thous and cash not a thousand, that th© Chines® say that
if you take any given sum on th© street and convert and re-convert it ten
times, you will have nothing left, even if you start with a million,”
(William F, Spalding, Eastern Exchange Currency and. Finance2 London,
Fourth edition, 1924, p. 3ST)
2%duard Kann, The Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p. 384;
and S. S. We gal, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 1915, p« 38*
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B. Silver
Around th© years just before and after 1893, th© situation of
silver used as a medium of exchange

27

in China can be briefly described

as followst
I. The complicated units (taels) were prevailing in different
places— the "tael" is the "ounce" of China, of which 16 make one catty*
or Chinese "pound."

As to the tern ?tael" it is said that:

The word "t&el" is believed to com© from th© Portuguese (some
claim it is connected with th© Hindu word "tola" or the Malayan
word "tahil.") Th© Chinese word is liang, which might also be
translated as "ounce." When general weight tael is meant, the
Chinese tern is liangs when a currency tael ismeant, th© expres
sion is li&ng yin dse, meaning silver t&el*
In weighing the precious metals* however, th© tael is th© heaviest
unit, and ithas decimal subdivisions,
tbson© thousand-million-millionth /-j

29

each with
1_

it® own name, down to
v

vl,000,000,000,000,000'

t&el.®^

a

part of a

detailed table is found in Mr. Morse’s Currency in China.

In China the tael is not a coin.

Taels may be circulated in native

^Mr. H. B* 81listen, "China Dethrones Silver," foreign Affairs,
Vol. 14, p. 355, says s "In China the metal has hitherto occupied a
three—tiered throne— as a standard of value, as a medium of exchange,
and a® a store of value."
^Herbert M. Bratter, Silver Market Diet!onary, Commodity Sxchang©
Inc., Hew York, 1933, p. 174^"Tfae tael as a coin I© purely fictitious, no such coin existss
the tael, or liang (as the Chinese term It), is actually a measure of
weight, equivalent to 583.3 gr., but it is used also as a measure of
value. The special divisions of th© tael for currency purposes area
10 cash a 1 Candareen
10 Candareams » 1 Mace
10 Mao© a 1 Tael
The Chinese way of expressing them is*
10 Li 2 1 Fen
10 Fen s 1 Ch9ien
10 Ch’len - 1 Liang
Just as there is no tael coin in circulation,
neither are thereto
be found any coins called mace and o&nd&reent they
are all measuresof
weight as well as of value." (W. F . Spalding, Basterrs. Exchange Currency
and
Finance. London, 1924, 4th edition, p. 412)
B. Horse, Currency in China," Journal of
J3# 0* JR. of R. A.S.,
Vol. 38, 1906, p* 39.
~~
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orders, banknotes, or shoes'^ of silver of an approximate weight of
from one to fifty taels*

These shoes in practice never amount to an

exact round sum of, say, ten, twenty-five, or fifty taels.

Owing to

reasons such as th© fact that no regulation® could be enforced, after
the development of a long age, there was no uniformity in the several
taels current in th© different parts of the country.

For instance,

the Chungking tael prevailing in Chungking City i® different from th©
Shanghai tael of the same weight*

The T scoping tael is different from

the Haikuan and the Raping t&els*

Besides these relative popular taels,

nib may be said that ©very commercial place (local market) has its halfdoaen, or dosen, or score of local taels, all generally recognised and
all ourrent •”

As to their weight it is said that ’’the weight ranges,

at different places and even in th© same place, from 540 to 533 grains.
There was no available figure*

«34

"Or* J* 0* Ferguson mentions seventy-

36
seven distinct varieties of tael,”
and Mr* H. B* Morse states that he
has notes of 170 different and well-recognised currencies, gathered
mainly from the treaty ports and their immediate vicinity.

36

The non-uniformity of currency units in different places and even
in the same place results in inconvenience to trade and to the individual
to a great extent*

The following quotation is a good example illustrat

ing that complicated situation.
^ G * Yis soring, On Oh in© so Currenoy. Vol. I, Amsterdam, p. 147.
33*Ibid ♦» p. 150*
^Silver is most commonly current in oval ingot® called "shoes,”
from their resemblance to a Chinese shoes but what may b© called frac
tional currency is in obovoid lumps weighing up to two or throe taels..**
Shanghai shoes weigh close on 50 taels ©aoh. •• .Hankow and other Tangtg®
ports also oast oval shoes close on 50 taels in weight, and Tientsin as
well* Hewehwang shoes weigh from 53 to 54 taels***.Sxoapt to make change
th© small lumps of silver are seldom seen at Shanghai, and when received
from other cities are sent to be oast Into shoes. (H* B. Mors©, The Trade
and Administration of China. London, 1913, pp. 146-147).
34h . B. Morse, Currency in China, p* 40.
®®G* Vessoring, On Chinese Currency. 1912, p* 146.
36
b. Morse, The Trade and Adminis trat ion of China, London, 1913, p, 166.
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On® town may V® taken to typify many*— th® tcro of Chungking,
in tbs province of Saaehwan, in th© far west of China# Her® th®
standard weight of th© tael for silver transactions is 565.6
grains, and this is the standard for all transactions in which
tha seal© is not specified* Frequently, however, a modification
of the seal® is provided for, depending in some oases upon the
plaoe from which the bs rohact comes or with. which h® trades, ard
in others upon the gpods in which he deals* A merchant coming
from Kweichow, or trading with that plaoe, will probably, but not
certainly, use a scale weight 548*9 grains i a merchant from Kweifu,
a town on the Yangtze, a hundred miles from Chungking, will buy and
sell with a tael 562.7 grainsj and between those two extremes are
at least ten topical weights of tael, all "current” at Chungking*
In addition to these twelve topical "currencies,n there ar© others
connected with commodities. One of th® most important products of
Szechwan is salt, and dealings in this are settled by & tael of
556*4 grains, unless it is salt from ths Tzeliu well, in which
case the standard is 557*7 grains• A transaction in cotton cloth
is settled with a t&el of 555*0 grains, but for cotton yarn the
t&el is 566*0 grains, and for raw cotton the tael is 547*7 grains.
This seems confusion, but we arc not yet at th® end * TJp to
this point w® have dealt only with th© weight on th© scale, but
new cosies in the question of th© fineness of the silver with which
payment is made* At Chungking three qualities of silver ar® in
common use— "fin® silver" 1*000 fine current throughout th© empire,
"old silver® about 996 fine, and "trad® silver" between 960 and
970 fine; and payment may be stipulated in any one of these thro©
qualities* Taking ths score of current tael-weights in combina
tion with the three grades of silver, w© have at least sixty cur
rencies possible in this on® town*
Besides th© local taels, there were three principal taels which it
is worth while to mention he ret

th® Kuping or Treasury tael, the customs

or Haikusn tael, and the Tsaopiag tael.

Th© Kuping tael may be taken as

a standard of taels in a certain sense*

In it all Government taxes and

dues other than customs revenue, and th os & paid in kind or in oopper
oash, ar© calculated.

In theory it is uniform throughout the Empire.

"The normal standard Kuping taal, 675.6 grains of silver 1,000 fin© is
th® receiving rata (th© paying rat© being 0.2 per cent lighter) at th©
Imperial Treasury, and th© several provincial treasuries vary from this
38
standard in scme instance© as much as one per cent •"

370* Vessing, .Qn Chinas© Currency. 1912, pp. 148-160.
^®H* B. Morse, Currency in China, 1906, p. 43.
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Th® Haikuan tael (from §81.6$ to 589 grains) is a purely arbitrary
standard of currency in the ImperiaL Maritime® Gustos® .

In 1854 the

foreign-oontrolled Imperial Maritime Customs was set up in Shanghai.
Th® special "Haikuan tael” was established as th© Imperial Maritime
Customs unit instead of the Carolus dollars which had become common in
China*

All of China*s trade passing through the Customs, and all duties

levied upon it* were figured in th® Fiaiku&n tassl *

It existed neither as

ingots nor as coin* merely a certain weight of fine silver*

As to the

exact weight of th® "Haikuan tael*” many different figures can be found
from different sourcess

39

In the British Treaty of 1853* it is 583.3 grains*
In the French Treaty of 1858* it i & 583.1 grains*
Mr. S. C» Taintor (Statistical Secretary, 1873*78) fixed it at
582.94 grains.
Mr. B. Kopsch (Statistical Secretary, 1891-93) found it 587.68
grains.
Mr. Pascal Martin, in I860, decided on 531.47.
Other Commissioners estimate from 681 to 689 grains.
An independent test at Ganton (1906) gave a weight of 581.83
grains.
The Statistical Secretary (1906) found it to be 881.56 grains.
Though all customs dues are prescribed in this non-existent and non*
uniform currency, they are collected in local money at rates of exchange
fixed by the Customs authorities.

For instance, "The equivalent of 100

E&lkuan taels has always been 111.40 Shanghai taels end in Tientsin
105.215 Tientsin t a e l s I t
at Bingpo.

In theory the equivalent of 100 Haikuan taels is 101*642395

Kuping tael®.
curreno y*

has always been 105.83 Teaoplng tael®

The Tsaoping tael

41

is another unit of the value of

It is current throughout th® provinces contributing tribut©

in kind (such as rice) which is sent to th® capital by s©a or the Grand
H 5 E r : 7 pp. 40-41*
Vis sering, On drrinois© C u i * ^
p® 146^
B. Mors®, Currency in China, 1906, p. 44*
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Bo si da8 ths local taels and the three principal taels mentioned
above* there was one kind of local tael called Shanghai tael*

Although

the principal field for the use of the Shanghai tael is Shanghai* it was
also made use of in other ports* suck as Manchuria and Kw&ngtung, when
& relatively stable unit is desired, for example, for contracts,
Shanghai was equivalent to 518„5X2 grains of fine silver.^4

4:3

Th©

Still

another local unit, which should be noted in detail, is the Peking tael«
In Peking, then the Capital, the Kuping tael was the unit of all official
transactions.

However, besides the Kuping tael, there were three stand

ards of tael weight (that is, (1) the "Kungfa" of 555,7 grains, (2) the
"market" of 552*4 grains, and (S) the "metropolitan” or "two-tael
scale of 541,7 grains), and two recognised standards of silver (that Is,
1,000 and 980 fine).
The foreign banks established there have within a few years past
adopted the Kung-fa tael of 1,000 silver as their currency of ac
count* Each of these currencies, ©accept the Kuping and Kung-fa, is
further subject to a difference of 0*6 to 0*9 per cent, according
as it is "equalised" or “empty" or "mercantile” or "complete”} thus
100 Kung-fa taels are equivalent to metropolitan taels 102*80 if
mercantile, 102*70 if empty, 102,60 if equalised, but only 102,00
if complete*
*2Th0 Tsaoping tael contain® 565*5 grains troy* For monetary pur
poses references to the Tsaoping tael mean 565*5 grains of silver, 0*944
fisc, Kuping basis. Since Kuping fineness considers 0*987 to 0*989 a®
equivalent to 1.000, the 0,944 fineness referred to above becomes actually
about
, _
Bratter,
Silver
.Dictionary,
._ 'U_
. ...
M 1*1I*g*a«| Market
*i ..
mmrnmtm*n>i*inm»'*iiwiw*jb» Commodityv
_
_ _ 0*933, (Herbert
* _
Exchange, Inc*, New York, 1933, p, 180)
P. Young, “Shanghai Tael," Americanh'conomio Review, 7oX, 21,
1931, p* 682.
^ D * H, Leavens, "Chines® Money and Banking,” The Anna Is of th®
American Academy of Political and. Social Science, Nov. 1930, pp* *206-207*
^®wThe addition of 2 taels In the hundred, Z%9 will bring this to
the value of th© Market tael; he no© probably th© name," (Footnote of
H. 3, Morse* The Trad© and Administration of China, pp, 155-156,
4 % . B* Morse, The Trad© and Admin 1b tration of China. tendon, 1913,
pp. 156-166.
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2* Variability of purityt
(a) Ths ideal standard— In European countries the standard of
1,000 fins represents silver chemically pure, with no admixture of gold
or of oopper and lead, but the merchandise of silver is little differ**
eat from the pure silver*

Far instance, American quotations of bar

silver are .reduced to a basis of S99 fine and British quotation to a
basis of 926.

"In China the standard of 1,000 seems to refer to a

silver eoanreroially pur© as shown by the crude methods of th© touchstone or of crucible assaying.

This is th© standard of Kuping*

,,47

It

was ascertained that the "pure silver” of the Kuping tael touch is ac
tually 987 fine when It was reduced to the Western standard of chemically
pure silver.

46

(b) The local st andard«?*-The standard of the Kuping tael men
tioned above is the fineness with which all local standards ar© compared.
For instaras©, at Tientsin all silver is reduced to a theoretical local
fineness of 992 s at Ghefoo, to one of 976j at iiaukow, to on© of 967.

49

There was an exception, at Shanghai, and in the countries subordinated
to it silver is rated, not by fineness of a "pure silver" standard, but
by the addition, to each shoe of about 60 taels weight, of a quantity
to indicate the degree of superiority of quality over a presumed fine
ness which is 944 of the China standard of pur© silver."

st)

(c) The local convention— It was merely a tradition in th©
commercial world in a certain number of ports.

For Ins tame, in Shanghai

the convention was that 98 taels of Tsaoping tael on a standard of 944

4?Ibid.. p. 148.
4*ibid.* p. 149.
glbid.
Ibid.. p. 148.
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fine on ths ICuping basis of

1 ,0 0 0

"Shanghai convention currency*”

fin© settle a liability of 100 taels
Th® convention w&s very important on

the exchange from on® tael into another also*

For instance, on© who

wished to convert Kuping taels into Shanghai taels first considered th&
weight, i*e«, one hundred Kuping taels (by weight) wore equivalent to
101*80 Tsaoping taels (by weight) 3 next, for difference of touch, on,
say, two shoes (100 taels), 5*6 taels were added, which made 107*40*
Third, by the Shanghai convention, this sum was divided by 0*98, which
increased it to 109*592•

To this 0*008 was added for melting fees, and

the value of 100 Xuping taels was then found to b® Shanghai taels 109*60*
This kind of convention varied from port to port*

For Instance, at

Tientsin a "premium" was added instead of dividing by a "convention"
ratio*

In sosne ports there was no convention at all*
(d)

Varying purity caused complicated system of remittances^-*

There existed variability of purity between small pieces of silver by
which people in China made payment for the daily retail price as well
as "shoes" of "sycee" of about 50 taels each*

In the daily business,

most people did not know a reasonable method by which to test the touch
of a piece of silver.

If they wished to ©hang® cash by th® irregular

pieces of silver in order to meet small payments, th® judge of th©
masters of the cash— shop or cash-st&nd from which they changed cash
by their silver was th© only "touchstone" for both parties of the
transaction*

Naturally the cash-shops have always nm.de a living and

yielded big profits from their unfair judgment*

In th© payment of

wholesale and th© settlement of transactions between the native banks
and concerns, if the transfer of a sura of T!shoos" wore neoessary, ths
process of testing and calculating would be operated much more reasonably*
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The practice in Shanghai is chosen as an examples
Let ns assume the simple case where our Shanghai merchant wishes
to remit th© contents of a box full of silver (if he wishes to make
up an exact ©urn in Shanghai currency* certain comp lie at ions are
added)* the silver in th© box will be in the shape of "shoe®" of
"sycee" of about 50 taels each* and of varying "touch** (degrees of
fineness}* If th? $© shoes are marked* In ink* with th® results of
a previous assay at ths Assay Office for the Foreign Settlement,
the preliminary stage becomes unnecessary * but if they have come
in the course of trade from another port* or if their last previous
assay was made by th® Assay Office for th© Chinese City* then all
existing marks are washed off and th® silver must b® sent to th©
proper office* Hare ©aoh shoe is weighed and th® result written
on on© side* It is then "touched" and the difference (usually an
addition) from a certain standard* as indicated by the colour on
ths touchstone* is written on the other side* This difference for
touch is so much for the shoe irrespective of its exact weight*
which is anything between 49 and 54 taels* but an allowance of
0*05 tael is added for each tael by which the weight of the shoe
exceeds 50 taels % thus if the quality of the silver is 2*70* th©
addition for a shoe weighing 49*75 or on© of §0*05 tael® is 2*70*
for one of 51*25 taels is 2*75* for on® of 52*15 taels is 2*30*
and so on* Let us take two such shoes weighing 60 and 51 taels
and having 2*60 and 2*40 respectively added for touch* making for
the two 501 2*60 1 511 2*40 - 106*00; this result, divided by 0*98
(th© Shanghai "convention"), gives 103*163 as th© number of Shanghai
taels in our two shoes* If th© transaction is on© in Shanghai currenoy only, this ends it****
From the example mentioned above it is obvious that even within one
port, say Shanghai, th® trouble from th® transfer of silver in order to
settle transactions was too much for a business man*

Th© practice of

settlement of transactions between ports by transferring silver, from
ths point of view of different taels, different touch of silver and
different conventions, must be much more complicated*
3* The situation of foreign coins in China around the yo&r 1898
can be briefly described as followss
a* Different foreign coins prevailed In different area©— Among
the foreign coins, first the C&rolu© dollar and then the Mexican dollar

6*Ibid*, "pP* 160-161*
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had for many years been accepted as th® currency of the foreign banks
and merchants and for th© sal© of import© and purchase of exports and
for exchange quotations* in most ports of Chins* especially in Shanghai
at one time and in th® Yangtze basin*

The French trade dollar has had

its greatest circulation in the province of Yunnan adjoining French
Indo-China*
of Fukien*

Ths Japan6s® silver yen has been much used in th© province
Th© Hongkong dollar has been popular in aarta in parts of

liorth China* where for a time it was at a slight premium over other
dollars*

The American trade dollar seems to have been rapidly drawn

into the interior through the Yangtsa River trade*
b. The exohang© value between local foreign dollars and local
taels fluctuated considerably— Various foreign dollars were in circula
tion in different parts of the Empire*

Various reasons caused a certain

kind of foreign dollar to become popular over a large or small area and
to appreciate in value to 30 or 40 per cent* above its bullion value*
In some of th© smaller treaty ports* such as Mmgpo* Hangchow or Wuhu*
the Spanish dollar was most in favor*

Though lighter than th® Mexican

dollar* it was in suoh demand as to fetch 11*40 Mexican*

A very interest

ing and well-known record can be cited as an example of this situations
The ravages of the Taiping rebellion restricted the consump
tion of imports* and notwithstanding increased importations of
Carolus dollars* collected from all parts of th© world, they were
soon driven to a premium* which by 1858 amounted to 50 per cent*,
and in 1856 to over 80 per cent* of their intrinsic value| and
the curious spectacle was seen of exchange quoted at Canton at
4s * 11 d« per dollar (Mexican) and on the aam© day at Canton at
7s*
per collar (Carolus)* The situation beoaaas intolerabl®,
and on a fixed day merchants* accounts at the banks were trans
ferred* unit for unit* from a currency (th© Carolus) containing
374J grains of fin© silver, to a currency (the Shanghai taol) con
taining nominally 526 grains of fine silver per unit*

®^H* B* Morse* The Trade and Administration of China, London, 1913*
p • 165 *
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Q«» Chopped dollar*-**Chines® people accepted the varlous foreign
dollars for what they were worth, not according to their face Talus but
according to their weight of pure silver*

The first banker or merchant

into whose hands th® foreign coin came used to Kehopn it with an im
pressed ideogram about an eighth of an inch square, ^thereby giving th©
tradesman and the private individual his certificate of bona fides
of the guaranteeing government.

This was repeated by each succeeding

banker, until the chopped dollar resembles a disc, or rather a cup, of
hammered silver work**

This resulted in th® situation tbs.t the same

weight in a coin (the silver dollar) with the same inscription was worth
at one port, say Shanghai, from 5 per cent* to 5 per e@nt, more than at
another port, say Canton, whether the valus is expressed in gold, in
silver taels, or in commodities! but at Shanghai th® coin remained as
it cam® from the mint, and at Canton it was chopped*

As to the origin

of the chopping of th® foreign dollar, it is ©aids
The Chinese officials, towards the close of th© eighteenth cen
tury, desired to halt the further inflow of foreign coins* They
induced some of the Chinese silversmiths to manufacture dollars, in
every respect similar to th© Carolus dollar* In order to reap
bene fit s£>r themselves the silversmiths added alloy up to 5Q^ in
some provinces* This is the origin for thf$ exohang® shops to im
press every genuine dollar handed out with a tiny ideogram in order
to give guarantee to the public*
d* Variable bullion value between foreign coins— As stated
above, Chinese people accepted foreign dollars for what they were worth.
Because of the variable bullion value existing In th© foreign coins much

”

^ I b i d *. p* 164*
Kann, The Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p* £97j and Wen
Pin Wei, The Currency Problem in China, p# 41*
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more trouble was added to individuals and bankers g whan they sett lad
the payment and received funds through the transfer of foreign coins.
For instance* at Canton on July IS* 1842* in order to pay 100.00 tael®
gg
of fine silver it was necessary to pay by weights
111.458 taels in Peruvian dollars#
111.900 11
" Mexican
w
112.150 w
" Bolivian
*
112.520 •
M Chilian
109.790 **
” Indian Rupees
#
113.207
”
©hopped dollars.
In a word* instead of th© convenience of adopting & coin of unifom
touch and regular appearance* the employing of foreign coins has offered
the same type of compile at ions as that of China*® old system# i -©* * the
d iff© rant taels and variable purity of si Ivor *
4. China*s local silver dollar and fractional silver coinage—
Although there were neither national silver dollars nor national frac
tional silver coins in China prior to 1898# the un-unifora provincial
silver dollars from the provincial mints and the fractional silver coins
of local mints had added on© more trouble to the existing serious situa
tion.

Since 1887 the first modern mint was set up in Canton of Kwang*

tuag province and turned out the Chinese dragon dollars* bearing the
emblem of the dragon and the fractional silver coins* other provinces
followed the lead to establish local mints* suoh as Wuchang Mint of
the provinces of Hupei and Hunan in 1895 and the Tientsin Mint in 1896.
For the purpose of understandIng the causes which 1©d to the situation
of un-uniform local silver coins it is w.iso to describe briefly the
development of these local mints and the coinage of these coins.
It goes back to the tine shortly before th© Opium ";ar (184 2) when*

R. bagel * Chinese Currency and Banking* Shanghai* 1915* p. 52.
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la 1336, a provincial treasurer sent a protest to Poking, then the
Capital, against the imporation of opium and declared that th© imported
foreign eo ins were of groat oomrenieno© to trad® ®tsd, imlik® the opium,
were producing not the slightest injury to China*

Th© official showed

that the coins had then an extensive circulation in th© four coast
provinces in the southern part of China*

After th© Opium 'filar (1842) all

the different' kinds of foreign silver coins in fact war© lawful money in
Canton*

In 138? in China th© monetary circumstances which resulted In

ths establishment of th© first local mint (Canton) were as foIXowss
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1* Aftsr the Taiping Rebellion, ths oash oiarrency was vniy unsatis
factory because of the stoppage of th© coinage of oash in general*

The

revival of industries in ths provincas increased th© demand for the ©ash
currency;
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2* Sentimental reasons, according to which China desired to have a
coinage on lines which were similar to the system employed by all modern
countries;
3* ^ith th© Increase in th® bullion value of the cash coins, owing
to the depreciation of silver aft©r 1873, th© copper cash was promptly
melted down;
4* The multitude of different specimens of oash coins, genuine and
spurious, circulating side by side at unstable market rates— som® a
thousand years old and some cast only yesterday*

Kann, Th© Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p* 392; and
Wen Pin Wei, The Currency Problem In China, 1914, Columbia University,
p* 45; £• B* Wafeel, Chinese Currency anSTlJank, Shanghai, 1915, p« 55*
-

A detail of casting of copper cash in Tsing dynasty is shown in
the Appendix of Ur* Kann's The Currencies of China, p* 429*
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Besides these mentioned above, in Peking, the 10™cash pieces (token
money) had depreciated to about 2-cash in value and caused froqus nt
price disturbances*

SB

These conditions led th© impress Dowager to issue an edict in
1887, commanding, in response to a memorial of th® Board of Revenue,
that
All provinces along the Yangtze (river) and the seaboard be
required to convert a porti on of ths ir remittances to Peking into
oash and send this oash to Tientsin, there to be stored up In
readiness for us© in Pekingj that the provinces which were required
by law to manufacture oash should one and all be called upon to
commence operations without delay with a view to a gradual restora
tion to the old basis*
By a subsequent edict th© depreciated 10-oash currency in Peking was
given a fixed legal value based upon the market value in 1887*

namely,

2 oash for each 10-oash piece*
At that time Chang Ghi-tumg, then ths Viceroy of Kwangiung province,
who already planned to set up the Canton Mint for the purpose of coining
silver dollars, took this opportunity to suggest th© following points*
i. n ,000,000 in silver should bo struck off at once as the first
experiment and if these coins were received favorably, 16,000,000 in all
should be coined at Canton;
2* If the experiment should prove a success, he then would advise
that the Board of Revenue establish a central mint at Tientsin to coin
the national dollar;
3, Be proposed a coin slightly heavier than the Mexican dollar in
order to make its introduction easy*

®*V. supra, p. 45*
® W Pin Wei, The Currency Problem in China, Columbia University,
1914, p. 45.

This memorial was reforrod to the Board of Revenue and no reaction
was heard from it*

Ths prospect of an early ©atabl 1shmant of a national

and uniform coinage was thus lost sight of.

But Chang Chi-tung managed

to secure sanction for his Canton mint which was the first modern mint
set up in that country for the purpose of coining the silver dollar
and copper coin*

It was in the spring of 188? that he petitioned th©

fimprass to sanction the coinage of Chinese dollar®, bearing the emblem
of the dragon*

H© had the view that the Chinese dragon dollar would tend

to dislodge the foreign currency prevailing in China at that time*

The

petition of Chang obtained imperial sanction, whereupon the Canton Mint
began to strike th© first dragon dollar.
appearance on the market*

In 1890 th© dollar mad© its

The gross weight of it* styled Kwangsu cur

rency, was 0*73 Tsaoping taels or 0.7245 Euping t&elsj its contents of
fine silver weighed 0*6540 Kuping taels* which corresponds to th© fine
ness of th© Mexican dollar, via*, 902.7/1,000the•

It is said that ttth©

dragon dollar had at first a weight of 27*27 gram, which was afterwards
lowered to 26*9 grams*
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The fineness Is G*900»w

Besides the dragon dollars th© Canton Mint Issued the fractional
silver pieces and th© 7-candarin cash (old oopper cash) for the Morfch®
But It did not issue the modern copper coin (10-cash piece) until 1900*
It was decreed that th© new dragpn dollar should be legal tender and ac
ceptable as such in payment of taxes* likin, customs dues and official
salaries*

As a matter of fact, the new dollars were not favorably re

ceived by th© public and were accepted by the latter by weight, instead
of by count*
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They were acceptabl© outside that province only at a

g0Annual Report of the Director of the Mint of th© United States,
19°°, p. 524*
'
™
In 1696 the Viceroy, Mr* Chang Chin—twig who had boon transferred
to the Vie ©royalty of the provinces of Hupei and Hunan from the provinces

discount.

Othar provinces followed suit in ths course of years*

In

1898 Wuchang of Hupei province established a mints in 1896 Tientsin did
likewise.

But the result was still less fortunate than the Canton Mint.

Later on there were m a y provincial mints operating in China.

Their

doings were not subjected to Central Government control, and it resulted
in a lack of uniformity of coins and in overproduction.

£4

Furthermore

"every province manufacturing dragon dollars csabossed th© name of the
respective province thereon, thus hindering and curtailing circulation
throughout the country."
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At the beginning of the setting up of the provincial mints, the
seeds of trouble were already sowed by the non-unifoim and non-controlled
coinage of the subsidiary silver coins in each provincial mint.

The Mint

at Canton produced subsidiary silver coins for the first time in A. D«
1890.

These were of a fineness of 0*820, as compared with 0.9GQ— th©

fine contents of the dragon dollar.

The new subsidiary coins were well

received by the public and as they left a wide margin of profit to th®
Mint authorities, as soon as the other provinces realised the enormous
possibilities in connection with the product ion of the subsidiary silver
coins, th® immediate result was an enormous over-production of subsidiary
silver coins in several mints and a consequent fall in their market values
The over-production of subsidiary coins had been, circulated at a discount.
of" Kwongtung""and Rwangsl issued a proclamation to ths effect that the new
Hupei dollar was officially given a oash value at th© rate of one silver
coin to 1,000 cash. It m s soon found out that a mere proclamation could
not fix the exchange between ths two currencies and the order became a
dead letter. (Wen Pin Wei, Ths Currency Problem in China, p* 49.)
®^?he details concerning th® weight and the condition of th© pro
vinces* mints are shown in the Appendix of Mr* Kami’s The Currencies of
China, p. 819.
Kann, The Currencies of China, p. 816.
rom the table compiled in the Annual Report of the Director of
the M * of the United States in 1900, it is obvious“ThaiT“'most provincial
mints were emphasising the issue of the subsidiary silver coins about 1898

For instance* they were stated to be at a discount of from 2 to 3 per
oent. In Foochow and its district.
The unfortunate effect of the over-pro dust ion of the fractional
eoins by the provincial mints and the different content of the dragon
dollar had attracted the attention of both the Central Government and
the province governments.
this unfortunate tendency.

In 1898 the hoard of Revenue tried to check
Sufc it failed to reach its aim.

C. Paper Money
For nearly forty years after Tung-ohih came to the throne in 1862,
the issue of paper instruments of credit was left to banks* i.e.* the
native banks* the Shansi banks* and the foreign banks.

The fi m e * the

money-changers* and later on sons quasi-provincial or 11official1* bonks
followed the example of the banks in issuing paper money.
Generally speaking* of this paper currency issued by these private
organisations* a part is notes based on cash.

Such cash notes circulat

ing in local markets formed a considerable portion of the ordinary cur
rency.
trol.

They circulated independently of government guarantee and con
The notes were rarely current outside the district where th® credit

of the issuer was known to be beyond question*

There were also an in

creasing amount of silver notes based on the tael or the provincial dollar.
Those notes were also issued by the foreign banks, particularly by the
Hongkong and Shanghai banks, and circulated extensively in the advanced
commercial centers.
It was not rare that the cash-note® issued by firms, native banks*
atiA

other private organisations were circulating on a discount basis.
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.

For instanoe, oas kind
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of cash note, issued by a cash shop of Wuchang,

Hepie province, near Hankow, about the year 18©?, was circulating at 12
per cent lees than its face value*

That is, a cash not© of 1,000 cash

was worth only 880 cash in the market*
VI* China’s banking of the years around 1898*
The basis of private banking procedar © in China around the year 1898
had been mutual trust and confidence rather than state control.

The banks,

native, Shansi, and "official,1* had been private enterprises, rather than
joint-stock, corporation, and other types, though closely organised into
bankers* guilds, which laid down strict rules for carrying on business,
sad with severe penalties for violation of codes.
For the purpose of convenience to describe the existing banking
situation around 1898, it may be well to classify the banking Institutes
into the following groups*

A* Shansi Banks
The Shansi banks were originated and run by the people from Shansi
province of China*

Prior to the years around 1898, the Shansi banks were

the only institdbions that had branches or correspondents in every part
of the country*

Their drafts and acceptances were received anywhere,

•vwn by the goveramexftal treasury, without question.
It goes back years before 1898*
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As China’s foreign trade grew

these banks played a more important part*

They remitted funds from eea-

F. Spalding, Eastern Exchange Currency and Finance, p* 399.
^ S * R. vV&gel, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 1915, p. 166*

6T
paF%$ to t)Mi interior and fro® th® interior to sca-ports*

As th@ i23d^r**

provincial business increased year after year, the Shansi hanks slowly
gave up local business in favor of the

lecsit

native bonks*

Furthermors,

£b Maty instances, they supplied these local native banks with working
capital*

The native hanks haw, since about 1875, obtained support of

capital not only fro® other sources such as Shansi banks, but also from
foreign banks, through the medium of what is ©cmmonly known as ^ohop
leans•*

Meanwhile the governmental officials, with a view to personal

profits, deposited the public fends not only with the Shansi banks as had
been the custom for centuries, but also with the native banks*

By the

IsfsIspBSSli pri or to 1896 and after, the native banks, foreign banks» and,
ether financial institutions gradually took the places of the Shansi banks
is the basking world of China*

S« Native Banks
Originally the native banks were nothing else but changing shops,
where one kind of money could be changed Into another*

After emphasising

the Intor-provinoial business, the Shansi banks gradually gave up local
business to the local native banks*

The existing circumstances in China

led the native banks to dominate the local business! because, in the first
place, the resident and merchant of one province looked upon the resident
and merchant of a neighboring province not in th© light of eitiaens of the
same country, but as people out of whore thoy should make profit as much
as possible*

In the second pl&oe, the officials of local governments

looking out for their own larger interests gradually gave the native

®^It looks like the "call money” in th® money market of Europe euad
America-
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banks a share in the business a6 custodians of government funds*
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The native banks vers (end usually still are) partnership ooneerxs
with unlimited liability or one-man institutions and, in some instances*
family concerns*

They advanced money on the personal and finaneial

etasdisg of clients without requiring, security and issued draft remit
tances over & limited area*

Practically the native banks did all the

ether kinds of business done by the foreign banka In the present time*
The whole story ef China’s banking business can not be completed
without dealing with the Provincial Government Banks of the time*

As

mentioned above* the funds of the governments* while ga m rally kept with
the Shansi banks* were also loaned out to the native banks*
mostly went to the officials of districts and provinces*

The profits

In about 1890

the official began to organise their own banks in order to derive the
full benefits of the us® of the money which was left in their hands*
soa®times for long periods* before being dispatched to Peking*

Since

1880 a number of the so-called "official or provincial banks * war® started
is almost every province*

Really they were not Government bank© at all*

They did the usual banking business— receiving deposits* giving loans*
discounting bills of exchange, and so forth— and did such business with
an almost reckless disregard for safety or sound commercial principles*
They employed very little capital and traded on the credit of being a
so-called government bank*

These official banks* which cut into the

business of the native and Shansi banks* ware the greatest offenders in
connection with the unrestricted is sue of paper money In the latter years
of the Manehu regime*
^ S. R* 9Tagel* Chines® Currency and Hanking* 191G* p* 181*

C* Foreign Banks
After 1842, whan Shanghai was opened as a treaty port by virtu® of
the treaty of tanking, foreign Tearchants began to extend their operations
Into the Chinese banking business*

The Chartered Bank of India, Aus

tralia, and China (British) established its branch office at Shanghai
in 1853*

At that time, British merchants profited. In the trade of opium

and cotton goods imported and the Chartered Sank of India, Australia and
China was chiefly engaged in discounting bills and granting drafts to
these merchants*

Later on the hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation

also set up its branch office at Shanghai in 1867*

Later on many large

foreign banks gradually established bran on offices in Shanghai and other
principal cities in that country*
Around 1898 foreign banks arid branch banks of foreign banks played
an important part in the banking of China, particularly in the treaty
ports and in connection with foreign trade activities*

“Foreign bank®

in China sere sll located at the treaty ports or a certain place in Peking,
and under fcba system of extraterritoriality they are governed by the laws
of* the different nations having extraterritorial rights in China by
treaty*
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They did business with the old style Chines® native banks

through the “comprador” of the foreign banks under the latter®’ responsi

bility*

“They have been able to issue notes without restriction by the

Chinese Government”
ment*
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but with restriction by their own country's govern

However, “the laws of the different nations on the subject o.f

L. Lee, Currency, banking, and finance in Chins, Trade Promotion
Series, Ho* 27, 1926, y* 102*
^ I b i d •, p * 102•

TO
banking and the issue of notes vary ©onsidar&.bly*m<^
Th» foreign banka specialised in foreign exchange*

Deposits also

«*?3 carried« With them loans were made against document© or by moans
of overdrafts; credit information m s furniahsd; drafts and transfers
s a w issued; and foreign trad® was financed*.

Besides© th$se mentioned

above* the foreign bonks served another important business*

Following

the Opium War in 1842 against Great Britain*. China was crowded with
troubles within and without the country, year in and year out*

The

^iasss Government was compelled not only to inour large war expenses
but also to pay heavy indemnities*

This led to making loans from foreign

sources * end the foreign banks in China

acted as agencies for handling

such losses* which again yielded considerable profits to them*
la addition to these* the foreign banks in China have been the cus
todians of huge exma of money deposited by Chinese mnti&rism* militarists*
politicals, and other rich people* who considered the foreign banks* pro
tested by extraterritorial treaties* to be sanctuaries for their money*

D« Others*
Prior to the period concerned* there existed a group of ssiall money
shops and money stands at which people could get o m kind of money changed
for another*

They used different rates for exchange in order to make

profit from their customers*

People who hod silver dollars and pieces of

silver wished to change them into copper cash in order to pay for daily
purchases| those who had a large amount of copper cash wished to change
it Into silver in order to pay for wholesale purchases and had to do

71Ibid** p. 102

business with these money shops and money stands in either a big city
or snail towns in China*

The rate of changing silver from cash or

changing cash from silver fluctuated from hime to time and from town
to t a n *

There was no governmental control*

Til* Suaait&ry and Si gnifieance— Puring the latter part of the Tsing
dynasty in China* the struggle between the dominsuTt minor and dominant
major groups, the Empress and Shaperor, m d the conservative and the reform
parties prevented every chance to reform, the political function and eco
nomic life of China and to introduce the Western type of civilization*
On the other hand these conflicts fed the ambition of the aggressors
eisong the Western Powers and Japan*

The aggression of the Western Powers

and Japan in fact added fue 1 to the existing fire of conflict*

The grave

situation lasted until 1911 when the Republic of China was created*
Until the last period of the Tsing dynasty (1851) China*s Govern
ment was inefficient and decentralized both from the standpoint of organ
isation and personnel, and it could not meet th© strong storm of the
transitional period*

It failed not only to fores®© the conditions and

set up a suitable policy for the country, but also failed to handle th©
existing trouble*
As to the public finance, the revenue was quite inadequate to meet
the needs of both central and local governmentc3 the administration of
collections ©specially of the land tax,
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regular customs, and th®

n *

The tax-collector goes to the taxpayer and delivers the tax-not©
itemized in accordance with law (the permanent aettleneit) and precedent
(th© accretions resulting, from, many a battle and sancti onod by custom of
years) • The amount shova as th© total cn the not Ice is th ® amount which
must be turned into the fJsion’s treasury (magictrat®), ®ud takes no ac
count of the actual coat of collection, though an amount is always in
cluded for It3 for the Hsian, more sinioo, pays his subordinates little
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gIikin#n was poorly handled from. the viewpQint of "th© prinoi'pls of
economy; 'th© whole system of taxation had its fundamenta1 weakness
in its inelasticity*

It is not too difficult to understand why both

the Central and th© provincial governments# for many years thereafter#
resorted to the currency policy as the main way to solve their finan
cial difficulties*

dr nothing as salary# but compels the® to scratch around for their
mainien&ncej and ©van a tax-collector must live* Th© Hsian# however#
arms his collectors with power# and thus armed they are enabled to oxtract their noos ts of collection” from the tax-payer-* The amount to b©
exacted is indeterminate# and forms the subject of a battle annually
renewed between payer and payee *. •* (p* S3)
•«« « t
**In on© district (Esien) 44 par cent is added for me It age fee# or
inferior touch# and 26 per cent* for an illusory ’cost of collection's
in another th© amount in taels is converted into cash at 2#600 to the
tael# and converted back into taels at 1,105# being an a ddition of 136
per cent*# end then 50 per cent* is added for ’cost of collection**
(pp* 83-84}
•»«••
*^hs typical customs post# and the fattest# was that of th© ’Hoppo*
of Canton****In 1843# with a collection exceeding, ten million taels#
in amount# the official return was less than one million*
• • * « *

nXn 1903 the Russian statistics showed on export to China exceed
ing the Chinese Customs import by over Tls* IS,000#.000# and tan import
from China exceeding th© Chines© Customs carport by over Tie® 30#000#000;
it is unlikely that this trade passed entirely untoxed# bath on th© inward
and th© outward traffic# and, at 5 per cent*# the duty collector! on this
trade alone amounted to Tls* 2#250,000* (pP* 95-96)
e « ©• e

’’Likin is a now levy, with its asm administration independent of all
other taxing agencies, and the collection is much more in th© hands of
the officer in charge of each barrier and hi© subordinates than is pos
sible with oiher taxes**..A special oa.se**• will perhaps best illustrate
our meaning•«*the costs of collection, as far a© this particular col
lect orate was concerned# dm & to nearly 100 per o©nt*— that is to say#
they practically collected Tie* 7*50 of which TIs* 3*50 arc the costa
of collecting Tls* 4*w (p# 105)
(5* B* Morse, The Trade end Adminlatration of Chino# London, 1913)
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Because o£ the lack of & money market for arranging the dome silo
loan for & short term and other reasons, China’s Government exclusively
employed foreign loans, even despite high intsrest rates and oppressive
terms, in order to get money to moot the war indemnity and at times
governmental expenditures*

Most all of the foreign loam were eon*

tr&eted in terms of a foreign currency unit on the gold basis, and
secured by the revenue of customs duties and the salt tax*

China’s

Government therefore assumed th® risk of the fTuotuaticra of th® gold
price of silver and also lost the right to control th© revenue from
these two important resources*

The foreign loans had indirectly driven

the Chinese Government to abuse the monetary policy evon in peace times*
Regarding China’s foreign trade, two things were worthy of notes
(1) Both excess of merchandise imports and large amounts of imports of
silver for a long period before 1898 were balanced by the export of
gold, emigrants’ remittances and the issuance of foreign loans; (S) th©
total amount of China’s foreign trad© increased from year to year*
In spite of the serious aggression of the Western Powers, China’s
whole situation, although very grave, was not hopeless.

Th© failure

of the young Chinese Reform Party that was attempting to improve th©
administration of th© Central Government and set up a new, effective
political machine in 1898 was the turning point for that country.

Prom

1698 forward, China’s monetary system followed the whole fortune of a
state turned into the dark storm for many years*

In China th© Chansi banks with adequate capital and their inherited
career monopolized the cojmneroi&l banking, business for many centuries
(since about 1200 A* 1>. to 1898, and even as late as I911).
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After the

7*S* R* Wagel, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, '1918, p. 154*

greater development of the domestic? and foreign trade, the natural
tendency of division of labor and the existing ciroumstances in China
fed th© growth of the native banks, cash shops and the foreign banks*
Gradually the Shansi banks were forced to get out of the way for the
new corners and shifted th© local banking business to the native banks.
The native and "official" banks took over th® function of keeping public
fends*

The native and foreign banks handled the function of remittance

of funds.
From the standpoint of the functions of the banking bus in© as , the
native banks did every kind of banking business which the modern banks
are doing to-day.

In organisation the native banks were neither joint-

stock banks nor corporations, but either partnerships or individuals
with unlimited powers.
personal basis*

They advanced loans not on security but on a

They were not controlled or superintended by Govern

ments but by non-official organisations, the ’’bankers guilds."

Besides

the native banks mentioned above, a few ’’official" banks crowded into
the banking theater.

During the few years before 1898, th© "official"

banks not only did the usual banking business but also issued paper money
either for their own purpose or for various province governments.

The

foreign banks took advantage of their hug© amount© of capital and fits
protection of the extraterritoriality to control China’s foreign ex
change, to finance China’s foreign trade, to do usual banking business
in trad© ports, to facilitate eoice political foreign loans to China’s
Central Government, to open a safe way for the avaricious officers to
deposit their money, and to issue tho bank notes.
Until 1898 China did not have tor own Central Gov©ramont bonk.
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Furthermore neither the Central Government nor th© provincial governmeats trie4 to superintend the hanking business and. set up some sound
banking regulations*
The situation of China*s monetary system prior to 1898 was much
more complicated*

Generally speaking, both silver arid copper coin cir«

eulated side by side throughout the whole country®

The paper money of

native banks, foreign banks, and firms was a relatively local currency*
Speaking in another way, th© silver shoes or foreign dollars were the
exchange medium, although not legal tender, in the wholesale trade, for
salaries, aid for public payment in the trade ports $ the copper cash were
used for the purpose of retail payment and daily wages*

In the interior,

the silver shoe of smaller sis©, foreign dollars, and pieces of silver
were used for large payments} and copper cash, later on the subsidiary
silver coin, for small payment*
main role*

Is small towns copper cash played the

In trade ports or cities with foreign banks and Chinese

native banks, firms issusd silver notes based on either th© dollar or
the tael*

In the interior native banks, firms and individuals used to

issue cash notes, which circulated in a certain area*
The units of tael by which silver shoes and silver pieces are counted
are different from each other depending on places, business, and tradition*

It is the seme case on the ?,toudh” or "purity** of si Ivor®

silver shoe is neither regular in size nor of th© same purity.

The
Th©

irregular silver pieces oan be about one tael for the big sis©,
1/lOQth. of one tael for the small size*
ar© not quite th© same*

The purity of silver pieces

$hen people used either shoe a or pieces of

silver, they must weigh them and reckon their touch one by one*

78
Tbs foreign dollars circulate in their own preferred area or port*circulate by weight, not by count, in China#
Th® Chinese dollar and subsidiary silver coin produced by provinces
are different in appearance, weight, and purity*

Dollars circulate' out

of the province where they ar© produced at discount, and the subsidiary
coin at
A®

a discount even in the province where they aare coined*
to the copper coins, worn and new, genuine and counterfeit,all

of them are accepted by people#

The rate of exchange between silver

and copper cash fluctuates from time to time, from place to place, from
one kind of quality of cash to another *

Especially in Peking, then the

Capital, tdie token copper coins fluctuated much more than the heavier
cash in other places#
Gold in China was not used as a medium of exchange, bub as one kind
of artcask value, as a means of saving, and as ornaments.

For a great many

years, the export of China's gold was more than its import#

It is said

that one of the reasons leading to the excess export of gold is the
rising price of gold in the world market compared with the price of
silver#

Another reason is that the Chines© send gold out as on© of the

ways to settle the usual unfavorable balance of trade*
The fluctuation of the changing rate between gold

and silverin

the domestic market of China and the rat© of foreign exchange between
China and countries using gold money always followed the tendency of the
fluctuation of “the gold price of silver in th© world market#

GEAPTSR III
THS CURRENCY REFORM OF CHINA'S GOVtRMFS?^ AM) BSPORTAHT
PROPOSALS OF THE REFORM (BEFORE 1910)

I* Th© factors leading to th© preliminary proposals *
After th© war with Japan in 1895* th© modern reform movement became
extremely popular and spread over every branch of governmental adminis
tration*

Influenced by a small group of energetic reformers* who were

readily listened to by the Emperor Kuang~hsi, the government projected
many comprehensive and radical reform measures for the modernisation of
the country*

Within this high tide of reform enthusiasm the currency

reformers started calling th© government *s attention, to the existing
complicated monetary condition*

Although this general movement for

reform was rudely interrupted by the coup d’etat of 1898* and a r©ac
tion came with the return of the rule of the Empress Dowager, the govern
ment and some farsighted provincial officials never lost Bight of th©
existing serious weaknesses in the monetary system in the country.
II. The important preliminary proposals of currency reform befor©
1900s
A* Mr. Hu Chu-fen* the fayor of Peking* which was the national
capital at that time, in a memorial submitted to Emperor Kuantl~hsi in
1895, suggested the introduction of a uniform ooimage system using
three metals, namely, gold, silver, and copper.

He furthermore suggested

th© establishment of a bank of issue under the control of the hoard of
Revenue with branches in certain provinces.
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The prop©eels as submitted by Mr. Hu Chu-fen were not capable of
reeXlse&ien* because, In the first place, th® country at the time was
met reacty* for this change.

In the second place, he was not any too

conversant with the mechanism which his scheme entailed.
8. Mr. Wang Pen-yu&n, a censor* In another memorial to the Hmperor
in the same year* proposed the immediate coinage of silver to take th®
place of copper cm the market, and the opening of a central silver mint
In order to relieve the market stringency caused by the scarcity of copper
cash.
The only reaction to the proposal was the establishment of several
provinoial mints* which further complicated the situation.
There were numerous proposals of the same kind mentioned above,
but none of them revealed a thorough understanding of the existing
monetary situation, nor offered a well-drafted plan of reform.

Thee®

patriotic officials were not experts in currency theory or practice and
therefore suggested only what they thought to be important.

tfeverthe**

less* they had really suggested some significant points and advanced
wh&t they considered to be the suitable remedy for the serious monetary
condition which then existed.
C. The first comprehensive programme of currency reform was pro
posed in 1896 by Mr. Sheng Hsu&n-huai, the Junior Secretary in the
Foreign Office.

Within his program several main points were as foHowes

1. The Chingping tael, 900 fine, of silver should bo adopted as
the monetary unit.
2. A Central Mint should be stabliehed at Peking and branch mints
at Tientsin, Shanghai, Canton, a m Wuchang.
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3* Taxes should be made payable In the national coin and the use
of bullion as currency should b© prohibited*
4* A national bank, with a cap it al of 5,000,000 taels of silver,
all shares to be held by Chinese only, should bo established at Shanghai
and should b© known as the Imperial Chines© Bank of International Commere©*
5* Gold coins and subsidiary silver coins should also b© sainted*
Ur* Sheng was heavily interested in th© Chin© Merchants* Steam Navi
gation Company; and ha pledged th© shareholder© of th© Company to supply
the proposed central bank with one-fifth of its share capital*

-The recom

mended bank was to have the right of coinage; th© powers were to issue
notes, to handle all govermaent funds and to establish branch bank© in
.the provincial capitals, and in ports in Europe and America*
Although this proposal was sanctioned^ it was not put into effect*
Because his training had been that of an official in th© Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, he was not conversant with the far-reaching financial
system*

Fe&nwhil© tbs conditions within China &ft©r th© Sine-J&panes©

War were very difficult ones*

Before any definite step oould be taken

th© Boxer outbreak occurred and no steps were taken until about th© letter
part of 1901,
D, In 1897 l£r* Chen Chi-ohang, a censor, suggested that several
dencminati ona of th© cash should be struck by modern machinery and put

^The imperial sanction was granted Feb* 26, 1897, to Shong and ho
was given authority, as soon as the bank had been established, to strite
100,000 coins based on the tael in accordance with hi© proposal* These
coins were to be put Into circulation as an experiment* Th© powers and
privileges conferred upon the bank wore very comprehensive, including
the right to coin money, issue note©, handle all government funds and
establish branch banks in the provincial capitals, the open porta and in
Europe and Amsrioa* (ft'ext Pin-wel, The Currency Problem in China, Colum
bia University, 1914, p • 54*)
~
■

80
into circulation*

Th© eountefoiting practices with th© old cash had

become so&ndalous, and it was suggested that eoinag© by th© new method®
would safes oounfeerfait lag much more difficult*

Life© most of th© proposal®

©f that time, it lad to no practical action until

1002

.

£• In 1807 Mr* Yang Yi-ohi, who was then a junior official in on©
of tha ministries, stimulated th© embarrassment of th© government in
finding the msasifbr th© payment of interest end principal for its foreign
geld loans, proposed officially th© introduction of the English monetary
system into China, with th© gold pound as th© unit*

He suggested that

gold export through the port of Shanghai should be mad© illegal*

This

refora was not realised*
Among all of th© proposals mentioned above, with the exception of
Mr* Bhang hsuan-huai's banking project, non© offered a complete plan*
Each was but one cf th© many political and financial reforms that was
advocated by the government and by people over th® country*
III* The condition ftf 1000 and afters
A* The increasing foreign loara— Immediately after 1900 the worst
foreign gold debt was the Boxer Indemnities of 450,000,000 Haikwan taels*
This indemnity was made into a gold debt bearing four p e r cant* interest
and calculated at a rate fixed by foreign countries (eight in number)*
This indemnity debt was secured by (1) the national customs revenue,
(2 ) the revenues from native customs within one hundred fifty miles of
the treaty ports, (3) the salt tax*

2

The annual payment for amortisa

tion and interest was as followsi
A— 18,829,500 taels to be paid from 1st year to 9 th year,
B— 19,829,300
w
« «
u
n IQth ta * 13th " ,
^Feng“Hua Huang, “Public Debts in China,” Studios in History, &eo^nmietKi and Public Law* Vol* LXXXY, ho- 2, Columbia V)niv©rsYEy, p* 25*
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C— 23,285,300 taels to be paid from 14th year,
©— 34,485.600
" * "
*
" 13th w
to 30th year,
8— 35,350,150
« •
•
»t
a 30th "
" 39th
* .
The principal, £67,500,000 {in China9 s money it is 450,000,000 laikwaa
taels) and interest on the huge debt were payable in gold currency*
Th© amount mentioned above added to th© annual p&ymairfc on the war
indemnity loan (£38,032,884) of SinO“Japanese STIs t (1804*»X89§) and the
amortisation aid interest of foreign loans contrasted before 1300 are
really & heavy burden to the govorisnsnt«
B* The gold price of silver— Th© price of silver after 1900 continued
to dec 1in© further from its already depreciated level as shown by th®
annual rates shown below
1870
1884
1893
1894
1898
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1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1908
1909
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15/16 *
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15/16 tf
5/l6
"
«
3/16
"
«
1/lB
**
»
3/4
"
«
13/32 *
n
13/16 ,s
n
13/32 *
»
23/32 w

The decline of the gold price of silver increases the already heavy
burden on China’s Govermaent from the point of view of payment of gold
currency (since her standard was silver) for her foreign loans and debts
which originated from war indemnity*
C* Th© foreign countries* urgency for China’s currency reform— The
M&eksy treaty or what is known as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
between China and Great Britain, signed on September 5, 1902, provided

SfYmual Report of the Director of the Mint, Washington, D* C *,
1940, p* 867
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that “China agree* to taka th® necessary steps to provide a uniform
national coinage whioh shall be legal tender in payment of all duties*
taxes and other obligations throughout th® Empire by British as well as
Chinese subjects•** The Treaty of Commerce between the United States and
China signed in the following month also contained a provision to that
effect.
0* The example of currency reform given by th© neighboring countries—
Besides Japan and Russia which had adopted the gold standard in 1897*
several countries and colonies located around China had adopted the gold
standard or the gold exchange standard.

For instance* India* in 1893*

joined the rank of nations preparing to adopt the gold standards

in 1902

America decided to refora ourreno y in th® Philippine Islands 5 on Severnbar 25* 1902 the gold exchange standard was adopted by Siam; a currency
committee had been appointed already in 1893 to suggest Improvemanfc in
the currency system of the Straits Settlements and the Malay States § India
adopted th* gold exchange standard in 1898. In such

circumstances Shim,

was stimulated a great deal in her already loudclaim for currency reform.
In the spring of 1903 the great Osaka Exhibition was opened.

Th© Chinese

Government availed itself of that opportunity to delegate Prince Tsai Chon
and the Grand Councillor tia Tung to visit Japan*

UTa Tung was specially

charged to investigate ths working, of th© gold-standard system in Japan
with the object of having it introduced into China.

But no report and

proposal was ever made by Ka Tung.
S* The minting of new copper conte— Alt houjji the establishment of
the first modern mint in Canton was in 1889, the coinage of the new copper
cents began in 1900.

Th© design of the modem Chinese copper coinage is

m

e h a r a c f c a r i b y an aliagorloal designs th© stamping o f the value i in
many eases by the date of issue being iaassribedg by omitting the square
hole in tbs center, so ehar&cteristie of ancient cash coins*

These ar®

the most important of the innovations whioh distinguished the new coin
age from the antiquated issue of copper o&sh.^
According to one record,
The first modern copper coin produced in Canton is 28 m* su in
diameterj it is composed of red copper* The obverse shows within
an inner circle the dragon emblem, while the outer circle bears
the inscription ”£wangtung one cent.” The rovers© has ixusorigtions
In Chinese and Manchu characters* The doriominrAAon Mono cent was
soon altered to ttten cash,” an inscription whioh all Chinos© copper
coins of that value showed during the imperial regime*
The coinage of tbs Canton Mint was just a provincial affair*

Th©

conclusion of peace in 1901, after th© Boxer Rebellion, led to an im
provement through far-reaching reforms in ©very branch of China’s national
life*

Relating to the new copper coinage, a reform ©diet was issued under

date of February 2, 1902s
•••Let the Viceroys and Governors of Hi a provinces along th© River
Yanhse and the sea-ooast provide th© necessary funds and adopt th®
aforesaid plan (as the plan of Kw&ngtuaag and Fuehien) and at once
mint these coins in addition to th© otha r being mad© by them, that
they say be put into general circulation....The legal cash of the
Capital ought also to be of th© seme sortj therefore, lot th© pro
vinces of Fuohien, Kwaagtung, and Kiangsu at one© forward to th©
Board of Revenue several hundred thousand each of the copper coins
minted by them, that the s&id Board may pay them out and get them
into us©, which we hop^ will be beneficial arid oonvenient to the
people and prove a help to the currency..<,•
The order of the Coatral Govormnont was obeyed by the provinces whioh
foresaw the possibility of obtaining profits from minting.

Provincial

^H* •£*-* Samsden, M o d e m Chinoss Copper Co i r s , ^orcoo'cer, p'.6.ss», 1011,

p. 3#
^S. Aaim, The Currencies of China* Shanghai, 1926, p* 393*
®Jbids, p. 39d.
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mists sprang up liks mushrooms #

!,Their output; of now copper cents was

readily taka®. by the people* not only at the face-value of 100 to th®
dollar* but not infrequently at a premia*n7
Within a few years after the beginning of the coinage in 1900* a
bogs amount of the copper cents was put out from these provincial mints#
One source put the estimate at the figure of 10,000,000,000 places issued
up to th® and of 1908*
Wuehang Mint*

9

8

and probably over a third of these earn® from the

From other sources it is said that the'total issue of

copper coins rose from 1,698,700,000 pieces in 1904 to 7,600,000,000 in
1&# following year; and at the close of 1906 there were sixteen copper
mists and 846 coinage presses with a capacity of sixteen billion coins
a year#

10

The imports of copper, whioh rarely amounted to over a mil

lion taels before, increased to nearly twenty-two million taels in 1807®
These new copper coins weighed only 7*6 grama, containing ninety-five
per cent* copper and five per cent# sine, and th©actual values of
tael and a dollar were then equivalent
respectively*

to228and

a silver

168 pieces ofcopper,

These cents or ten-cash pieces at first circulated at the

rate of a hundred for & dollar#

Therefore these cents war© only token

coins which at first the people took readily*
F# Depreciating the new copper cents— After overp rodnotion of these
new coins, the old cash, being undervalued in t$xms of the* new coins, was

7Ibid», p# 395#
A# Hamsden, Modern Chinese Copper Coins, Worcester, Mass*, 1911,
p* 4*
B. Mor
^Currsncy ixi
JourDii
1 of tb.6 3y?® 0»
Rt A* J3*, Vol* 38, 1306, p, 15*
H. Wagel, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 1915, p# 108%
aryi g, Kami, The Currencies of Chino., Shanghai, J.92S, p* 102®
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rapidly disappearing from the principal city markets through the opera
tion of Gresham's Law (the better ones were melted down and the inferior
ernes driven to surrounding territory)*
The success and the minting profit obtained by the provinces* whioh
had mints* caused Jealousy among soma of the provinces without possession
of coinage plants*

This led to feverish activity for installment of

further minting machinery*

In the minds of governors* coinage of money

became a favorite means of raising revenues*

In consequence* the over

production of the new copper coins or copper cents and finally the de
preciation of their value was ih© result*

For instance* they depreciated*

in terms of silver in Shanghai, twenty-two per cent* within the year 1006*
The conditions in different provinces varied* but the depreciation was
general*

Furthermore this situation became more serious from th© follow

ing causes:

The embargo which was placed by some of the provinces on

the import of copper cunts from neighboring provinces caused further
depreciation of this copper cent in the market of the ov©r-produotive
provinces*

The lack of uniformity owing to th© coinage by different

policies of province mints was also responsible for depreciation from
the original value of the copper cent*

11

The Government was gravely concerned about th© depreciation of copper*
An edict issued on August 22, 190b pointed out the serious situation*

On

December 7 of the same year* th© copper coinage was ordered suspended for
a period of thro© months, ©waiting results of invest!gat ion*

Under the

nominal control of the Beard of Finance th© minting was soon resumed
in 1906*

From then on no attention was paid to the actual demand for

Kann* ?hg» Currencies of China* 1926* p* 395*
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solas.

Violent fluctuations in the silver value of thes® copper coin©

took place almost dally*

la th© coarse of th® following; years the

provincial mints continued to strike large quantities of copper coins
ia their osa way.

It is said that in 1906 the total issues of copper

coins turned out by provincial mints was

1

*7 0 9 ,5 8 4 , 0 0 0 piecesj in 1907

and 1906 the issues were 2,851,200,000 and 1,428,000,000 pieces,
respectively.

In 1909 most of the copper mints were obliged to close

daws, the market being over flooded with coppers.

In 1910 the total

issue was worth the silver value of 100,000,000 taels.^
ius to the confusion of the coinage and distribution of China5s
copper cents, the following factors were accepted as the causes increas
ing the seriousness of the confusion*

(1) The absence of adequate

transportation facilities, which prevented rapid and organised distributies.*

The outlying districts lacked this copper coin and the producing

centers were congested with it,
be Very extensive.

(2) Speculation in these co ins grew to

The copp©r cent is distinctly a token coin of a

bullion value inferior to its face amount.

It has become an article

of fluctuating value and an excellent object with whioh to speculate*
(3) Ignorance and avarice displayed by some of China's official,s.
(4) The prohibition o£ the part of one province to permit the importa
tion into its own domains of coppers produced in another province*
{6) Th© deliberate adulteration of the metallic content of the coins,
reduction of their sise and weight and very inferior workmanship.
(6) Tim refusal of all government offices to accept the new coins at
their face value, 100 pieces to th© dollar, but instead only at their

12Ibid.. P. 397.
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market Tftlui*

(7) An additional factor, contributing indirectly

towards tbs icoliao In Talus of China's copper currency system, is to
ha f©and ia th© uncontrolled issue of vast quantities of copper cash
note®*

These ar© ©a itted not only by provincial banks, but also by

private* banters, by cash shops, by pawn shops and by dealers in msr©handle© ©h© have ©if fie lent standing to Induce the people to accept
swell notes*

(8) Furthermore another principal cause of th® debacle is

he be found ia the desire ho derive undue profits from minting*

IS

O* The ©ver-produa tion of subsidiary silver coinage™***If wa trace
the tendency of tbs provincial minte’ policy, we shall find that the
provincial mints mere originally created for the purpose of minting
the old eash and the silver dollars*

Sooner or later they tend that

the issue of the eld cash involved a loss to the respective provincial
governments * Thus they stopped issuing the cash end turned their full
attention to-the silver dollars*

Finally they found that thee® Chines©

dollars (dragon dollars) were not freely received for taxes, end wfeaa
taten, ware accepted by weight, and not by count * These dollars had
not the prestige of the Mexican dollars, but had only a provincial
gmrente©* ***** outside the province of issue circulated only at a digcount•

The policy ©f the mints vias changed again*

energy to the issue of subsidiary silver coinage*

They devoted thair
The* ten-cant and

tweetyoent pieces of subsidiary silver coins, whioh consisted of
silver 800 fine (while the dollar was 900 fin®) could be sold from the
at 110j for the dollar and still show a profit*

In this case

the Inevitable result m s an enormous overeproduction of these silver

*sIbid *, pp* 387-406*
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84&sldiary coins, thou greatly out of proportion to th® output of th®
dollar pieces*^*

Tbs logical consequence was th® falling in their

m r h i t value*
HP"* The currency reform of China's Govornmont end the proposals
consenting currency reforms
Since the movement of reform initiated by Emperor Kwong-sui in 1898
had failed, no step regarding th© currency reform m s taken either by the
Central Severasent or the provincial governments*

However, the situation

of the monetary system in the whole country became worse*

At last th®

Cent rtO. Government was forced to do something because of the seriousness
of the situation*
An edict issued after th® Boxer Rebellion by th© Impress Dowager in
August 19G1 ordered the closing of th© provincial mints, except those at
Canton and Wuchang®, and legalised the circulation of coins issued by
those two mints in view of their uniform might and fineness*

These two

mints were ordered to supply all the provinces with coins, in exchange
for pure silver ingots*

Th® ©diet declared that seventy per cent* of

the tribute and taxes were thenceforth to b© payable in silver syce®
and thirty per cent• in silver dollars*

18

The officers of the mints were

required to give great care to th© strict uniformity in th© weight and
fineness of the coins and to render quarterly reports of th© mint to th®
Board of Revenue*

Owing to the enormous ©xtent of th© territory and th©

total ismae of dollars was estimated at 40,000,000, while th©
number of fractional silver issues was 1,400,000,000, according to a
government statement made in 1910* (Wen Fln-wei, Th© Currency Problem in
China* Columbia University, 1914, p* 45.)
2-^The word syce® used in China to describe silver oj a certain fine
ness* •• •Syce© is in China often called Wen Yin, meaning pur® silver”*.**
Syeee silver is gene rally oast into "shoes” in China. (Herbert M*
Bratter, Silver Market Dictionary* 1933, p. 172*)
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absence of modern means of transportation, th© eapaoity of th© two
m in ts was not great enough to supply China with the neoeeeaiy ©sins*

A© a natter of fact, th© edict of reform of th® provincial mints was not
obeyed*
In 19Q3 China Joined Mexico in proposing to th© fiovarxausnt of the
thaited States that an arrangement b© made for an international inquiry
Into the silver quest! on*

fin April 2% 1903 an Imperial edict was issued,

appointing a Financial Cosraaission.

The sssn© edict ordered the establish*

sent of a central mist at Tientsin for the purpose of making silver coins
uniform*

The edict stated in parts

8e hereby command Prince CHixig and Chu Hung-chi, in conjunction
with the Board of Finance, to consider carefully all necessary steps
to mate© improvements in that direct!©a* *.*
At any rate, uniformity must be preserved with regard to all
the money received or sent out by the Board of f inance or by various
provincial treasuries****Weslso command you to make exhaustive in
vestigations as to how to frame satisfactory regulations, mad submit
them to .us in regular order for enforcement*
Unfortunately Prince Ching, th© head of th© Gkyvenzmanb under the
S&press Oow&ger, and Chu Euag-ohi, the President of th© Board of Foreign
Affairs, were not men well versed in this particular branch of knowledge*
Besides the establishment of a Central Mint and the Financial Com
mission, all the Chines© legations in Surop® were instructed to partici
pate in the discussion of China’s currency reform*
Professor Jeremiah W* Jenks co-operated with H* H* Hanna and C* A*
Conant, members of the Cossniesion on International Exchange from th®
H&lted States, after being invited by China’s Government and visiting
China with the purpose of investigating business condition© in that
country, and he suggested a new monetary system for China early in 1904*

m
The main Ideas in his plan ares
&.* Stand&rd— He recommended a general monetary system of si Ivor
coins with a fixed gold value• The standard unit of value will consist
df eartain grains of gold and bo worth presumably th® gold vs.Ins of a
tael of silver.

Silver coins at par with standard gold at a ratio of

about 32 to 1 will be coined for circulation in the country.

It will

be free coinage of suitable pieces on demand for reasonable coinage
charges.
For maintaining the ratio of 32 to 1 between gold and silver, he
gave the following reasons *
Fluctuations downward in the value of silver would increase the
difference between the bullion value of the silver coins and their
face value under a gold exchange standard* thereby imposing a
heavier burden upon the credit of the issuing gavernmenft and increas
ing the dsger of counterfeiting, but suoh fluctuations would not in
themselves necessarily defeat the system, as is shown by the circu
lation of the coins of the countries of the Latin Union and the
United States at a face value more than double their bullion value.
Fluctuations upward in the price of silver bullion, on the other
hand, if they carried the price above th® coinage ratio even for a
short time would involve serious risk of driving the coins to the
melting pot and denuding the countsy of its currency.
The issue of coins upon a gold exchange basis at the ratio of
32 to 1 would meet these conditions at th© present price of silver,
because it would afford a margin of about IS per o®nt between th®
gold exchange value of the coin and the bullion value of the metal
which it would contain.
Furthe rmoie he said that the ratio of about 32 to 1 did not depart
widely from the current gold value of the silver currency in circulation
in the Orient-

IT

It represents the average price of silver for the ten

years ending with 1902.

Jtill another reason for ohoosing the ratio of

32 to 1 was given by him as fbllows*
H* Hanna, C. A. Constat, and J. W. Jenlcs, Stability of Interna
tional Sbsehanfc®. 58th Congress, Second Session, KouseTo? Representatives,
Document So. 144, Washington, 1903, pp. 92-94*
I7Ibld., p. 25.
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It seems to to desirable, therefore* in countries whos® police
system is not thoroughly organised to prevent and detect counter
feiting and whose oredit la not of the highest order, to depart
from the ratio of European countries and the United States and to
choose a ratio more closely approximating the bullion value of the
coins**a
8* Adninl strati on— ’For the purpose of establishment and management
of the new plan, the Chinese Government should employ a foreign comptroller
eft the currency having general charge of th® system for China*
C* Schedule of time— He recommended that th® now system be put into
effect when 25,000,000 of the new coins were rea^r for circulation.

The

Government should declare, from time to time by proclamation in the vari
ous provinces, the new coins legal tender for debts incurred after a cer
tain date*

Within five years the new system should be introduced into

all the treaty ports and as far as possible elsewhere*

All customs duties

and local taxes should be collected in th® new currency as fast as it was
adopted*
0* Set hod of maintenance— For the maintenance of the parity of the
silver coins, +hs Chinese Government should open credit accounts in
foreign trade ports against which it mig^t draw gold bills at a fixed
rate somewhat above th® usual banking rates.

For replenishing th®

gold fund after Its reduction by gold bills, the comptroller of the cur
rency had to honor silver drafts drawn by the foreign agents of th©
Treasury in exchange for gold at rates fixed by the comptroller*

If it

were necessary a loan would be mad© in order to scour© with adequate
exchange funds.

Th® seigniorage profit from coinage would be kept a® a

separate fund*

10 Ibid*, p. 26 .

In introducing his plan, he pointed out that th© introduction ot
th® new system must, in the nature of the oe.se,Mb® gradual.
the hanks would he required.

The aid of

IS

Finally he Ha t e d the economic benefits of th® proposed reform*
(l) ^Farther losses in the proceeds of taxation o&ussd by th# fall in
the gold value of silver will b© brought to an ©rid” ? (2) an increase in
the public revenues will be the result of the increased stimulus given
to trade and industry by th© adoption of a stable monetary systems and
(5) the inducement of foreign investment § in China*

20

From Mr* JenkS* plan, it is easily understood that some distinguishing ideas had been in hie mind*

Generally speaking, his plan shows a

relatively well considered grasp of th® existing situation and detailed
schemes feu* the operation of the plan. H© based his arguments on the
principles of monetary science and drew reference from th© practice in
the colonies of Me stern Powers*
gold-exchange steward.

In th© main his plan was known as a

But it is more or less different from th©

theoretical gold-exchspge standard.

According to a theoretical gold-

exchange standard a legal and fixed ratio is determined by a nation
without active gold coins, but with subsidiary silver coins for the pur
pose of circulation.

In his plan h® seems to put th© ffgold coins” with

the subsidiary silver coins for the purpose of circulation.

If this is

so, his plan is a modified kind of gold standard and is not th® pur©
gold-exchange standard.

tTow from the technical point of view, Professor

JenksT plan left sons problems to bo solved*

^ Ibid.. p. 23.
aolbid., p. 24.
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1* As to the ratio of 32 to 1, he &ays that wit would afford a
margin of about IS per cent between the gold exchange value of the
coins and the bullion value of the metal whioh it would contain,!t but
if the price of silver bullion went above the coinage ratio in a short
tine, it would tend to drive th© coins to th© malting pot*
be remedied by changing the ratio*

That might

From the theoretical view, the

change of ratio is a reasonable and possible policy, but in practice
it is not a safe policy to change a fixed ratio within a short time
in a case like that of Chine*

In view of ths lack of good systems

of transportation, coxsroani cation, and banking, and from the viewpoint
of the conservation of Chinese people, it is doubtful that changes of
ratio oould be declared by the Government within a short time to meet a
sudden change in the gold price of si Ivor in the international market*
2* If bar foreign trade should permanently show an unfavorable
balance, under ti» Jenks* plan China would have difficulty in maintain
ing her exchange fund safely*

To borrow foreign money in order to

maintain a gold-exchange standard is not only dangerous but also is
impossible *
3* In the case of China around 1900 both Chinos© Government and
people were taking many pains In dealing with ths Yvystern r’efwero*
Normally ths appointment of a foreign comptroller for the currency
reform is considered a desirable financial stop, but in fact It would
lead to political trouble between China *b Government and the foreign
invaders*

The appointment of the Inspector-General of th© Imperial

Marine Customs of China has offered a good example•

But as a matter

of fact, China really needed experts on currency reform*

In this dif

ficult situation it was a logical result that the plan of Professor
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wad provincial governments &ad influential individuals in bh© country,
Among the opposers Chang Chih—tung, then the viceroy of Hunan and Hupeh,
mad© a strong attack on the plan because of the appointment of the
foreign comptroller.
Besides th© questions mentioned above, there were still many to be
decided.

In his plan, "the unit to consist of *** grains of gold and tb

be worth presumably th© gold value of a tael or somewhat more than a
Mexican dollar"— if th© "taeln is used, what kind of ta©l is it?
If the ntaeiw is not used, what sis© greater than a Mexican dollar
will be used?

How does th© plan treat th© existing copper cash and

ths subsidiary coins?

How does the plan treat the Provincial Mints?

Another serious difficulty will be met, when a money system of
gold-exchange standard is introduced into China*
of preventing counterfeiting.

That is th© problem

Professor Jeiiks had considered it whan

he drew th© plan, but ha omitted the specially serious character of the
counterfeiting in China.

As Mr. P. W. hen pointed outs

Of course, the danger of counterfeiting is unavoidable in other
countrie s where token coins are in circulations but it was claimed,
*rsA this must be admitted as quit© true, that the danger was es
pecially great in China because of the enormous extent of terri
tory and the looseness of the political system. Moreover, th©
leased territories could easily be mad© use of as & basis for
counterfeiting operations if th© Government should successfully
prevent them in Chinese territory.
Viceroy Chang Ghih-tuag, who wielded groat influence in the M&iaohu
court, did not favor the plan proposed by Professor denies.

First of

all, lie objected to employing a foreign comptroller who would play, an
\

The Currency Problem in China, 1914, pp. 98-99.

important ftinabion in the plan proposed by Professor Jenks*

Secondly,

be pointed out th© impr&et icab111ty of the gold standard system for
China* and said*
••♦The people are poor* product of labour cheap, labour and
personal service unremunsrativ©, th© common people economical in
their way of living* Therefor© the daily expenditures are usually
reckoned in terms of the cash* A poor man limits his daily ex
penses to not over 20 cash, those of the w© 11-to-do olasses to not
more than S0/7Q cash* In trade cantors along the sea coast and
the Youngtsse River gold and silver* bullion or coins, circulate
side by side with the cash; but goods from th© interior* whother
wholesale or retail, are always valued in terns of the cash****
Generally speaking, In the cities of th© provinces of Kwapgtung,
Kwangei, Yunna, Kiangsi, Chekiang and Ki&ngsu, 70/80 per cent* of
the business is done in silver currency, the remaining 20/50 per
cent* in the copper oash| in the trad© centres along the banks of
the upper Youngtsse business is done, partly in silver and partly
in cash; in the interior towns on both sides of the Youagtoae th©
proportions are 10 per cent* in silver sad 90 par cent* in cash;
in the provinces along the Huang River 93/99 per cent* is cash and
the rest is in silver* ' Taking the country as a whole, the copperusing area is ten times as much as the silver-using area* Hence
it is easily seen that China is actus. 1ly a copper-using country,
although foreigners considor it only in the light of a silverusing country * Hot? much more different, therefor®, China is from
foreign countries where it is found suitable to use gold, on ac
count of the enormous wealth and the high level of prices prevail
ing in these countries.
For this period of time statistical material can not be obtained.
In my opinion Chang#s analysis closely follows the existing, facts*
For a criticism of the ratio of 32 to 1 between silver and gold
proposed by Professor Jenks, Chang hold that the silver coins in
Professor Jenks* plan were to pass at th a ratio of 32 to 1 in Chinn,
but if payments abroad were made with these coins they must bo valued
'according to their bullion content on the market price, i.e., about the
ratio of 40 to 1*

This regulation proposed by Jenks would therefor©

compel the Chines© people to pay over to th© Government a taoX gold,
22

XI. H. Hanna, C* A. Conant, end J* '?• denies, Stability of Internati QMAjl ffxchaiur.e . bSth Congress, Second Cession, louse of Representa
tives* Document Ho* 144, TVashington, 1303, p. 25*

worth 40 taels of silver* as the equivalent of 32 taels of silver*
while foreigners upon entering Chines© territory csould with $2 taels
of silver get the equivalent purchasing povar of one tael of gold.
Apparently Professor Jenks w&a attempting to follow ths long-time ratio
and the example of the Philippines*
The ratio of about 32 to 1 was adopted in th© Philippines and
has been recommended for other countries* because it seems to
conform to the requirements of existing conditions.....The ratio
of 32 to 1 does not depart widely from the present, and recent
gold value of the silver currency in circulation in the Orient.
It represents the average price of silverfor the ten years ending
with 1902. It was also the actual ratio of about two yvsarsu&go
and of several preceding years.
But it is truethat when Mr* Chang wrote his criticism th© ratio
of 40 to 1 was the case inthe local market of
commercial ratio of silver

China.

But ths average

to gold in London1s market was 34.68 and

33.33 in 1901 and 1900 respectively* and the average ratio for the ten
years ending with 1902 was about 33 to 1.

Mr* Chang criticised Pro*

fessor Jenks * ratio based on the average for ths past ten years by th©
already changing ratio in th© currant market.
Finally as to the suitable time vhen China could adopt the gold
standard* he maintained that the reform of China *s currency must begin
with establishing uniformity in the silver and copper currencies.
value of a tael in ths cash should be mad© fixed end deficit©.

Th©

After

the currency has been made uniform* after the coins o f silver and of
copper have com© to stand in a definite ratio, after thp

us© of bullion

as currency has been given up, after th© product of gold mining has
gradually increased and the use of gold for ornamental purposes has boon

^Annual Report of the Director of the hint* 1940, ^sshington* p. 6
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effectively prohibited, after railroads have spread over th© whole
country, after silver coins have bosom® universally acceptable, after
eonsumption of native products has Increased, after manufacture by
means of modern machinery has pushed into the interior, and after the
circulation of silver has reached even the remotest regions of th®
Empire, then the government should investigate the whole situation of
China and consider attempting to introduce th© gold standard*

Mean

while he pointed out that "if gold become dear and silver cheap, it
would be a great encouragement to the development of export trades con
sequent ly domestie industry would spring up in course of time and China
would become economically independent*”

As to adopting the unit of

tael instead of the dollar, ha argued that ¥?th© adoption of th© dollar
as & unit was not feasible because tbs adjustment, especially in the case
of the land tax and grain commutation, where th® fractions are carried to
a millionth part of a tael, would become exceedingly difficult*"

At

that tims even though a strong body of opinion was against the tael and
in favor of th© dollar, which was 72/100 of the weight Of the tael,
Chang proposed the tael coinage*

Be suggested that an experiment be made

in Wuchang first, and if it is successful th© scheme will b© adopted by
the whole country*

To this proposal, the imperial sanction was granted*

The Viceroy was then in a position of great influence • As id© from th©
fact that h® was Viceroy of th© two important provinces of Hupei and
Hunan, he had had a vice-regal career of more than a quarter of a century,
and was the leader of the literate.

Furthermore he had been a pioneer

in the currency-reform movement and was responsible for the establishment
of th® first mint at Canton in 1887*

His memorial may b© reasonably taken
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as voicing th® official opinion of the time*

His proposal greatly

influenced th® creation of th® tael coinage act of 1905*
Following Chang** proposal, about 600,000 tael coins have boon
minted at Wuehahg as an experiment«

Chang tried to carry out his plan

in his own province of Hupei by way of providing an example for th© whole
country, but his death put an end to his own project*
In 1903 Hr* Jamiessin, an Englishman, pointed out that th© gold
exchange standard, which was the plan supported by Professor Jenks,
stressed foreign trade sad ignored domestic commerce*

He held that the

direct object of China’s currency reform was the silver standard Che
may mean the uniformity of the silver coins, since it is logically is*»
possible to have both a silver standard and gold exchange standard
operating simultaneously), and that the gold exchange standard should
be adopted only after the silver standard had been perfooted*

Even

though be never suggested a valuable plan, his observation was rela
tively near to the practical situation of the existing Chin©a© currency*
claim influenced the argument between the

silver standard and the

gold standard under the movement of currency reform to no less extant*
Another important suggestion concerning a uniform currency for
China was Sir Robert Hart’s proposal*

Sir Robert Hart, th© Inspector-

General of Imp rial Marine Customs of China, presented his proposal to
China's Board of Foreign Affairs in 1803*
The principal point of his scheme was *fa silver coinage on a gold
gA
basis •**

He pointed out that the gold price of silver varies from day

to day and is still falling*

Because of th© uncertainties of the gold

despatch^ of Sir Robert Hart appeared in a Chinese Hu-Fao (news
paper) May 7, 1803 and the copy of the same proposal oan also bo found in
pages 36—42 of Mr* Joseph Adkins* Banking and Prices in China, 1905•

price of silver, China’s traders suffered much inconvenience and China’s
Government had to pay more to foreign countries for her gold debt and
indemnity than she otherwise should have to pay*

China had no gold in

abundance, therefore it would not be easy to adopt a gold currency*

What

is needed for her is to find a method by which silver coins with uniform
purity and uniform method of manufacture may have a fixed gold price.
But he did not throw any light on what would be the fixed value of gold
in relation to her silver coins.

He only stated that*

A tael, or silver liang, consists of a certain quantity of silver*
Shall this be weighed by the native treasury scale— -the kuping— or
shall it be the American twenty-cent piece
which already has a
fixed gold value recognized in all countries‘
t At present eight taels
(liang) are one pound sterling. This might, without any difficulty,
be fixed upon by authority.
He did offer some suggestions*

(1) There should be only one mint;

(2) the mints in the provinces should all cease their operations; (3) in
ths Central Hint there should be a foreign mint master, an export, an en
gineer ftwrf an accountant; (4) it would be well to retain the decimal nota
tion already in use, i.e., the names "liang, tsioxi, fen, li*f1 He mentioned
that four silver coins (i.e., a silver tael, J a tael, J a tael, and l/lQ
a tael) and two copper co ins (l/lQQO a tael and l/lGO a tael) should be
coined; (5) the silver tael and half tael should be nine parts silver and
one part copper.

The quarter tael and th© tenth of a tael should be made

up of eight parts silver and two parts copper; (6) provinces should trans
fer all the silver in the official treasuries to th© Central Mint to be
melted and made into coin; (7) paper notes representing the new coins may

may mean the 25/-piece of the American coins.
Joseph gdkins. Banking and Prices in China, 1905, p. 37*

100

or may not be mad® and circulated by the Mints (S) when th® Central
Mint has ooaasenoed working , the circulation of foreign coins in China
and the use of uncoined silver should b@ prohibited after a definite
time; (9) foreign merchants having firms or banks in China must us© the
silver money in China*

They must obtain China*8 silver coins with gold

on application from China’s exchange officers*

Th© gold is taken charge

of by the exchange officer and may b® used in paying th® indemnity to
Western Powers or as a reserve for gold bank notes or for the manufacture
of gold coins; (10) it is requisite to have a satisfactory understanding
with th® banks of foreign countries*

^fh© negotiations must be

from time to time with those banks* so that in this matter of currency
there may be no uncertainty or want of clearness*”
Be neither offered anything new to th© existing opinion as to th®
movement of th© currency reform nor drafted any sore detailed plan for
reference to China’s Government•

But he had contributed something prac

tical to the group of officers maintaining a silver standard for Chins.*
It was due to the fact that ha occupied a very significant position in
China’s financial world, and meanwhile h© was introduced by the British
Government.

His claim gave a strong recommendation to the Chinese Govern

ment and finane ial wor Id •
Opposing both Professor Bonks’ plan and the silver standard .for
China, Mr* hu Gei-tc, the Chinese iliniater to St* Petersburg, submit ted
a memorial 'which followed Professor Jenks* plan*.

In his memorial, h®

maintained the accumulation of a gold r e s e m .for the gold standard
system*

Be held that, since China is th© only non-gold country in th©

world and all other countries are gold countries, tho on$y way to protect
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China.*e foreign trade is to circulate gold coins in as much, as the high
price of gold and ths low price of silver are injurious to a country
having the silver standard*

He advocated the plan of collecting the gold

ha&rded by the people and expressed his own opinion that this may be
brought about by selling government posts.
He gave & comparison of th© advantages between th© country using
gold eoins and the country using silver and said %
Financial experts have estimated th® years* output of gold, and
there is no cause fb r concern lest it be not enough for the supply
of the people of every country* As to the output of silver, there
is no end to it* The greater the supply of silver, the cheaper:it
gets, so that the present high price of gold is not in reality that
gold is dear, but rather that silver is cheap.
A gold-standard country is like a man who has accumulated riches
to buy grain— if the grain is cheap, he reaps the benefit. A silverstandard country is like a farmer who has accumulated his grain and
holds it for arise in price— if the price goes down, h® suffers* So
silver-using countries and gold-using countries are in the earns case
as two people making a barter, in which on© man’s daily increase of
loss is only the other men’s daily increase of gain. Therefore, if
we use uncoined silver for money we are in just such a os,so, of
barters with those countries which have a gold coinage, and it is
needless to say which country is the loser* To use uncoined silver
for money is like using uncooked rice for food*..for uncoined silver
is nothing more than & product of th© earth* Other nations consider
silver merely as a coirtv.odlty and not as money*.**At the present time
gold is used in all nations throughout the world.
As to th© coinage unit, he proposed that th© silver coins should b©
called 11yuan” because they are round and s,yuantt means round*
coins should be called "w®n*w

The copper

The weight of the new silver coin should be

28

of ”0.72 ounces (as in the Rexican dollar.”

With this unit as the basis,

gold and copper coins are minted besides the subsidiary silver on®a.

Hi©

arrangement was to have trwo gold coins, one worth ton silver yuan, and th©
Gold Standard in International Trade, Soport on the Introduction
of the Gold-Sxohang.e Standard. 50th Congress, 3d Session, Sens.to, Docu
ment No* 128, 1904, p"* BE.
g8Ibld.,p* 196.
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other five silver yuan®*

The coinage of copper was certainly an essen

tial part of the system.
Be also recommended a total coinage, on th© averag®, of two silver
dollars per capita or approximately BOO,000,000 yuaas.
only a quarter of this total would be needed.

At th© beginning

Of this 200 million

dollars, fifteen per cent, should be mad© into gold coins end the rest
into silver pieces*

In every $1Q0 ths re should b© one gold coin of $10

value and one of $5 value*
coins*

Th© remaining $85 should be made into silver

The uaifom method and designs must be used in the Central and

provincial mints*
Regarding the old coins, he proposed that during the first few years
tee government should give full market value udien taking back the old
coins*

Bid: after ten or more years nthe coins can be bought at the rate

of ordinary silver end it will not be necessary to consider them at their
*29
coin vali» .
He figured the needed goldreserve in thefollowing ways*

As the

bbw yuan was to be 920 fine theremaining 80 part® became th© nation's
seigniorage*

Out of a total coinage of 800,000,000 yuan.a the profit

should be 64,000,000 with which th© government could not only pay its
debts and cost of coinage, but also form a gold reserve. Meanwhile the
Government would at the beginning of the new system raise & currency loan
and deposit the borrowed gold aong the various foreign banks? thereby
foreign nations would know that

China had goldin reserve and thus would

insure confidence for the new system*

39jbid*, p, 198 *
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Xu his sohem© on® th lag whioh is mors important; and was pointed
out by him, but still was never determined by him* is th® ratio between
the three metal coins, i.e., gold, silver, and copper.

H© only said

that a
Ths system of coinage as adopted by the other nations has a
fixed value in relation to each oth.r, &ad although there arc ex
change charges, the market value is approximately th© same, so
that banks have no change to impose upon the people, nor have
foreign merchants any opportunity for swindling.
The three metals, gold, silver, and copper, will have a fixed
relative value; on© silver piece being worth so many copper ones,
and one gold piece being worth so many silver ones..».Gains 0021
then be used everywhere, far and x&ar, at the same value.
At that time, both foreigners and Chinese opposed to his plan for a
gold standard gave ths following reasons*

(1) The economical conditions

is China did not permit the us© of gold? (2) China had not enough gold
to meet the need for a gold coinage; (3) Chinese banks and exchange
shops which mad© their livelihood out of exchange, discounts, false
cash, etc., would oppose the adoption of th© gold standard; (4) the
officials of the governments and tax collectors who manipulated the
discount and exchange so as to appropriate money to themselves would
oppose it; (5) th© mints in th© various province© now reckoning upon a
surplus to make up deficiencies in th© provincial expenses would not
like it; (6) complications would arise out of indemnity payment; (7) the
gold standard proposed might collapse on account of the unfavorable
balance of trade; (8) the Chinese wore fond of talking but never did
anything, and they stuck to their ancient customs so closely -that it
was difficult to adopt anything new.
To answer these opponents, he held that the third and fourth of

^Ibid

pp. 1S2-193 .
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the objections mentioned above might be urged against any system of
unifora coinage.

To the fifth* he said 51it was not originally intended

that the surplus of the mints should go to enrich the various provinces*0
As to the first and second he held that economic conditions then in China
required the oirculation of copper and silver* but the gold-standard
system was not intended to replace copper and silver with gold as a
medium of exchange and that the adoption of th® gold standard was for
the purpose of giving foreign nations confidence in China*

To the sixth*

he held that all nations have recently adopted th© gold standard* there
fore China should use gold for the sake of convenience in commerce*

To

ths seventh* he maintained that when imports are great and exports small*
money gets into foreign countries and the amount of money on the home
market is small*

Then the value of money is high and with th© money

dear prices must go down*

China*s exports will increase and money will

return to China from foreign countries again.

To the last one* he

furnished some examples in order to prove its untruth.
But as to what th© coinage ratio was to be* he did not give any
recoraiendation.

It is evident that th© considerati on of th© coinage

ratio and the maintenance of that ratio are factors of primary importance.
By overlooking this point, Mr* Hu left in© whole plsei fundamentally defec
tive and unworkable.
The Board of Revenue, however, was much impressed by his proposal
and arguments and subsequently submitted a memorial which received
immediate imperial sanction*

The Board proposed that (.1) a gold reserve

be accumulated and ultimately gold coins b© issued in addition to silver.
It was to the great disadvantage of China to use silver’whor all the rest
of the world had a gold standard*

(£) Thor© was a large gold hoard among

xos
the people*

To obtain the gold supply for mintlag purposes which were

considered urgent , th© money paid In for ranks* titles and offices
should be paid one—half in gold*

The memorial reads

We (ministers) have m d e further investigation Of the sugges
tions submitted by Hu Wei-te*•*in which he asks that gp Id coins
m y be issued in addition* His report as to the advantages and
disadvantages is very thorough***.hhsn Japan was about to adopt
a gold coinage* she first collected gold for ten years before
proceeding to mint it* A great deal of gold is hoarded by the
Chinese people* ***Xt becomes very necessary to adopt soma method
to secure a reserve of gold which may m e t the demand for minting
purposes*••.People who desire to purchase restoration to lost rank
and those who desire to purchase promotion* as well as those who
want to be advanced on the list of expectants by making subscrip
tions sad thus secure the right to an earlier appointment to fill
a vacancy, shall be required to pay one-half of the sums respec
tively required in gold, Treasury standard, at the rate of 1 ounce
of gold for 32 ounces of silver*
In 1905 the Board of Revenue petitioned the throne to put a stop

to the eoin^e by the provinces, and to turn four province mints into
52
branch mints under the Central Mint at Tientsin* ' With this petition
mentioned above, the ministers proposed the "Ten Regulations for the
reform of the currency.
1905*

ts

The "Ten Regulations

$$

we re granted on August 22,

These proposals were results of two years* deliberation on th©

part of the ministers of the Financial Commission and the Board of Revenue
or the Board of Finance*

Ths content of' the "Ten Regulations*1 is outlined

as follows*
1* The coinage of silver, after the weight and fineness of the
coins shall have been decided upon and sanctioned, shall be allowed
only to ths Central Mint and th© branch mints at Tientsin, 31ankin»
Canton, and ftuchang* The Central Lint shall be under the direct
management of the Financial Commission*
2. Ths provincial mints already in operation shall be allowed
for the present to go on with their minting, but they shall be
allowed to us© only the machinery already on hand— no further
machinery may be added to increase the output*

Kaan, The Currenclos of Chl:-aaP 1C 26, pp«
3%Annua I Report of the Director of the .joint.* mishin^ton, 1906, p* 192.
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Th® fineness of "the copper coins to be stinted shall bo 96 per
cent ptir© copper and 5 por cont zinc* Ths wsigjrb oi ths coins
shall be, via., 20-cash piece, 4 mace, kuping scales; 10-oash
piece, 2 mace, kuping; 6~cash pieoo, 1 xmo& > kupingj 2-oash piece,
4 cendareens, kuping. The matrices shall be furnished by the Board
of Revenue, and th© coinage shall be exactly like that of the cen
tral mint, except that on the obverse on© character shall be added
to indicate the province in which the coin is issued, so as to
facilitate examinat ion*
5* In all the provincial mints the coins minted each day shall
be in the following proportions? Ton-oash pieces, five-tenths of
the whole number, and 2-cash pieces, also two-tenths of the whole
number; 20-cash pieces, but one-tonth* The demand for coins smaller
than the 2-cash piece shall be supplied by th© use of th© old cash
in circulation*
4* The number of the coins to be minted must be determined by a
careful consideration of the supply and demand*
6 * All the provinces engaged in minting these copper coins must
first supply in full th© lack of the ordinary cash in their own
provinces, and they must not ship t h e m in large quantities to other
provinces.
6 * Every viceroy and governor in ahose province there arc mints
for the coinage of silver or copper must one a ©very three months
report to the Financial Commission and once a year report as to
certain requirements*
7* Owing to savings in the cost of transportation, certain of
the provinces should send their quota of silver of the imperial
revenues to Tientsin to the Central Mint.
8* Every requj st from merchants for permission to mint copper
coins shall be refused*
9* After the bank of 'the Board of Revenue shall have been put
into operation, the silver and copper coins minted by the Central
Mint, will be delivered to the bank, which will distribute them
from time to time, according to th© deficiency in the supply of
cash., in the various provinces.
10. The weight and quality of the copper coins shall be mad®
uniform* The various provincial governments shall b® forbidden
to purchase the ready-made copper disks from foreign merchantsZ*
Three months after the sanction of th© '’Ten Regulations,” th© acts
of the "coinage of taels” and "fractions of the taol in silver" were
granted by imperial ©diet*

By these the silver—t&al coin w«a provided

standard coin and copper coins were provided for euppl©went ary use*
By the acts th© standard coin, corresponds in its face value to th©
bullion value of the metals contained and circulated in any ©mount*
^Ibid.7 pp* 193-195
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The subsidiary coins ware token coins and circulated. within a certain
amount.

Th© reasons by which silver m s ilia choice as standard and

tael as the unit are*
China9s aeourauiations of gold are not large# and heretofore#
in public or private financial transactions, it has been customary
to use silver and copper, so that it is still difficult for us to
decide how gold should be used*
The silver coin* heretofore minted in the various provinces
have imitated the Mexican dollar in their fineness and weight, but
this was sanctioned as a temporary measia*© only, and can not be
regarded as a fixed rule.••.China, in the levy and collection of
her taxes end duties, has mostly used the Kuping tael; and th©
people, too, in the use of silver, have generally made their reckon
ings in taels, mace, c a m are ©ns, and 11* Your ministers are there
fore of the opinion that in fixing upon a standard eoin for China
we should select the Kuping tael, mint it with extrema care, and
maintain its fineness in full, and that more than all else it should
first of all be received by the board of revenue in payment of im
perial dues.
AS to the fineness of the new silver coin, it provided*
The purest silver in circulation in China to-day is shorn by
chemical analysis to oontain not more than 98 or 99 por cent of
pure silver, but a deduction of 2 or S por eent should ba allowed
in minting, the new coin to cover th© cost of coinage, and it is
proposed to make the new tael piee© of 9 mac© 6 car.da reens of pure
silver, mixed with 1 mace’s weight of pure copper, to be fixed as
the equivalent of 1 Kuping tael of full touch*
The acts provided that all provincial taxes levied in kuping taols
shall be paid in the same amount of th© new tael coins •

But the acts

did not provide an effective way to force upon the bankers and merchants
a kuping tael of 96 touch in the place of a kuping, tael of pur© silver*
Foreign banks would only accept it at its bullion value——that

is, at

3*80 per cant discount; and the government, accepting revenuein that
currency, would stand to lose to a corresponding extent*
portant weakness of the

34Ibid., p. 198*

36ibid*
36Ibid., p. 201*

36

This lui-

acts might have been one of th© reasons why
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the ’’tael coinage acts” of 1905 were never put into effect.
Regarding the fractional silver coins provided by the sam© acts*
they provided as the following table indicates*

Denomination
^ tael piece

Face value
a kuping tael
silver full
toueh

2/l0 tael piece

1 /5

1/10

1 /1 0

*

S?

Pure silver
0.48 jkuping tael

Pure copper
0.05 tael (kit-*
ping)

*

0.17

*

0.03

*

"

0.085

n

0.016

*

In the acts it was also stated that as th© general rule (with some
exceptions} in every 10 pieces minted 4 of them shall be of 1 tael's
value and 2 of the denomination of b/lO tael, 2 of them 2/lQ t&el, and
2 of then l/lO tael.

The 5-mao© or 5/10 taol and other fractional silver

pieces shall be legal tender in every transaction to the amount of 10
taels.
According to the acts, all people may send their silver to be minted.
nEvery tael of kuping silver of full touch will be refined to pure silver
985 fine, or finer; in return for it they will receive one of the now
tael coins... .The excess in the fineness of ths silver will pay fchs cost
of the mintage.*^
An important point which the acts failed to decide was the rat® of
exchange between the copper coins and silver.

Probably the depreciation

of copper cents in terms of silver from the original value of those
copper cents varied in different provinces.

3?rbid., p. 199.
58 Ibid., p. 200.

It was a tough job for the
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ministars to settle*
At Hi® time when the acts were drafted,, there war© different
opinions among the ministers sad some viceroys*

Viceroy Chang; Chih-

tung of Bupeh. province and Viceroy Yuan Shi-kai of Chili were in favor
of the silver; tael unit*

Those who had favored ths gold standard were

naturally disappoint ©d, but the real disagreement was over the question
of th© coinage unit and of the fineness of the silver in the coinage of
the standard piece*

The controversy centered on th© question of th©

relative familiarity of the people with these two units, dollar and
tael*

Those vctio were conversant with monetary principles pointed out

that there should be free coinage of the standard coins either without
charge, or subject to a brassage charge for covering the expense of
assaying, loss of interest and th© cost of th© alloy*

For those reasons

the tael acts fixing the fineness ft 960, while the kuping silver is
987-5 fine, was considered defective*

They held that should the people

lack confidence in the new system the coin would probably depreciate,
if it were accepted at par valve, the high seigniorage would be
an inducement to counterfeiting*
Disagreement among influential officers over thsse questions,
together with the unsettled problem of the exchange rate of copper and
silver coins, offered ample opportunity for delay of this reform act*
Another important cause which led to the postponement of a ddfinit©
action with regard to currency reform was the mounting gold price of
silver owing to th® large purchase of silver for coinage in India*
"When after 1905 exchange improved to over three shillings per Shanghai
tael, th© Government found it easier to meet gold obligations, due on
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account of th© Boxer Indemnity said several other loans
The postponement of currency reform lasted about three years, until
1908*

In that year another major movement In the history of China’s

currency reform was initiated by Mr* Tong Shao-yi’s suggestions*

Hr*

Tong, the special ambassador to the United States, upon his return from
America made & series of suggestions on the questions of currency reform,
to th© Board at Finance in 1908*

He urged an immediate reform of th©

Chinese currency as pledged by treaty provisions with foreign countries*
Hie suggestions were on five subjects, namely, the standard, the sia© of
the silver coin, the fineness of tie silver in the coinage, ths subsidiary
coinage, and the treatment of the existing copper currency*
On the suggestion of the standard, Mr. Tong reached the conclusion
that the reform had best begin on the silver-standard basis, but with the
ultimate aim of attaining the gold standard*

He found that the gold-

exchange standard would be very difficult to an force in China, and that
the difficulty was that, tho token coins under this system would be con
tinually fluctuating in terms of tho silver bull!021* Alse h© feared
that the coins might depreciate through over-issue of th© token coins
for th© seigniorage*
.

As to the sis© of the silver ooins, he favored the adoption of a

unit of the weight of the

dollar*

but in the memorial given by him and

submitted by the Prince of Ghing and other ministers he accepted th©
tael coin with the remedy of th© coining in large amounts of th® half tael
or 5-maea pieces, which were to be unlimited legal tender along with th©
.

S. R* tlagel, Chinese Currency and Banking Shanghai, 1915, p* 118.

in
standard tael, the one-tael pieeo*
G& the \ju©sti on of the treatment of* th© copper currency, hs ©ug*'
gested that th© new coins should be used to retire the old, end pointed
out the fault of the previous acts in not including the copper currency
in the return cons idor at ions hut treating it as an independent system
by itself*
On October 5, 1908,
of Hr* Tong’s to attempt

an edict

was issuedin response to a memorial

to establish, the tael coins^©*

Th© memorial

of Tong who had been supported by Prince of Chi&ng; and other ministers
of China’s Government mentioned that the Government had decided upon a
silver standard*

Tong mentioned that a poll of provincial opinion was

taken and eleven provinces were found to be in favor of the tael unit
while seven were for th© dollars#

Th© ministers recognised that the

tael coin would be heavyas pocket money, but
remedied by the

coining

in large

ths situation could be

amounts ofth© half tael or 0-raac©

pieces, which were to be unlimited legal tender along with th® standard
tael*
In the imperial decree reacting to Tong’s memorial, silver was made
the sole legal tender*

The reason for adopting the silver standard and

the method of maintenance of it was declared by this imperial decree as
follows*
If actiml gold coin were to be taken as th® standard unit, it
would be difficult to raise th© necessary amount} while if gold
were merely taken nominally as the standard unit, grave danger®
would be incurred. It is evident, therefor©, that we should first
standardise sad render uniform th© silver currency, and
care
fully proceed to take measures for a further advance, with a view
to assuring the adoption of a gold standard in the future*

112
this silver currency, except in so fur as calculations under
treaties and agreements with tho foreign powers will reemir© to be
made as before* shall be uniformly used by all yamens,
great or
small, in Peking or th® provinces in all their treasury transac
tions, and all allowances for differences of weight or touch, or
mslt&ge fees, etc•, shall henceforth be perpetually forbidden*
In the decree it said that a large silver coin weighing 1 kuping
tael and 0*5 of a kuping tael shall be minted for general convenience
in use*

A 3pind of small silver piece of l/lG and b/lGO of a kuping tael

will serve as a subsidiary currency*

Th® two silver ©oina aforesaid

will be 0*980 fine, .mil© the two small silver pieces will be 0*880 fine*
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To give the silver coins weighing 0*5 of a kuping tael th© sas© legal
tender as th© silver coins of 1 kuping tael in ord©r to secure eanvenienc®
in the use is the special feature of this edict.

Unfortunately the edict

did not find a suitable and definite way to settle th© old coinage.

The

only step taken toward currency reform by the edict of October 6, 1908
was the establishment of a Bureau of Currency Reform*

This Bureau con

ducted extensive inquiries in all parts of the country with regard to .
the standard sise of the silver, the fineness of’ silver in the coins,
subsidiary ooinage and tho treatment of existing copper coins*
In 1909 several proposals were presented to the Government.
them an outstanding one was Bheng E^uan-hwai*s plan*

Among

In 1896 Mr* Sheng

had suggested a program of currency reform with a practical system of a
national bank*

Unfortunately th© outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion (1900}

kept the Government from taking any definite step about it*

the

In this

^ T h © word used in China to describe th© place and buildings where
officers of govemmants wark.
^Annual Report of the Director of the Mint, Washington, 1909, p*

248*
Ibid*, p. 248.
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year (1908) h© proposed another plan for the currency reform of the
country*

Prom his plan It. is apparent that hi© last goal is the gold***

exchange staidard, but his immediate objective is th© uniform national
silver dollar similar to the existing dollar.

He held that sooner or

later exchange rates of Chins on go Id-stand ard countries slight be
stabilised by use of deposited reserves in foreign countries.

Effort

should be mads to reduce excess of imports into China ao as to prepare
for a gold standard.
He gave a new re© oranandation which is the coin of $1*50.

He main

tained that the silver dollar should be .72 kuping tael of *900 fineness*
The silver dollar was to be the same as current dollars, and worth about
42 cents U. S. currency with silver at 56 cents an ounce.

Silver coin

of $1.50 was recommended because it would contain practically the same
amount of silver as the tael.* but should not b© c&lld tael coin.

Other

silver coins were to be those of &1.QG, 50, 20 and 10 cents $ copper.coins
were to be 20, 10, 8 , 2, and 1 cash pieoes, 10 ©ash to equal l/lOO of a
dollar.

The Bank of China, in association with mints and th© bank note

printing office, should have charge of the issuance of coins.
As to th© method of introduction of tho new system, lie advocated
that taxes anr? customs be payable in new ourrojioy, silver syce© b® bought
up

minted into new coins, old silver coins be redeemed by th© Govern—

m&nt and remizxted, coppers bo withdrawn at tho rat© of about 125 to the
dollar and reminded, silver bullion b© received in exchange for paper
notes, after one year*« time about 2/s or 3/6 of this silver b© coined,
*mH silver notes be exchangeable for gold notes, presumably ht varying
rates.
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In the long run the foreign exchange rates on th© gold standard
countries shall be stabilised eventually by use o f reserves deposited
in. fearsign countries.
in the new msney*

All obligations due th® Government shall be paid

Quantity of silver ooin will be limited to #1,000,000*

estimated to be $2.50 per capita.
In treating the tael, he held that one-i©.©! (not bo be known as
taels but as 11.60 pieces) coins might be allowed to circulate in in
terior districts along with the new dollars.

The kuping tael has about

1.50 as much pure silver as the dollar so tael coins would circulate
without causing trouble.

The dollar should not show on its face the

fast that it contained *72 sf a kuping tael*
Meanwhile in his plan he mentioned that among the provincial mints
only tie or threw mints should be continued under the control of the
Central Mint in Peking*
Mr* Sheng had been interested and had put forth effort for the de
velopment of China *s comraunic at ion, transportation and m o d e m Industries.
From his proposal for currency reform it is apparent that he understood
the serious situation of the currency in China and the significant points
also, but he was not familiar with th© knowledge of monetary administra
tion*

Por instance, he suggested th© coins of ftI.SQ-pieces in order

to uphold the tradition of Chines® people, meet the withdrawal of th©
old copper ooin at a rat© of about 125 to on© dollar and th© limitation
of ths silver coins bn an amount of* #1,000,000,000.
to be some kind of idealism*

All of these seem

i\® can not, nor did he himself, find any

scientific Basis and reasonable statistics for these figures.

Never

theless, Ar« Sheng did throw some light on tho future of China *s banking
operation and the bank of issue.
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Another plan w s proposed by Prince tsal Tse, who was before 1908
opposed bo th© silver tael standard of Chang Shih«*tung®

He had sug

gested establishing the Bureau of Currency R@forra to study the eco
nomic condition and monetary custom in the currency histories of China
and of the Western Powers*

After the death of Viceroy Chang Ohih-tung

he revised the regulations of 1905 fundamentally which had been' based
oa the silver .tael standard and already promulgated, and did his best
to try to set up the silver yuan or dollar standard*

He held that one

yuan silver ooin must be 0*72 kuping t&el with 0*900 fins silver, i*e*,
0*648 tael pure silver*

In 1908 he proposed a plan of currency reform

at the Lang Jeen Yuan (Congress) •

He reached his conclusion by a

gradual process of adoption of the gold standard over a period of ten
years*

His plan also failed to materialise because of the wide opposi

tion to the Government and the consequent Revolution (1911)*
Still another plan in 1908 was the suggestion of th© Board of
Finance of China1s Government«

Reacting to the urge to adopt the gold

standard by Mr* v;ang Ta-hsieh, Chinese minister to Great Britain, the
Board of Finance in 1908 outlined four different policies, on® of which
may be used by the Government, and the Board favored the last one, as
followst
(1) The introduction of the uniform national coinage based on
silver, giving it subsequently a fixed parity %ith gold, such as
found in British India*
(2) At the very beginning the introduction of silver coins at
a fixed value in gold which will be maintained afterwards, such as
found in tbs Philippines*
(3) To supplement the token silver coins 2n (2) with a partial
note circulation.
(4) The introduction of the :r»aw national silver coins on th®
silver basis in order to replace the old coinn and bullion currency*
Subsequently, the note circulation will be extended to replace th®
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saw standard, coins; th® coins so withdrawn will be held as a trust
fund or sold for gold* fthen the note circulation becomes universal,
th® policy then will be to declare for free coinage of gold at tbs
market ratio of & given time and convert the silver notes into gold
notes* If th® gold reserves prove insufficient at any bin®* th®
notes aaay be redeemable in silver bullion at its market value In
-eld.43
Th® fourth point, said to have been originated by Samuel Ingham,
United States Secretary of the Treasury under President Jackson, was
preferred by the Board of Finance, because it combined the advantage®
of the others*

However, to carry out this plan it was necess&jy to

prepare over a period of years*

Because of the insuffioieaat stock of

gold and the unsound banking system, the scheme was consequently dropped*
The whole situation would not be complete without mentioning the
suggestion of Viceroy Yang Shih-hsi&n of Chihi Province*

In 190T he

intended to minimize the loss due to China*s payment of th© Boxer in
demnity and the foreign loans in gold coins by coining; gold coins at the
Tientsin mint •

But Viceroy Chang Shih-tung criticised it as defeating its

awn purpose, and Chang advocated the development of gold mines, rather than
the coining of gold money, for the solution of the problem*

Yang had neither

a tangible plan nor an adequate argument to meet the criticism presented by
thorn® who advocated silver currency at that time*

His suggestion, like

other.minor or»s, gave no significant influence to the improvement of th©
currency reform*
In 1910, for the first time a proper act to deal with currency was
Issued*

It provided much more concrete reform measures than its previous

ones (such as the ten regulations of 1905 and the acts of the "coinage of

L* E* T b &o , Currency Reform in China, p* 5*

11?
taels”)*
year*

The imp©rial sanction was given to it on May 24 of th® sm m

These regulations for the national coinage consisted of eleven

articles and thirteen supplementary articles •

Th© important points in

these regulations can be briefly described as follow®s
(a) As to the unit of currency, they provided that th0 dollar (or
yuan) will be the monetary unit of the T& Ghing ^ipire*

Below unity

the reckoning is decimal*
(b) For the appearance of the coins, on on© face of the silver dollar
and on all kinds of subsidiary coins will be a dragon ©ad on the other
face the characters "Ta Chlng Silver Coin, One Dollar.»n
(©) Begarding ■the different coins, the following table Is condensed
from the original articles:
Weight
kuping
tael
Silver coins
One dollar (yuan)
50-cent coins
25*
10*

Fineness

*72
•36
*18
864/10,000

9056

80$
80$
68$

Pur® silver

*648 tael of silver
•288
•
•144
”
8616/100,000 w

Nickel coins
5—cent coins
Copper coins
2-cent coins
1*
5-mill
*

1-

"

To be determined later

J

1* Y u a n or dollar will be standard coins 50— csont and under will
be subsidiary.
2. Nickel coin will be delayed for investigation into methods of
mintage, and the resources for the material.
3* One—cent coins will bo postponed owing to th© danger of their
being confounded w i t h th® bon cash coins formerly minted.
4* Kuplng, tael - 37 30l/l,000 grams of pur® silver*
5. No limitation in th© us© of the standard dollar, and the sub™
sidiary silver coins may not be offered in excess of five
dollars1 worth in any on© payment| nickel and copper coin
may not be offered in excess of half a dollar*s worth*

^Annual Report of the Director of the Mint, hashington, 1911, pp.
236-242*
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(d) As to the ratio between the new dollar and th® tael, they pro
vided that during the introductory period of Issuance of th© new coins,
one dollar and fifty cents will be reckoned as equal to one tael of th®
Board of Financers treasury weight, standard silver*

By standard silver

is meant silver of nine hundred and eighty-five ona-thousandths fineness*
As to the old coins they provided that the large end small coins previously
minted might continue to circulate temporarily at their market value*
Both, the governmental mints end th© Ta Ching Bank would gradually with
draw /them at the market rate to be reminted into the new coinage*

After

a certain period all such circulation would cease, and the mints and the
Ta Ching Bank would exchange the old coins as silver bullion*

The acts

treated the existing old coins in such a way for the following reason*
Silver coins were minted from the sixteenth year of Kwanghau
(18S0) to th® thirty-fourth year (1908)* The number of silver
dollars reported as minted at th© different provincial mints was
over 40,000,900, and the fractional silver coins amounted to
1,400,000,000* Since the number is so great, to call them all in
at once and ramint them would involve a loss in th® five items of
inferior touch, exchange, transportation, refining, and interest
of approximately $20,000,000* To arrai^o for this out of treasury
reserves would be difficult*
(e) To deal with the complicated problem of the copper coins, it
decided that copper coins previously minted, in th® provincial mints
would continue to circulate at their market value*

Th© Board of Finance

would be endowed with power to regulate it in accordantc with circum
stances*
In the original memorial of the Board of Finance on the proposed
treatment of the old silver and copper coins so as to secure stability
for the national currency, th© ministers held t at the Board of Finance
would take measures to redeem the coins and would remint a sufficient
numb ar as 2-cant and 5-mill subsidiary coins*

.Besides this a sufficient'
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number of th® best 10—cash coins would bo saleotod to serve temporarily
as l—oout subsidiary coins with a fixed value like the now coins , to bo
disposed of in the interior*

By this method in three years th® old

coins loft on th© market should not be over two-or three-tentha•

Th©

Board of Finance needed the hearty co-operation of all th© boards and
of the viceroys and governors in devising ways to prevent the jointing
of counterfeit coins*
The acts also set up & transitional period that provided that after
the regulations had been approved by imperial rescript during a period
of a year, all regular official receipts and disbursements would be con
verted into kuping taels of standard silver and -then reckoned in th© new
monetary unit*

After the on© year all public accounts would directly

reckon in the new monetary unit*
According to the acts, from the date when these regulations re
ceived the imperial sanction, all mintage of large and small silver and
copper coins in the provinces should cease*

Th© Board of Finance would

establish an assay office and engage an expert to take charge of it*
For the purpose of executing the act, a fin© of from $10 to $1,000 was
ruled tor those who were forced to discount the new coins and who refused
to accept the new coins*
These acts of 1910 mentioned above provided for th© first time for
the treatment of th© old coins*

It seems to ei© that the main body of

the acts can be said to be a comparatively detailed provision much more
than its previous ones*

The pol idles adopted by th© acts are much more

suitable to the existing serious situation*

If the government of China

at the time could effectively execute this act according to its provisions,
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it

have accomplished the purpose of* a tin.lf*orss. currency, ©von if

it could net h&ve solved the sorlous problem of fluctuating foreign ex
change at once*

However, the acts were criticised by Mr* la an Chi-chao

(the late famous scholar of China) for the following reasons*^*
(1) It was silent about the foreign coins then in th® hands of
the Chinese people (estimated at over 100,000,000 dollars)*
(2) The amount of provincial dollars was over-estimated suad the
Government ought to redeem these coins at the face value*
(5)
The dollars and the minor coins ought to have been separately
created»* **Ths silver and copper subsidiary coins which were all
circulating at different rates of discount at different places,
would be ©xch sn&ed by th© Government for the new coins within a
prescribed period of time at their actual mar lost value*
As to the Chinese governmental policy of banking regulation and
the banking situation during th© period concerned, before 1905 there was
neither the bank owned by the Central Government nor a Central Bank in
the country*

Until April 22, 1905, an edict mentioned the establishment

of a governmental bank and decided that Peking would be th© proper place
in which the governmental bank could be located*

Iftor the .Issuance of

the Ta Ching Sank Regulations, the Ta Ching Bank owned by the Central
Government was established in 1905*

This bank did not directly in

fluence China*© banking business as much as the central banks or govern
mental banks in other countries did their own banking businesses*
the

But

m o d e m banking institutions or foreign-style Chinese banks, modeled

on the plan of the modern, banks in Arnerice, or Europe or the foreign
hgnVa in China, were set up by individuals first in the coast ports and
gradually within the interior*
In the eleventh moon of the thirty-third year of Awang Hsu (about

^®p* y* Wen, ?he Currency Protolam in China. 1914, p. 128.

m

4t6

1807),

another a

bank, the Bank of CoHwrunicaiions * was

chartered with two-fifths of its capital from the state * for th©
flassoing and unification of various means of ©ommunication,, partioularly the railways*
Bowever* the major expansion of these m o d e m banking institution®
did not

0080

until th© ’
/<orld War (1914)*
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On th© other side* th©

native banks* with the foreign banks, still dominated the existing
banking world of China*

For a few years before 1910, the native

banks in China* besides the banking business* did all kinds of specu
lations* including land* foreign stocks and securities, and worst of
all rubber shares*

Unfortunately anything the banks took up in the

way of speculation fed.led and with the collapse of th© rubber boom
(around 1910) began the collapse of the native banks*
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V* The me rits of the *gold standard1’%
Honey is very commonly defined as a medium of exchange.
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In

much more detail money may be defined as narry medium of exchange which
ia (1) widely accepted in payment for goods and services and in set
tlement of debts* and is (2) accepted without reference to th© standtag, of the person who offers it in payment*

«50

Money may be said to

have three kinds of functions* i«©•* (l) essential services, (%} de
rived functions* and (3) contingent functions,

According to its

^*The China Year Book* 1921-22* Tientsin press, 1921* p* £82»
^ F * E, L©e* Currency* Banking* and Finano© in China, Trade Pro
motion series* No* 27* 1926, p* 72,
R* Wage1* Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 1915* p* 211,
49r . g « Eawtray* Ths Gold Standard in Theory and Practice* Now York*
1933, p. 1*
B* Foster and J# X* Bogan* .teonoy and Bfojakinf;* l-iow York* 1940*
P*
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essential services, money serves as (a) a measurement of value and
(b) it facilitates exchange•

From its derived function® , it serves

(a) as a standard of deferred payment, (b) it stares value, and (c) it
transfers value*

The oontingenfc functions of morny ares

(a) distribu

tion of sooial income, (b) equalisation of marginal utility in expendi
ture, (o) furnishing of the basis of a credit system, and (d) Impart
ing of a general form to capital.®^
Many commodities could be, and in the past were„ chosen for this
purpose*

But as the result of practice for hundreds and thousands of

years the precious metals have been generally chosen by mankind as the
most suitable ocasmoditie s for a medium of exchange.

Among the precious

metals gold, because of its especially suitable physical characters,
such as general acceptability, stability of value, divisibility, homo
geneity , cogniaability, malleability, durability , and portability, was
looted upon as the most suitable material for the functions of money,
far centuries*

After 1933 most of the important countries in the world

adopted the managed currency systems Instead of the gpld standard, the
old argument, i«e*, which one as between the gold standard and the wellcontrolled paper money would be the better one for the purpose of cur
rency and revived it as a significant topic among the economists.
ie another problem outside the scope of this paper*

This

In the period

iraasdlately after the China-Japan IHTar, from the point of view of either
the continued improvement of China’s foreign trade or the payment of
the heavy gold debts of the Chinese Government, it was really necessary
for China to pay much attention to the widely adopted gold standard*
As a matter of fact, either the group of officers in China's Government
51D. Kinley, Money, New York, 1924, p. 123,
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wii& insisted a uniform silver standard wme the necessary step for
China to take before she adopted the gold standard, or the group is
China aho maintained that the gold standard was th© immediate way for
China to take, had the same opinion, !••*, the gold standard must be
the last goal for the reform of China *s currency*
had explained th®

But neither of them

merit® of th© gold standard in the stability of in*

tarsal price and of foreign exchange.
Generally speaking, th© supply of gold, unlike the paper money
whioh can be issued in unrestricted quantities, is limited, end if
money is gold the supply ofmoney is limited*
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is always controlled by th© cost of production*

Th© supply of gold
Th© supply of silver,

os the other hand, most of which is produced as a by-product of th®
mining of other metals, is not automatically controlled by the cost
of mining silver itself*

Who n th© oost of production of gold is high,

some peer mines will b© automatically olosed*
creases*

Th© supply of gold de

The prioe of gold in tanas of goods, i*e*, th© purchasing

power of money coined from gold, goes up*

On th© other hand, th© price

of goods in terns of money or gold, will be lower.
production of gold will be low*

Than th© cost of

Th© poor mines or sons now mines will

open and more gold will be produced*

Th© fluctuations of the produc

tion of gold tends to condition th© lew or high oost of production of
it*

However, this does not mean that the purpose of stabilization of

priee can be reached by automatically controlling production of gold®
In the first place, it i s not the case that tho whole amount of gold
has been used for the purpose of money*

In the second place, countries

^ R * G • Hawtrey, The Gold Stand ard in Theory;and.practice, 1933,
p» 14*
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which adopted the gold-standard currency, even before the war, used
geld coins, bank money, and demand deposits subject to check for the
monetary circulation*

53

tion of existing gold*
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In th© third place, there may be maldistribu—
These are just some of the significant factors

which Influence the relationship between the quantity of gold and the
price of goods under th© gold standard*

But if one country adopts the

silver standard and most countries with which th© countiy on a silver
standard does business are on th© gold standard, such as was the case
of China about 1900, the gold standard is better than the silver one,
especially in the case of China with a system of silver sycee*

This

would appear to be true frcaa both the standpoint of facilitating foreign
exchange improvement and from the standpoint of stablizing the internal
price level*

Furthermore, the system of the silver sycee existing in

China would probably have to be abandoned*
With the gold standard,
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the rate of foreign exchange between

countries on the gold standard is determined in the long run by nparw*
In a country with a gold standard the value of gold Is th© value
of the monetary unit* Th© price of tha currency of on© gold stand
ard country in terras of that of another is the value of gold in the
former in terms of the value of
la in the latter, and can only
vary from parity by a fraction representing the cost of transporta
tion of the gold from one country to th® other*

^^iohael A* Heilperin, International Monetary Economics, 1959, p* 26*
5*Ibid*, p. 75.
®®”*The term ’gold standard1 may be used in a narrower or in a wider
sense* In the narrower sense it signifies* a monetary system under which
gold coins of standard specification, or gold certificates with 100 per
cent* gold backing, form tha circulating medium* In th© wider sense it
covers also the ease where notes or silver coins are legal tender, pro
vided they are convertible into gold at a fixed rate* Thor© must, of
course, be no prohibition of th© melting down of gold coins.” (G. von
Haberier, The Theory of International Trade* Mew lork, 1937, p* 23*)
Here I awe the "gold standard" In the wider sense.
G. Hawtrey, The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice, New York,
1933, p* 37.
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In the short run, the rat® fluctuates for reasons such as the desmnd
for and supply of foreign exchange,©to* , but this fluctuation is a
relatively limited one«

"When countries abandon the gold standard,

their exchange rates may fluctuate much more widely or may fluctuate
even less*
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If a country is on a paper standard, by the forces of

competition, there may be no limit to the fluctuations which may occur
in those rates*
Under the gold standard, according to the famous theory of the
Classical economists, the balance of payments of gold standard coun
tries can be automatically restored to equilibrium by th© movement of
gold and of commodities. After the balance of trade of a country ha©
become passive and gold has begun to flow out, the outflow of gold will
decrease the volume of money in circulation*
"quantity theory" of money, prices will fall*

By the operation of th®
Then th© export® from

the country will be stimulated and imports will b© reduced*

Gold will

flow in again and then th© volume of currency in circulation will expand*
Prices will rise, imports wx 11 be stimulated, and exports will be re
duced*
The movement of gold, which is the something as the cash paymeats necessitated by the passive balance of trad.©, produces a gap
between th© price levels of the two oountri©®. This in its turn
stimulate® a flow of goods in the same direction as the original
flew of gold, and th© flow of goods induces a flow of gold in th®
opposite direction. The two gold movements, thoreforo, cancel
out axti the balance of payments is restored to equilibrium by th®
movement of commodities* Thus, payment is made pr ovisionally in.
gold, but finally in goods.®®
In theory this mechanism preserves equilibrium in the balance of
payments.

It prevents a complete loss of gold by any one country and

Insures an appropriate distribution of gold among ilia gold standard
countries which enter into world trad®.
• G» Bawtrey, The Gold Standard In-Theory and Tract.ice, p. SO.
. von Haberler7~Th©^FHgoi^^oS^^ n ^ e r n a ^ l ^ a J ^ r ^ a T ni?^ 26-27.

CHAPTER IV
THE MONETARY SITUATION BETWEEN 1911-1928 AND
THE PROPOSALS FOR CURRENCY REFORM

After the Chinese Revolution of 1911, in which th© Manehu dynasty
was overthrown end a nominal republic established, the republican Central
Government within a short period of about two or throe years started to
get things into running order*

Then there cam© th© counter revolution

and the creation of the new Ehrire of Hong-shain.

The first President

©f the Republic of China, Yuan Shih-k&i, made himself the first king of
the new Empire*

The new Empire lasted only a few months*

On account

of Yuanfs death and the opposition of the military leaders in most of
the provinces, the new Snpire was closed and the Republic of China reopened*

But from then on there followed a succession of civil wars,

and the rise and fall of on© war lord after another, who controlled for
a time the Central Government, a province, or a group of provinces*
Following the political complications, th© outlook turned dark*
The year 1928 marked the new era in the life of the Republic of
China*

The establishment of the National Government of China at Nanking

took place in that year*
I* The Currency Situation from 1911 to 1928— The currency

situation

In China, after 1911, became much more serious owing to th© fact that not
only the existing complicated political situation did not improve, but
also the non-uniform silver coins and the subsidiaiy coins (silver and
eopper) of provincial mints added more trouble to the existing condition*
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The situation was pictured by Mr. F. E. Leo as follows*
•«» Since 1911 th© complete disorganization of th© ©dminls**
tretion has resulted in additional complications-•* The pro*
vineial mints, under th© control of various grasping militarists,
have been minting coins of all kinds, of inferior quality, for
revenue purposes* Consequently th© country has been flooded with
depreciated copper and silver coins. Th© variation in weight and
contents of silver dollars produced by different mints and even by
the same mints at different times has been *»»* • At the best they
are but a commodity whose expressed value in th© accepted tael unit
must necessarily fluctuate considerably .1
Much more detailed information would be needed to show bhe situa*
tion of China* s currency after the creation of the Republic of China and
before the eve of the creation of the new currency system of the
National Gove rnment of China*

A brief description of the currency

situation and classification of the proposed reforms will be given in
the following discussion:
A* The situation of the silver dollar— After the issuing of th©
eoinage lair of 1910,

2

the new standard dollar "yuan” with 0.72 kuping

taels end *900 fine was first coined in the mints at Wuchang and Wanking
in July, 1911*

When the revolution broke out in October, 1911, the

soldiers were paid with the new dollar*
In 1914 for the first time th© Yuan Chih-kai dollar was officially
issued*

According to the provisions of the new law3 of 1914, th© Yuan

Sheh-kax dollar with the picture of Yuan Sheh—kai, the first President
of the Bepublio of China, as a design on the coins, w&s to be 0*900 fin©
to weigh 0*72 kuping taelsi that is, the contents of pur© silver was
to be 0*648 kuping taels (23*97795048 grarrmeej in weight*

Since then th©

Tuan Sheh-kal dollars gradually replaced not only the Mexican and other

Ik* E* bee, Currency, Banking, and Finance in China* Trad© Pro
motion Series, no* 27, 1926, p * 6i*
2y* supra, p. 316 of Chapter Ull.
Sy* inform,, p* 153 of Chapter IV.
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foreign dollars, but also the Chinese dragon dollars, issued by pro
vincial government before th© coinage of the Yuan Sheh-kai dollars,
SBsre circulating in China at that period*

After an existence of

about thirteen years (1914-1927) the Yuan Shih-kai dollars had become
popular both in the ports and inland*
This do lar came first from the mints at Tientsin and Wanking,
then from some of the provincial mints*

The Bank of China, the Bank of

Cersainicabions and th© official provincial banks as the agents of the
Central Government exchanged, free of charge, the old dragon dollar for
the new Yuan Shih-kai dollars •
As to the weight and fineness of these dollars issued in different
A
years, Mr* A* Tracy Woodward offered the following reports
Republic
of China

Weight

3rd year
(19X4)
8th year
(1919)
9th year
(1920)
lOth year
(1921)

414*73 grains

Diameter

Thickness

0*880

38*75 m*m*

2*66 m*m*

Fineness

413.37

ft

0*880

38*75 m»m® . 2*66 m*m»

413*99

n

0*880

38 *78 m*m*

2*66 m»m#

414*66

tt

0*880

38.75 m.m*

2*50 m*m *

owing to both th© export of a large amount
From 1914 to 1917 , ,
Mexican dollars and the melting of a certain amount of the same coins,
the Yuan Shih-kai dollar had succeeded in f i m l y establishing iteelf*
Of eourse, th© un-uniform silver do'lar© minted by provinces still were
in the local market, but only th© Yuan Shih-kai dollar circulated in a
much wider area*

Once there occurred th© unfortunate debasing of the

Yuan Shih-kai dollar by the mint at Anking (the oapltol of Anhwei Pro
vince) and the formation of a powerful group for personal gain at th©
4 k * &ann, ^©"Currenciee of China, 1926, p* 326*
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International Settlement of Shanghai*

By the efforts of the Governments

these happenings were seen ascertained and checked*6
After the arrival of the revolution party, Kuomingts&g, in banking
In 1927, the mints at Shanghai and Hangchow began turning out Sun-Yatsen dollars, bearing the effigy of the late revolutionary leader of
China's Kucmingtarig, Dr* Sun Yat—sen*

The Sun Yet—sen dollars weighed

23*9025 grams of pure silver and an attempt was made by th® Hational
Government, which was established by the Khomington, to have them r©«*
place the Yuan Shih-kai dollars*
B* The situation of the paper money— The issues of the provincial
and local paper money, since the Revolution (1911;, added more compli
cations to the existing serious situation of th© currency*

According

to one source, an approximate amount of paper money worth $130,000,000
silver dollars had, to 1914, beer issued by twenty-three provinces and
£
districts •
Another source put the estimated amount of the total of
both Central Government and Provincial Government issues, bo 1915, at
#172,0C0,000*7
Among these provinces which issued paper money it was th© govern
ment of Kwantung Province which was first to turn its attention to th©
scheme for redemption*

An authentic record6 showed that of the total

notes issued (including 5G</, $1, $5, and $10 in that province),
amounting to $33,040,000, only a sum of $31,645,504 was redeemed and
cancelled at the fixed rate of t0*455 for each dollar during duly, 1914*
The remainder w^s left to be cancelled without redemption*

Tk© paper

6Ibid., p* 326*

%'en, P*
The Currency Problem in £hina, 1914* p* 134*
^William F* Spalding, Eastern Exchange Currency and Fineno©, Londod,
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notes in other provinces were subsequently either called in by way of
redemption at a fixed price or cancelled without redemption*

Unfor

tunately there are no available figures to show the real situation*
As to the bank notes, encouraged by the existing fact (issuing of
notes by th® Central Government, the provincial governments, foreign
banks, and some merchants in all parts of the country) there was nothing
to prevent the free circulation of notes put into circulation by the
Chinese banks*

The crisis of unsound and uncontrolled banking institu

tions (both native and modern banks) following the revolution of 1911
made all paper money issued by Chinese banks absolutely valueless*
that event only the redeemed notes

of

the

After

Taching Bank, the Bank of

China, and the Bank of Commimicati onswere oonsadored good in the minds
of the majority of the people.
C* The copper cents— With the appearance of modern copper coins** or
copper cent s, which is one kind of

copper

cash without a holein the

center, in 1900 all further supply

of

cash coins ceased*During

old

the World Ifar th© market value of copper rose and it became very
profitable to collect the old copper coins and melt them down for ex
port*

Thus tha existing old copper cash gradually went out of circu

lation*
The modern copper coins or the copper cents continued to ba turned
out by a number of provincial mints after 1S00*

According to one source

of information, the total output of the copper cents from 1900 until the
end of 1917 was 31,682,102,308 pieces of 1/ and 386,292,308 pieces of

supra* p* 82*
10S* Kann, The Currencies of China* 1926, p. 398*

in
Several series of oopper cents had bean coined since 1905*

Fro®

19OS to 1909 there were two series of copper cents} that is, the Tai
Tsin Ti Kuo series and the Regular Provincial series.
were issued in the period of the Tsin Empire.

Both of them

They were characterised

by (1) more or less uniform design, (2) dragon and clouds or waves,
(3) average weight 112-116 grains with 28 m.iru for tbs one cent piece and
33 ®.m* for the two cent piece.

Under the Republic of China, there were

several kinds of issues, such as the Commemorative series, the Regular
Provincial series, the coins for general use, and the ”blg money”
copper series.

They w r e inconsistent with regard to weight, size, de

sign, composition and workmanship, owing to lack of central control of
issue.
The over*production and un-unifonnity of issuing at last led to
the depreciation of these copper cents.

The cause of depreciation of

the copper cents more or less varies with different periods.

As Mr. E.

Kazrn says 9
The depreciation, which had taken place between the years 1906
and 1911, was due to over-production, and not to adulteration of
the metal contests. But shortly after the inauguration of the Re
publican regime, and especially after th© ending of the World War
in 1919, the production of copper coins became so prolific and
the metal contents so variable that, within live years, the situa
tion had become desperate. In certain districts of the country
not less than 300 oopper cents had to be tendered for a dollar in
1924. Occasional analysis of the fine contents of 10 cash (or 1
cent piece} pieces showed that there were debased coins in circula
tion which deviated up to Zb% from the standard weight of 18 oandareens. *
It is safe to say that at the last stages of the bad tendency
(around the year 1926} China*s copper coinage was not a medium of ex
change with a clearly defined standard, but merely ”a commodity with a
continually fluctuating price."

Ibid.,p. 407.
12jbjd., pp. 407-408.
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actual demand and ■the fin e n e s s o f th e s e o o in s *

Th® fo llo w in g q u o ta tio n

o f f e r s an example**'®

(!) Shanghai daily q u o ta tio n (O ctober 1 2 , 1925)
K a tiv e

in t e r e s t per day: A * M* t a e ls 0 *2 5 p e r t a e ls
P . M.
"
0 .2 4
11

1,000
"

Msacioan and Chinese #

a A * S3* t a e ls 72*53575 p e r 100 #
P. M . t a e ls 72.625
• «

Kiangnan cents

* A * K . t a e ls 60*70 p e r 100 cents ( s i l v e r )
P* M*
"
60*70
«
«
«

Canton cents

Coppers

: A * M* t a e ls 54*925 p e r
P * Um
*
55.000

100 cents ( s i l v e r )
«
tt
w

* A * M* 5 4 2 ,0 0 0 , per t a e ls 100
P. M* 542,000
*
*

Exohengo:
d o l l a r 1 - 12 s ilv e r - 2 0 ^ - p ie c e s , 19 coppers
d o l l a r 1 - 242 ooppers
10 cents * 18 coppers
10 cents *
6 coppers
( b ig money)
( 2 ) Shanghai F o re ig n Exchange Bankers* A s s o c ia tio n (on May 1 1 ,
1925)

Members o f th e above a s s o c ia tio n have agreed that, on 1 1 th . in 
stant end u n t i l f u r t h e r n o t ic e , s u b s id ia ry coin s w i l l b® re ce iv e d
and paid out a t th e fo llo w in g r a t i o : —
Subsidiary coins

Dollars
10
20
SO
40
50
60
70
80
90

cents
cants
cents
cents
cents
easts
cents
cents
cents

9
m
m
=

9

S
a
m

s

10 cents silver and 5 coppers
R
and 11 coppers
20
n
and 1 copper
40
n
and 6 ooppers
50
ft
and 11 ooppers
60
(t
and 2 ooppers
80
»
and 7 coppers
90
ft
and 12 oopper©
100
w
and 2 coppers
120

(5) Post Offloe notification
(Shanghai, Ootober 2, 1925)

Subsidiary eoias tendered for the payments of taxed mail matter
mill be accepted at the foil wing rates*
!'
One Mexican or Dragon dollar * copper cash 2600
*
*
»
«
* oopper cents 260
91
* 16 lO-cont pieces, 9 copper cents
v : and 5 cash
/
/

*or one 10 cent piece may be obtained stamps to the face value
of ? cents plus 10 cash*
A 10 cent stamp coats one 10 cent piece, 6 oor>p©r cents, and S
cash*
A S cent stamp costs 7 copper cents plus 5 cash*
A 1 cent stamp costs 2 oopper cents plus 5 cash#
It is apparent that the exchange rate between the subsidiary coins

and the dollar, between subsidiary coins and oopper cents, and between
subsidiary coins and the copper cash fluctuated from business to
business, from time to time, and from place to place*

This added more

trouble to the existing serious confusion of China* s currency situation#
II* The monetary policies of China’s government and the advocates
of currency reform during the period concerned:
A* The policies of government and the proposals of currency reform—
In the beginning of 1911 Mr# Sheng Hsuan-huai was appointed Minister of
dommonications• Through his instrumentality a foreign loan was signed
on April 15, 1911, between the representatives of American, British,
French and German banking groups on th© on© part and Duk© Ts&i Tee, the
Minister of Finance of China on the second part#

Df th© loan of

1:10,000,000, thirty per cent* was contracted to be used for the develop
ment of hanchuria, and the remainder for the purpose of reforming
China* s currency system*

Meetings were held in London and Berlin by

representatives of the four power group and th© Chinese Government with
the purpose of finding a suitable scheme for the reform of China’s
currency system*

Under the terms of the loan, it m s agreed to Invite

Dr* G* Vissering, late president of th© nJave.sche Bank” to act as

im
monetary advisor to th® Chinese Gevenament*

About M O O ,000 of the

loan was paid to China to be devoted to Manchurian development immedi
ately after the loan agreement sms signed*

3)r* Vissering1s appointment

was made just on the eve of the Revolution (October, 1911)*

Owing to

the outbreak cf the Revolution, this loan was not completed, but Dr*
Vissering carried on his investigation for one year*
After studying the Chinese currency situation for a year, he
drew a plan for the currency reform of China*

His plan was accepted

by the Revolutionary Government and gave rise to the plan of the Chinese
Currency Reform Committee of 1912*
His whole plan is briefly described as foil owe?:
a* The standard of currency— He maintained that from the standpoint
of stability of prices and foreign exchange, the gold standard is the
beet one, but from the standpoint of existing circumstances in China
•perhaps for some time to come, a gold coin will be far too big a unit
for the ordinary transactions in the interior of C h i n a I n

China th©

gold exchange standard with a circulation of token coins of silver,
nickel and oopper may be the suitable one for a transitional period*
But the principal disadvantage of a gold exchange standard is that It
is always to a certain extent an artificial system which requires a vexy
close supervision if a deterioration of th© currency is to be avoided*
However, this is not the disadvantage which only the gold standard
possesses and it is the disadvantage which even under the silver standard
cannot be avoided*

14g* Vissering and W* A* Roost, Cto Chinese Currency, Amsterdam,
1912, Vol* I, p* 16*
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Under a silver standard the silver coins carry their own real
value in themselves• But a very serious disadvantage of this system
is that the same objection of artificialness remains in full fore®
as regards the circulation of subsidiary oopper coins, which can
not be detached from the silver currency*15
Thus

he proposed that during the early period of reform China should

have a dual currency, a silver standard and a gold-exchange standard*
b* The sise of unit— fie criticized the new unit of the new dollar
?yuaa* provided by the Chinese government in 1910 as being too large a
unit* A large unit tends to raise the prices of commodities, salaries,
wages and the oost of living****

instead of the unit "yuan3 of

28*97795048 grams of pure silver; that is, 64&/ l »C0O of a kuping tael
of pure silver,*^ ho suggested that one unit of silver coin should con
tain 8*50 grams of silver with *900 fine involving a gold ratio of about
21 to 1*
The several coins proposed by him are#

is

Silver Coins
one unit piece 8*50 grammes, 900 fine
two unit piece 17.00
*
" *
4 unit piece
4*75
H
800 "
l/5 unit piece 1.90
”
"

7*65 fine weight
15*80 "
5*80
w
*
1*52
w
”

Nickel Coins
1 ^ 0 unit piece
1^80
«
«

Weight and alloy to be determined later on*
"
*
Copper Coins

1 cent piece
1 cent piece
z
, ,
2 cent pleee

15

Weight and alloy to be determined later on*
”
"
«
«

P* 17 *
Ibid., p. 61.
17^7. supra»y p. 127.

18 Ibid., p* 95*
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The gold coins should he issued, only after the silver end
subsidiary coins had been In circulation for some time*
Gold Coins
20 unit piece
10 unit piece

8*09974 grammes, 900 fine, 7*289766 fin© w.
4*04987 grammes, 900 fine, 8*644888 fine w.

The new unit was to weigh *8644883 grammes of fine gold, which is
equal to about 25 cents United States currency, and was determined from
gold value of l/5 of a kuping tael of silver*

His reckoning is as

fellows:
1 kuping tael * 575*8 grains - 57*31128541 grams
(987 fine)
(987 fine)
Thus, 1 kuping tael * 568*3146 grains of fine silver, and l/3
kuping tael * 189*4382 grains of fine silver*
The normal silver price for that moment was a value of 28 d*
per standard ounce* (i.e* 28 d*will buy 480 grains of standard
silver)* Therefore the same 28 d*will buy 37/^0 of an ounce, or
444 grains, of fine silver*
The gold value of the rroposed unit, expressed in silver at
the price of 28 d*, would thus be
189*4382/444 x 28 d. » 11*946553 d.
For 240 d* * gold sovereign ( » 7*52238 grams of fine gold)
Thus the new unit (l/5 of a kuping tael) «
7*52238/340 x 11*946555 * 0*3644885 grams of fin© gold*
When we adopt a future ratio between gold and silver as 21 to 1,
■fee fine silver content of th© proposed new unit would hav© to be
0*3644883 x 21 s 7 *6542543 grams of fin© silver*
Supposing a fineness of 900, the gross weight of th© new unit
must be 8*504727 grams *18
Comparing this coin with the shilling and others, w© find th©
following figures *
Gross weight
of silver
plede In
grams*
Hew unit
proposed
Shelling
Beichamark
France
Guilder
Bupee

8*504727
5*65518
5*55555
5*
10.
10*126
11*665811

19ibld*, pp. 68-90,

TCet weight
of silver con
tent in grams:

7*6542543
5*2310415
5.
4.175
9*45
8.100
10.69182675

Equivalent
in fine gold
of grams*

0.5644883
0*3661192
0*35842
0.29032
0.6048
0*3749962
0*4882113

Giving a ratio
as from:

21*1
14*28:1
13.95:1
15 5/8 :1
21*6: 1
21.9: 1

i

m

The bullion value of this proposed silver token coin would
only become equal to its nominal value if the price of silver
rose to 45 d* per ounce standard* With this margin it would seam
to be vexy satisfactorily safe—guarded against the consequences
of a rise in silver*
Meanwhile he presented a comparative table of the content of gold
coins between China and other countries
\

Gross weight
in grams *
Now2C unit
piece (China)
Sovereign (Br*>
20 Beiehsmaxk piece
patch 10 Guilder piece
SO Francs piece
10 Ten piece
U* S* $5 piece
& Sftglaj

Fin© gold
content in
grams*

Fineness*

i

8*09974
7 *98805
7.96495
6*72
6*45181
8*55525

7*2^9766
7 *32238532
7.16845
6*048
5*80645
7 #499925

0*900
0*916
0.900
0.900
0*900
0*900

8*559

7*525158

0*900

e* The steps of adoption of the new system—
According to his plan, an outlined scheme is as follows*

21

First period of transition
(1)

The very first step must be the adoption of a future gold unit

as the foundation of a new system in order to avoid speculation on th©
announcement of the gold par, and also to avoid the possibility that the
new unit would later on have to be raised to its future nominal value*
(2) The organisation of a Central Bank of issue, or otherwise the re
organization of the Tft Ching Bank as a central bank for the whole
country*

(3) The introduction of the new gold unit as a money of

account for book credits and book transfers*

(4) Securing th©

cooperation of the foreign exchange banks and of th© private Chinese
h»wWy

bankers for the introduction of th© new gold unit into their

bookkeeping*

(5) The issue of bank notes based upon th© new gold unit#

20lbid*# p* 91*
21Ibid♦, pp* 111-112
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(6> The accumulation of a gold reserve against th© aforesaid hank notes*
(?) the regulations of the mansgement of this gold res ©nr©*
ally dtQltriiig the bank notes legal tender*

(8) Eventu—

(9) To niak© a close study

of the conditions of the balance of trad©, and of the balance of payment
for China*
Second Period
(10) The establishment of weight* fineness* and alloy of the token
coins and of the nee subsidiary coinage*
eoins and simultaneously•

(11) The issue of these token

(12) The accumulation of gold reserve against

the token eoins* and the regulation of its management*
sirable* the coinage and issue of gold coins*

(15) If de

Also, if desirable* the

temporary adn&3ion of seme particular foreign gold coins as legal
tender* and the temporary issue of gold certificates*

(14) The procla

mation of unlimited legal tender of (I) the silver token coins of 1
unit and 2 units i (XI) the above-mentioned gold coins and eventually
the gold certificates«
Third Period
(15) The gradual withdrawal and subsequent demonetisation of th© old
silver dollars* as far as necessary of the old sycee, and of th© present
copper cash*
In hie plan, a special point which distinguishes it from other plans
is that in the first period h© uses one kind of money for book credits
to take the place of gold units*
The requirement for employing token coins and then adopting a gold
exchange standard is that the government ought to bo able to protect
against counterfeiting and against illicit importation of false coins*
especially the tthonest* counterfeiters in the first instance*

Further

more* the government should have some means to meet a possible rise in
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tfe* gold price of silver to the extent of raising the bullion value
of tho ooin above its nominal value, which could result in the coins
going into the melting pot*

From the point of view of China1a

situation at that time* he ©aids
China is certainly not in such an enviable position enough
to prevent a serious degree of counterfeiting, especially in the
remote parts of the interior****22
Therefore he gave us an alternative ways
China would have to try and do without token coins for the
first few years* However, as a stepping stone to a gold ex
change standard she might for the present have a unit based in
gold in conjunction with bank-notes and the silver and copper
currency now existing..•• He claims that by this method (to
maintain a double standard for a while) all speculations in ad«*
vance of the new measure and the sudden losses and gains* which
were the unpleasant features of conversion in India and the
Straits, could be avoid«d*2S
The issue of bank-notes under the Central Bank* the next step in
his plan* would be more difficult to counterfeit because of the
technical skill required, the numbering of the notes, and ©o forth*
but he held that the reserves under his scheme would be represented by
gold stocks or gold credits held abroad*

For the following reasons he

pnxiously maintained that the issue of notes in the bank unit should
i

purt be a government issues
/
j(1) There is a temptation to misuse such power in times of
,
stress by the government j (2) proper gold reserves abroad should
i
be kept strictly and exclusively for the redemption of these
/
notes *24
/ 1
d« How is the system maintained?— According to his plan the
i
;
[- Central Bark redeems its notes in foreign drafts, charging slight pre
mium in amounts of 50,000 or 100,000 or more of the new units*

Reserve

funds in cash, bills of exchange or first class investment of short

z£g* S* Wage!, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai* 1915, p* 156*
25lbld*, p * 136 *
24ibid., p. 138*
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Maturities * should be maintained in several foreign financial centers*
Ams t e r d am may be the administrative ©enter of reserves for western

countries and Shanghai for the eastern ones*

Bank notes should be

issued at first only -when an equivalent of gold, bills payable in gold,
or silver capable of being sold for gold, were tendered the bank#

Re

serves of about fifty per cent# are contemplated eventually*
Seigniorage profits go into a currency gold reserve fund to form a
government fund but is t o be managed by the Central. Bank in the same
wa y as the bank note reserve fu n d s ♦

Fiduciary coins can be redeemed in

the same manner as notes, in amounts of 50,0 0 or 100,000 or more of
new units, or i n gold or silver bullion*

Opportunity should be given

in many places in China to exchange fiduciary coins for larger coins,
notes or transfers in amounts of 10 or 20 units or more*
e* Others— The Board of Directors of the Central Bank, a private
institution with some government control, will be elected b y share
holders, and a president and secretary will be appointed by the govern
ment*

A Government Commissi oner appointed b y the government would

supervise generally the transactions of the Bank, especially those of
general policy*

The Bank should secure the services of a few carefully

selected foreigners*
Chinese dollars •

Capital of the Bank is about ten million

The Bank has a monopoly of note issues bo the exclu

sion of the government, and aots as fiscal agent to the government*
In Dr* Vissering1s plan, the important policy in the operation of
his plan is that the date of minting of the token and other coins would
actually be left entirely open for many years after starting the bank
unit system in actual practice*
In Dr- Vissering’s mind, the silver standard does not procure any
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stability of prices fop commodities, contracts and so on*

Furthe more,

under a silver standardTTth© same objection of artificialness remains
in full force as regards the circulation of subsidiary copper coins,
which cannot he detached from the silver currency*”

For the purpose of

stability of prices and foreign exchange a go d standard is the best one*
bat from the view of existing circumstances in China the gold exchange
standard is the suitable one for a transitional period*

A gold ex

change standard has the advantage that the gold standard has*
insures stability of prices and of international exchange#

It

Under the

gold standard just a few steps are needed to guarantee the nominal value
of token coins, and to maintain the parity of foreign exchanges#

For

the special circumstances in China, he would adopt a money of account
for book credits; then an issue of bank notes of a new gold units
after adequate accumulation of a gold reserve, then declare the bank
notes legal tenders then issue token coins and new subsidiary coinages
if desirable, then issue gold coins*

His last step is the gradual

withdrawal and subsequent demonetisation of the old silver dollars, as
far as necessary of the old syoee, and of the present copper cash*
It seems to me that the key point of his whole plan Is the first
step; that is, "the introduction of the new gold unit as a money of
account for book credits and book transfers*”

I have the same question

which l£r* Wagel has; that is, in the case of China, how would Ur#
Vissering make effective this kind of highly skillful policy?
to "secure the cooperation of the foreign exchange bank*"

he says

It would ssem

difficult for the Central Government to secure the cooperation of
foreign banks*
hew

Even though China’s government has reached this goal,

the money of account be run all over the interior, in most of
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which places these Is no uniform measurement of value, no uniform
exchange mediima, no modern banking institutions, and no good trans
portation and oommunioation system?
After the aoooptanco of Mr* Vissering*s plan by the Revolutionary
Government, the Chinese Currency Reform Committee drafted a plan in
1912*

It decided in favor of the adoption of the gold exchange standard

in order to stabilise exchange, to make payment© to foreign countries
economically, to place the nations*© foreign trade in safety, to stimu
late the inflow of foreign capital, to minimise the drastic fall of the
value of "the silver tael, and to avoid the loss of interest due to the
hoarding of gold*

The plan called for the issuance of silver substitute

coins for the gold unit, for the gold reserve exc?aange fund, foreign
bonds and other means of international settlement*
For various reasons this plan has never bean brought into effect*
Mr* Vissering was succeeded in Hovember, 1912 by Dr* W* A* Roest,
but on the daath of the latter in January, 191-3 Dr* Vissering again
took up the post of honorary adviser on currency matters*

Meanwhile

a Bureau of Currency was formed with Dr* Chang Tsung-yuen as chairman,
to consider the question of currency reform in the light of the sug
gestions made by Doctors Vissering, and Roest*

In 1913 l.'r. Hsu Un-yuan,

acting director of the Audit Department of the Chines© Government, was
one of the three members of. the Currency Reform Commission and a strong
advocate of the silver standard*

After the Government of China had de

cided upon the adoption of the silver standard, Vr. Hsu drafted a law
for unification of silver coinage which anticipated the creation of the
National Currency Regulation of 1914*
is as followss

Tha general idea of his scheme
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ft* The unit of thenational coin.——He suggested the term 1tHuanM as
tha name of the new standard coin for the followingreasons
la olden times the currency system in China m s called
tthuen—fa *
In the
pastwe have been accustomed tocall the
dollar yuan* This word is also used by Japan® In order to
make a distinction between the currency units of the two
countries, we adopt the ancient name huan as the name for owr
unit *25
Ha held that the total weight of the unit of standard coin should
be 65 oandareens kuping weight (0*55 kuping tail} or 20 grammas*

He

As tha 72—candareen dollar is now approximately equivalent to
1,500 cash, then the 55-candaroon dollar will be approximately
equivalent to 1,0'0 cash, which is a number at once regular, conveaoient and possible of decimal progression* The relative value
between silver and the cash will not be altered* Trie people will
be in possession of a dollar whose value is not too high for
daily transactions* It will not tend to force up the standard of
living*
The 72-eandareen dollar is of too high a value to be suitable
to the people and it invites irregularity*
To introduce by force decimal progression with the 72~cand&reen
dollar will be a source of great danger* This act will encourage
speculation* A dolar is now worth as much as 1,520* If its
value is forced down to 1,000, the laboring and other classes
will suffer acutely, as the dollar will be depreciated b ~r one—
fourth of its usual value, and there is no prospect of lowering
the price of the necessary commodities*
He cited the usual foreign provision as an example to decide the

fineness of the standard coin suggested by him with 90 per cent* silver
and the remaining part with copper*
b* The decimal progression— The Huan will be divided into 100
fdng or contendj each feng shall be divided Into 10 II*
c» The sioaidiary coins— According to him, huan, the standard coin,

will bo unlimited on the amount in on© transaction*

The silver token

coins, 50 feng and 20 feng, involved in one transaction shall not exceed
10 huan*

The amount of nickel token coin, in fong and 5 feng, involved

Zbjinmtel Report ofthe Director of the Mint, 1915, Washington, p* 209*
^3j[bi4«, pp* 209—210*
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in

transaction shall not exceed 5 huan*

^he amount or copper token

eoin, 1 feng and 1 li, involved in on© transaction shall not exceed 1
huan*

The one li of the copper token coin shall be of the same value

as the cash then in current use*
d* The designs of the coins— The standard coin as well as the
silver and nickel token coins shall be inscribed with the national flag
and four words s’*ftandard coin, one huan**1 and so forth on one face of
the coins*

On the other side shall be engraved the picture of the

President and the date whan the dollar is minted*
The special features in his plan were: (1) the new term 1!Euon” for
the standard unit suggested by him in order to make a distinction with
the term *Yen* of Japan; (2J the weight of 55 oandaroens kuping for the
unit of standard coin in order to meet the existing market rate of one
dollar to 1,000 copper cash*

Neither of these suggestions had been

adopted by the government when the National Currency Regulation of 1914
was drafted*
Srinivas R* Wagel, a private scholar studying the Chinese currency
situation and the problems of Chinese currency, believed that the
greatest difficulty of currency reform in China is not the fluctuation
of the exchange rates of gold and silver but the lack of unification of
domestic currencies*

He urged that the Shanghai tael should be jma.de

idie uniform currency unit and that subsidiary copper coins should be
unified*

He especially offered a reasonable criticism about the plans

proposed by experts for China, ©specially about V'v* Vissoring*s plan*
Some points of his criticism and suggestions are given as followss
is* He £5.rst mad© a comparison between the conditions existing in
China and those in countries of Europe*

Ho saidi
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Contrast the conditions in China with those in Europe* There
is no comparison between the national wealth of the two countries*
There ere no manufactures in this country, and besides the country
has been for nearly forty years buying more than it sold, and thus
accumulating a large adverse trade balance* The country has no
wealth with which to improve its industry and manufactures j and it
is a well-known fact that the profits of industries and manu
factures are greater than those of agriculture, and that such pro
fits alone have enabled Europe to adopt and maintain a gold
standard* Moreover* China has not even the freedom to develop in
to a manufacturing country•*•• Foreign goods entering China are
taxed merely to furnish revenue to the government* and not with a
view to encourage local industry or with a view to enable her to
compete with foreign manufactures* Tie standard of living*
especially in view of the almost entire absence of manufactures
and the small national wealth, is extremely lows and the ratio be
tween the standard in China and England may be roughly put at one
to fifty*27
Therefore, he concluded that China is not able to follow the line of
the foreign countries to adopt the gold standard*

The adoption of a

currency unit must be regulated by the active circumstances existing in
the country which adopts the currency unit*
b* He did not omit the merit of the old system existing in China
which used to be ignored by most reformers of China1s currency*

He

pointed out ■shat the fault of many proposals for China* s currency reform,
such as hr* Vissering*s, is the assumption that "because the gold or gold
exchange standard has been found suitable in another country, they should
also serve the purpose for China*"

As a matter of fact, the Chinese

currency system had some merits to have existed for centuries*
currency reform is to be carried

If

ut in China successfully, one should

consider the possibility of adopting her existing system to suix; modem
conditions

27Srinival H. Wagel, Chinese Currency and Banking, Changlmi* 1915,
pp• 265—266*
SSlbid*, p* 269#
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o* He also pointed out the ignorance of the local trade in most of
the proposals of China*s currency reform*

nlTo doubt foreign trade and

foreign intercourse have a deservedly higher importance than local trad©,
but****no proper regulation of currency is possible if sufficient heed
is not given to the situation as it affects purely local interests*tt^
He presented a bird’s eye view of the local trade situation in China
at that times
The situation, especially during the past thirty years (before
1915 j has been as followss ^h© traders and merchants in the ports,
and the foreigners dealing with Chinese, thought in terms of the
artificial and
the conventional taels of the differentlocalities3
the Government
and the
Provincial officials thought interms of
the kuping taels and several provincial taels, as distinct from
the taels in the ports; the Haikwan was the money of the Customs!
the people in the interior, and even in small places very near the
ports, thought only in terns of the cash, which 1ms remained su
preme, in spite of all charges, and an almost unvarying standard
from Tientsin to Canton; in spit© of the circulation of the
dollar, few except wage earners and small shopkeepers thought in
terns of the dollar except in a fevj places where convention held
to the dollars the circulation of the piastre in Yunnan or th© rape©
in some parts of Szechuan has not made people think in terms of the
rupee or piastre*30
According to his theory of tho value of money, gold does not give
any special advantage over
stability of price*
of exchange between

he other possible standards from the view of

In his mind "economic forces determine the relation
any twocommodities, end the same forces determine

the value of gold in relation to commodities*w51

Ther©for©,what finally

determines the value of money is not the number of metallic coins or any
other coin of stendard money, but "what a certain amount -would fetch ih
the market*"
He maintained that if China adopts the go.d standard, it would mean

%% b i d *, p* 269*
3QIbld*, p* 272*
31ibid *, p * 274—276 *
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nothing ®iso but th.® appreciation of* gold, which shs has not gob wnrf
in the meanwhile the depreciation of silver, which is her national

wealth.
©. He held that the gold exchange standard is not the suitable on®
for the existing situation in China for these reasonss

(l) the Chines©

have long been accustomed to having their money at its mere bullion
value in any shape or sise; (2) China's Government is not powerful
enough to prevent counterfeiting and can not defend its frontiers
against the introduction of counterfeit money from ©broad, if she adopts
g«
the token coin, the fundamental of the gold exohang® system.
At last he concluded that nthe primary steps in any reform must be
to establish a coin which, with its auxiliaries, would prove
acceptable in every part of China.®

readily

34

f. Mr. bagel's plan— Because of the special circumstances in China,
such as both gold and silver being used at their bullion value and the
value of copper coins depreciating as much as possible in order to bring
them to the level of their bullion value, aixl different taels and purity
of silver existing in various ports and places throughout the whole
country, he therefor© held that (l) in the first stage China should
maintain its copper cash and silver monetary system "with the copper
each as tha basis and the silver tael as the unit for the standard.®
(2) China's cash, which has boon the standard in China for many centuries,
should be the foundation of currency reform.
meet with no objection*
suited

A copper coin token should

(3) The Shanghai tael is in ©very way the more

as a standard of value for China than either the kuping or the

3%ibid.,"pp. 276-278.
g3lbid., pp. 280-283.
34Ibld., p. 284.
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h&ikvm tael.

(4 ) The Shaagh&i fcael , properly spa aking „ ought to be

worth 1,000 o&sh*

{A dst&llod &ooouat of hi® proposal is s h o w la

pages 409*315 of his China so Cur rency and Banking®)
How let os taka a view of his whole idea.

In the first place, he

held that only the economic forces determine the value of gold in rela
tion to comiodities,

''What finally determines the value of money is not

the number of metallic coins or any other coin of standard money but
n
what a certain amount would fetch in th© market.
Therefore from the
4%
view of stability of prices, gold does not give any special advantage
over other possible standards.

Furthermore, China does not have gold

enough to support the coinage of her gold
is adopted.

00

ins if the gold standard

From another angle. If China does adopt the gold standard,

that means the depreciation of silver, which is her national wealth.
Therefore, he held that it is not necessary to adopt the gold standard
as the only possible policy for the purpose of stability of her foreign
exchange.

In the second place, he held that the fundamental of the

gold exchange standard system is the token coin, and China's Government
has not enough. power to prevent counterfeiting.

Thus the gold exchange

standard systos can not safely be adopted in China.

The using of book

malt illstoad of the token coin suggested by Dr. Vissering is not a suit
able policy for China because it ignores the local situation.

In the

third place, he maintained that the local tradition and existing condi
tion should be recognized, when th© standard and unit of currency are
determined.

In the special eas© of China any reform of eurrenoy must

establish a uniform coin first.
According to his opinion he set up some steps for the currency reform

of China as ffcllowst

a reform m k i n g copper coin token® should meet with
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3&o object ion j the government should regul&t® the supply of the c&sh;
ike new standard unit of th© Shanghai tael should be worth 1,000 oaahj
sod the Shanghai tael would be th® more suitable standard of iralie for
China in ©wary way*
But he failed to tell us (1) by what way China's Government would
Induce the people who used to appraise th® copper cash and silver coins
according to their bullion value to accept the copper coin© as tokens;
(2) if according to his plan, 1,000 cash is regulated to be worth one
tael of silver, how much copper must be contained in o u unit of th®
token copper ooin; (5) in what way the Government would control the
supply of copper coins; (4) when the new unit of the tael is issued,
how the Government would treat the existing silver dollar and the sub
sidiary silver coins.
In January, 1914 the draft regulations proposed by th® Bureau of
Curreroy received the approval of the President and th® Cabinet of the
Republic of China,

they were the National Currency Regulations and th®

Regulations for the Enforcement of the Currency Law.**®

In these regula

tions not only the plan of Vissering was not adopted, but even the im
portant points were not very different from those in the Regulations
for National Coinage of 1910.^
1. In this act the same silver yuan with exact weight, as that of
the Regulations of 1910, was adopted as th© unit of currency (i.e.,
0.648 kuping tael or 23,97796048 grams of pure silver).
2. The following is tlm value of th© national coin in its decimal

®®The ?/hole text of the law is shown in The China Year Book, 1921-22,
Tientsin, pp* 296-299*
supra, p.
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progression
Silver coins

Gross weight
candareens

Silver

1 yuan
i "
20-cent piece
lO-eesrb piece

72
32.4
12
6

90$
70$
70$
70$

7

Hlokel
25$

Hiokel coins
5-eenfc piece
Copper coins
2-cezxt piece
1-cent
w
5-li
*
2-li
"
1-li
•

28
18
9
4.5
2.5

Copper
10$
30$
30$
30$
Copper
75$

Copper

Pewter

Lead

95$

4$
«

1$

n
«
n
w

«
n

w
w
41
n

Article 6* So restrictions ^i&ll bo placed upon the use of tbs
1 yuan piece • The amount of 50 cent pieces involved in one trans
action shall not exceed twenty do liars* The amount of 20 cent and
10 cent pieces involved in one transaction shall not exceed five
dollars. The amount of nickel or copper pieces involved in one
transaction shall not exceed one dollar* This restriction shall
not be applied to the collection of taxes and th® exchanges in
the national banks.
3. As to the right of minting and the minting fee* they provided
that the right of minting, and issuance of the national currency shall
belong to the Government.

If the Government coins 1 yuan silver pieces

for people it shall charge them 0.006 each as a minting fee.
4. According to article 1 of tha regulations for the enforcement
of the- currency law. the

national coins must b© used as th® medium in

the transaction of any financial dealings in the country.
5. Article 2 stated that the Goverzaaent shall exchange the silver
dollars coined by the old mints with th© national coins and remint them.
A provisional order shall fix a certain period

in- which the old dollar

will possess the sane value as the national yuan (new dollar).
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The reform cm which "these regulations were based was planned to
commence within a district and then gradually to ©xtoQd to th® whole
country for the following reasons:

(1) there being different financial

customs in the various parts of the country, th© reform should be started
In trade ports; (2) the amount of th© now coin© and naw bank notes m s
not sufficient to meet at once the demand of th© whole country; (3) the
ciroumstanees in different parts of th© country demanded suitable re
vision of the currency regulations to meet th© special needs of each
district.
After the publication of those regulations, the criticisms directed
against them might be grouped into tha followings
(1) The emission of a definite statement to th© effect that
Government institutions will always accept the token coins at their
face value*
(2) The excessive margin of minting profit in the case of 2 cent
coins, whioh should weigh" 36 per cent more (222 grains Instead of
1 ® grains), if they are to have the same intrinsic value in rela
tion to face value as th© present 10 cash copper coins*
(3) The 6 cent nickel coin would represent even a greater margin
of minting profit, as its intrinsic value would b® only about onetenth of it* faoe value•
The Bureau of Currency of the Central Government was abolished in
1915, but re-established in 1918*
1918,
sent•

bo

For three years, between 1915 and

active action for currency reform was pursued by China®s Govern-

In August, 1918 an attempt to introduce a gold standard was pushed

by the Minister of Finance, Tawo Ju-lin.

He advocated th® issuance of

gold notes based on the gold yuan having 0.752318 kungfun (it may
mean the wgramtt) of pure gold.

Mr. Tsao Ju—lin, in a >p©tition to th®

®^KoJi Matsuoka, China *s Currency Reform and Its S1p-,nifioanoe, The
Imperial University of Kyoto, Vol. XI, XSSSjTp* 81*

16$

varged that stops should bo taken for the issue of6 gold
ourrsxtty notes and for the re—estab!ishtnant of the Currency Bureau*
fi® stated that the scbemo of th© national currency regulation of 1914
had been, ©erried out and added that another step in advance was required
to achieve complete success.

The reasons presented by him were*

(1) That China's foreign indebtedness and the Indemnity* amount
ing to one—third of her annual budget, were in gold currency*
(2) That exchange fluctuations were a serious hindrance to the
development of trade* end
(5) That the most advanced nations of the world use gold.
The important points in his plan are briefly described as follows*
a. Gold dollars and gold currency notes issued— lie suggested the
gold standard with reserves concentrated in certain cities in China.
The reserves were to consist of Chinese gold ooin, bullion or foreign
gold coin.

National gold coins should be minted and gold currency

notes should be issued by a bank or banks appointed by the Currency
Bureau of the Central Government.
b. The sise of the unit— The new unit was called nchin yuan1*
(gold dollar) and was to contain .725318 kungfun of pure gold or
2.01683 Mi— lm non■ of kuping tael, worth about fifty cents United States
currency.

Gold notes should be 1 , 5, IQ, 20* 50 and 100 dollars.

The

(toreran eat migit order the issuing of gold currency notes of small de
nominations, such as i l/S, 1/10 of a dollar.

Subsidiary coins provided

in the national coinage law of 1914 would be used as fiduciary ooins
in the gold currency system.
o. The method of Introduction— At first gold notes should be
issued by two Government banks, the Bank of China and th© sank of
Communications, backed by geld reserves.

Th© conversion rates between

g8The China Year Book, 1921-22, Tientsin, p. 299.
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gold, motes tod silver coins sod sotds would be postod fnro tiae to
time*

A£ first government railways, telegraphs and other Gesamimioa-

hi cm offices and, later, public funds and salaries would accept and
mo

new notes*

fVhen the proper moment arrived, th© Government

would declare the legal ratio between gold and silver and would enforce
the geld standard*

Uhifioation of silver and copper coins should be

accomplished by rigid enforcement of the existing National Coinage
Law*

Old coins should be exohanged for th© new coins or notes at the

legal rate prior to a certain date, after which old coins were to be
accepted only as bullion.
of these operations*

The two Government banks would take charge

The Currency Bureau would b© established for ten

years to carry out the refc m *
d* The policy of maintenance of the system— Th© reserves of the
gold notes should be held by the two government banks and concentrated
In certain cities in China, which might be in certain foreign centers,
where any type of the notes aright be cashed*
e. As to the tael— After a specified date all accounts and transac
tions, both government and private, should be interns of dollars, not
taels~

Treaty nations should be consulted regarding conversion of

the maritime customs to the dollar basis at rates fixad by the Currency
Burses*
f * The Central Bank— The Bank of China and th® Bank of Communica
tions were to perform functions of th© Central Bank, i*©*, were to be
the fiscal agents of the Government*

They should have th© sole right

of note issue, and other banks might circulate notes as agents of these
two bankfc*

Banka with, notes now outstanding should withdraw them within

a fixed period*

Prior to this tlme fchoir reserves should b© ©et aside
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for rstirQBOJit of 'the notes, and bo sealed by "th® Currency Bureau*
In his plan "th® Control Mint was to be at Tientsin*

Th® on®’-dollar

coins should b® coined less and less, and emphasis placed on the half
dollar•

Furthermore ha held that foreign advisers should be obtained

for currency refom.

He had the opinion that even if a gold standard

were not adopted, currency unification would be beneficial and would
facilitate a future shift to gold*
From a technical standpoint, his plaawas a relatively complete one
in comparison with the previous ones proposed by his predecessors*
Sold currency notes were to be used to a considerable exbent in order
to save the circulation of gold coins*

By means of th© assistance of

the Sank of China and the Bank of Coaamunications, a careful policy and
an adequate reserve could take care of the gold currency notes through
normal times•

Banks with notes then outstanding should withdraw them

within a fixed period, after which & special reserve should be set aside
for th© retirement of the notes still ©insulating*

The Bank of China

and the Bank of Communications would perform the functions of a Central
Bank*

By means of rigid enforcement of th© existing National Coinage

Law (1914) the goal of unification of silver and copper coins was counted
accomplished*

In his plan th© subsidiary coin in the National Coinage

Law of 1914 is used a* fiduciary coin in th© gold currency system*

The

Central Mint at Tientsin would coin th© one dollar less and less, and
the half-dollar more and more in order to meet th© existing condition
of th© leer standard of living and popular, but entail amounts of numerous
trass aotl one * After a specified date the old measures of value, th®
taels* would be abandoned* .All of these points mentioned above were
surely the neeessaxy steps for currency refom at that time*

im
W m n m r * he left out

Isport&ni and difficult point of deciding

tha i*|al ratio between gold and silver*

In his plan he only scentleased

that *The conversion rate* between gold notes aad silver colas end notes
shall be posted from tise to

sad "'when the proper isQRcet arrives,

the Ocveroaent will declare th® legal ratio between gold irnd silver..*.*
the poiat eade his whole plan a ha I f complete statute*

Forth© m e r e , in

hie plan, *tfce reserves of tha gold notes shell be held by the two
government beaks end concentrated is certain cities In Chine, which
eight be in certain foreign

centers, where anytypo of tb©notes

be cashed*1* This is his issthod to maintain

stig&t

thenew system*

Chine did not produce an adequate as&ount of gold to support the
exhaustion of the reserves by seans of the unfavorable balance of in
ternational payssei^s.

If the tiase ooem&s the Covemaenfc will be forced

to borrow foreign loans for the purpose of currency reserves*

In tbs

case of China the experience has been that foreign loans and *foreign
advisers* always tend to soa© type of political invasion f m & outside*
If China was already a country with self-control led custom duties*
effective ad*inirtr*tion, a powerful Central ^oaenacieat, available
transportation, ee&sgunieatlcn and financial institution©* sad wee with
out all kinds of foreign invasion and interrupt ion, th© plan proposed
by Sr* Tsao might

said to be useful *

Els plan wee enacted by

& Presidential mandateon August

10, 1&1&

in the fdfst of regulati on© „ but hi® plan was depend®at upon a loan frees
Japan to assist In China's currency unification*

The proeeeds of the

said lean were to be deposited with bank® in Japan ae reserves against
which gold notes were to be Issued*

At th* very time,

nation-wide

as?
boycott against Japan forced the elaborate and unworkable regulation#
then promulgated to remain in abeyance,

the contents of the regula

tions for the issue of gold currency notes were the some as those ineluded in Mr* fsao’s plan*^
After the failure of Mr* Tsao’s attempt at currency reform in
1918, the country fell into a pessimistic situation by a continued
aerie# of civil ware*

The authority of the Central Government could

never be effective outside of the Capital, Peking*

So further reforms

were executed or proposed until th© establishment of th© National Govern
ment at Banking in 1928, except the establishment of the unsuccessful
Shanghai Mist*
In 1920 a memorandum from the foreign exchange banks at Shanghai
was offered to the Central Government*

In it the "Eleven Practical

Suggestion#n concerning the creation of a mint in Shanghai were recom
mended to the Chinese Government*

(The text of the suggestions is in

the China Year Book, 1921-22, pp* 309-310.)

The Chinese Government

aeoepted the advice, so far as the mint was concerned, from the foreign
exchange banks, but showed itself unwilling to place such a mint under
foreign experts1 control (the important point in the suggestions and
one ten# in the suggested loan from the foreign exchange banks)*

The

Chinese Geverosenb turned to conclude two loans with the Chinese banking
group for the purchase of rolling—stock for the Government railways
fbr the purpose of the proposed Shanghai mint*
On March 3, 1921, the Loan Agreement was signed between th©
Ministry of Finance and the Chinese banking group (representative of

£®The text of the regulations for the issue of gold currency notes
is found in pages 299,300 of the China Year Book, 1921-22.

xm
tlto principal fiuaeial ifitsreets in China) for tha ©rootion and
ment of a m o d e m mint at Shanghai*
The mo u n t of the loan was $2,500,000 Chinese currency«

In the

meanwhile the Chinese banking group suggested the following points?

40

1 • height and fineness of the coins*“According to the suggestion
offered by this group, it would be wise to adopt the fineness of the
yuan Shin-kai dollar at a new fineness of 890*00 for th® new dollars to
he coined by the Shanghai Mint, i.a#, containing a weight of 0*6408 of
kuping tael or 25.9024808 grass (according to the law of 1914, the dollar
should be 0*648 of a kuping tael, or 25*97795048 grams of si Ivor, and
the fineness should be 900 silver and 100 copper)*
Z* A new die should be adopted for th® Shanghai Mint in order to
distinguish the coins from the existing issues*
3* Judging from the standpoint of the minimum cost of minting, a
1*5 per cent (that is, 0*01 tael seigniorage) seems to be a Just charge*
Then a dollar would oontain 0*6508 kuping tael*

However, should the

1*5 per eexrt• seigniorage become too high at a future date, It could be
reduced by a presidential mandate*
4* The Chinese Bankers1 Association at Shanghai and the Shanghai
Mint will work together and fix the amount of money that the mint should
coin every day or every month*
5.

If China should adopt a system of free coinage, the bullion syce©

and the tael standard should be first abolished*

The reason held by

the banking group iss

tf^yhe original suggestion is in The China Year Book, 1921-22,

pp. 314—317*
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^
bullion sycee and the t&el standard ere bo he allowed
to r«Baini dollars will still have a market ©xahango quotation
daily* When th© exchange rats Is high* people bring their bul
lion to the mint Tor coinage, and when th© rat© drops, the mint
would owns© coining altogether*
6* Organisation of th© mint— Th© control of the Shanghai Mint should
be in the hands of the Ministry of Finance and th© Currency Bureau*

The

officials should be appointed according to their real qualifications
both regarding knowledge and experience* and should not be ©hanged or
shifted too often so as to insure efficiency of the mint management
and production*

A. foreign assaying expert should also be employed for

testing the variations and fineness of the coins minted*
7* Productire oapaoity of the mint— A basis of daily production of
#€00*000 would be enough bo start the initial production*

The present

plant of the Mint should leave plenty of room for further expansion so
that enlargement plans to the extent of 11*000*000 daily production ©an
be formulated whenever necessary*
8* in order to make certain of the abolition of the tael standard
and bullion eyeee* the Shanghai Mint should appoint a Special Committee
consisting of persons* who have olose connection with the question of
the tael and the dollar* to discuss ways and means of abolishing the
bullion syeee and tin tael standard* as well as to test the fineness of
coins and supervise the coinage of the mint* and to make suggestions
for general efficiency of the mint*
In the reply by the Ministry of Finance and the Currency Bureau
of the Government to the Chines© banking group* it stated *
duly instructed the Shanghai Mint to act upon them*

TtW© have

In case we desire

to make any changes we will discuss them first with you on th® subject*”
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1923 * a©w mint had bean constructed at Shanghai and equipped with
up-to-date machinery.

Unfortunately the installation was not finally

completed* on account of lack of funds* and the plant was never operated
until 1927*
la 1927 the Shanghai Mint (with the Hangchow Mint) began turning
out the Sun Yat-sen dollars bearing the effigy of the great revolutionary
leader* Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

The Shanghai Mint was later expanded into th©

Central Mint in 1933.
B.

Th© banking situation and demands for positive reform of China's

monetary systems
1* Banking situation during the period concerned— Th© losses from
speculation* especially owing to the rubber boom (about 1910) and the
various local disturbances weeded out nearly half of the existing native
banks*

By the Revolution of 1911 th© native banks were assailed* on the

one hand* by th© foreign banks which pressed for Immediate payment for
ehcp leans; on the other hand* by the fact that tine native banks had
net th© bens fit of using governmental funds which were gem©rally de
posited with them by local officials.

Under the sudden attack "the

banks crumbled to pieces one by one* and as early as .November of that
year* or in th© second month of the Revolution* the number of -the native
41
banks left was a tenth of those existing prior to 1910.n

After this

crisis* the surviving native banks were certainly better than th© ones
of the previous year* although they were not quite sound.
On the side of the Central Government the "Nineteen Regulations

ttS. R. Wagel, fihinese Currency and

191&, p. 213.
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(kvtming th* Issuo of* tit® Convertible BftQk"not9 Currency” were issued
la 1910*

They provided bnly for the bank-note issue of the Xa-Ching

n w r »

After the World War broke out In 1914, on account of th© withdraw
ing of the foreign banks free China*a banking business to a great extent,
and the development of China’s internal and foreign trade, th® Chinese
banking; institutions, especially China9s m o d e m banks, started to spread
their operations to a considerable extent*

But the banking activities

were still in private hands and free of Government control*
Is 1912, far political reasons, the Shanghai branch of the former
Ta-Chisg Bank reorganised into the Bank of China*

After the reorganiza

tion it fell into private hands where it remained for many years*
The banking development of China during this period (1011 to 1923)
tended met only to increase the quantity of the modern banking institu
tions, but also to the establishment of a sound banking business by selfsupervision*

For instance, in Shanghai the Bankers* Association for the

modern banks was organised early in 1915 in order to roach the goal
of self—control and mutual help*

After th® example of th> Bankers*

Association for the m o d e m banks, the Native Bankers* Association, tha
highest authority of the trade of native banks, m s organized in 1920*
In other trade ports there was th® same tendency*
Z. Demand for positive reform of China's monetary system— Although
during a long period (from 1918 to 1928) there were no further monetary
reforms undertaken by China's Central Government, from the

individual

^Annual Report of the Director of the Mint, Washington, 1910, p* 240*
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side there came a 8®ri$s of loud voices, or even som& unsuccessful
loi^sds^s urging the positive reforaa.*

Even though, these movements

hod no direct results, they influenced the la tor opinion of th® public
and the actions of the Government a great deal*
Of those movement&

themore distinctive ones are ag felloess

In 1921 some petitions and memoranda to the Government from several
Chinese banking groups urged currency reform.

One of them is ths peti

tion from the conference of Chinese bankers at Tientsin In &ay, 1921*
It (1) petitioned the Government to abolish the tael, making the dollar
the monetary unit of China; (Z) petitioned th© Government to establish
a system for issuing bank notes; (3) proposed to the Government the
resisting of old coins; (4) petitioned the Government to exempt trans
portation charges on bank notes and silver forwarded by banks*
Another memorandumsubmitted on October
banking group had drawn

6, 1921 by the Chinese

the attention of the Government and the public*

It mentioned the following points;
(1) Gold should be adopted as the basis of Chines© monetary cur
rency;
(2) The use of the tael should be abolished;
(3) All the mints In the country should be placed under a unified
system of management in order to reach a uniform fineness and legal
standard*
(4) Every rostrlotion shall be imposed on the minting of old sub
sidiary soins, both in silver and copper?
(5) The profits realised from the minting of new subsidiary coins
should be deposited in a sinking fund which would bo solely used in the
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introduction of a uniform silver our rare y and in the adoption of a
Said standard*
(6) The paper currency throughout th© country should b© reformed
so that iifcbecomes uniform*
(7) Proposals should be made to stop th® foreign banks from issuing
notes*
(6)

As the notes issued in foreign currency by th© foreign banks

in Chinese territory infringe on China’s sovereign rights# strong action
should be taken to have such note issues stopped at once*
At the Fifth Annual

Conference of the Chines® Bankers*Association

held in Peking in April#1624# the ease resolutions# more or less# were
again passed with regard to the currency situation*
C* Tiro important proposals for currency reform in 1628*
After the establishment of China's Kational Government in Banking#
an economic conference was convoked in 1928 under the supervision of
the Government •

The Conference proposed a plan for th© purpose of

unifying existing silvercurrency and advanced a plan for a gold stand
ard*

The content of the

proposal is briefly as followss

a* Tbs standard and unit— Tha silver standard will be based on th®
existing silver dollar*

At first the unification of existing silver

currency is needed Immediately* and then other preparations shall be
made looking to a gold standard*

The silver standard dollar should be

freely coined except the subsidiary silver coins*

The unit will contain

64 #08 eand arsons of kuping tael of purs silver (72 cand arsons with 890
fin e n e s s ) and will be equivalent to 23*9024808 greens# or 368*87 grains

of purs silver*

It is approximately the average weight of current silver
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doll&rs *

It is "w ot *th about forty*two

g

®nts United fifcat©3 currency with

silTfir &t flfty»fiT6 cents an ounce • The subsidiary coins shall b©
silver of 60# 20# and 10 dents# and copper of 1 and Jr cents*

The

silver subsidiary coins shall be .700 fine, and copper .950 fine.
b. The method of introduction and maintenance— Within a certain
period the old silver dollar will be exchanged for a new one on th©
basis of dollar for dollar.

The old subsidiary silver coined accord-

i»E to established standard will be redeemed by the Government with the
new subsidiary silver.
Government account»

The subsidiary coins shall be minted only on

The profits from coinage should be acemulated in

preparation for the adoption of the gold standard and for carrying out
monetary reform.

The reserves against bank notes shall be sixty per cent.

cash and forty per cent, securities•
e. The treatment of the tael— The tael must be abolished and re
placed by the dollar.

Th© contracts, taxes t*nd payments of all kinds,

government «*d private# expressed in taels, must be converted to a
dollar basis at the rate of 0.6669S kuping tael to on© dollar (the old
silver dollar contained an average of 0*6408 kuping tael).
d.

The Central Bank— Th© Central Bank will be established with

capital subscribed by th© public.
four main districts*

Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow and Canton.

Central district will be Shanghai.
of note issue#

Th© country will be divided into
Th©

The Central Bank will have a monopoly

the amount of notes for each district will b© limited.

The existing bank notes must be withdrawn within a reasonable period*
The Board of Directors shall be elected by shareholders, and th© Governor
Anri vio©—Governor of the Bank shall be ohos&n by the Government from
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among members of the Board*

Above the Board of Directors a Committee

of Supervisors -will be appointed by the Government.
®«nt

The Local Govern*

•••h banking district will select a member of this Committee#

The Central Bank has the functions of receiving deposits from, other
banka, fixing the discount rate, and issuing notes and acting as the
Government Treasury*

The provincial banks shall be made uniform in

character, shall be made stock companies with a minimum capital of
$1,000, 000, end shall not have the right of note issue*
e* The ¥infc— The number of mints in the country will depend on
whether a central banking system or a federal banking system is adopted*
If the former is adopted, one mint is adequate j if the latter, several
mints are necessary*

The existing provincial mints must be abolished*

The Central £ int or mints will be under the direct control of the Minister
of Finance*

All available measures should be taken to prevent counter

feiting*
Seme significant points In this proposal were accepted end put into
act afterward by the National Government.
Dr* E# W* Kemmerer, the financial adviser to the Chines© National
Government and Chairman of the Kommerer Commissi on, in 1926, set up
study currency conditions and to reoommend reform measures, presented
his report on the "Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a
Gold Standard Currency System in China* on November 11, 1929*

The plan

drawn by Dr* Kemmerer for China is known as a gold standarda but it is
really a gold exchange standard*

Even Dr* Kemoierer himself said so*

im

Thar© nr© three us©s of gold coin in & count ry *s monetary cir
culation: (1) t© pr ovid e money for hand to hand olroulatl on and
bank reserves, (2) bo provide full-wolght comaodihy money for th©
needs of would-be hoarders who laok confidence in the country*©
fiduciary money, and (3) to provide gold for redemption purposes
and for International payments, whereby the country *& currency
supply is adjusted to the demands of trade and the gold parity of
the currency is maintained.
The last of the three above •mentioned functions of gold coins
•••is idie only legitimate function of gold coins that could not
better be served in China by silver coins and bank notes* It is
to provide a method of performing this function without the nsce©sity of circulating gold coins in the country that the meohanissa
of the gold-exchange standard is recommended.4®
In another section under the title of "Sources of Fund,” he ©aids
"Such premia (received on the sal© in China of drafts) have proved to
be important sources of revenue for the gold reserve funds of many
other countries having the gold exchange standard and are likely to be
so in China
Dr# KsBsserer gave a detailed explanation about the reasons why the
gold standard is preferable to the silver standard for China*

It is

because (1) China *s foreign trade is almost entirely with gold standard
countries; (2) China *s public debt is largely a gold standard debt and
is likely to be Increasingly so for many years to come*
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In view of

the downward movoment of the price of silver in the world market, ”the
monthly expenditures in silver for service# on China’s gold public debts
are now (October, 1929), about 11,000,000 greater than were th© monthly

—
® k T W# Kemmerer, National Covernra©nt of the Republic of China.
Cossais sion of Financial Bxperts* Project of Law for the ^TradualT Introdue*
tion of a Gold-Standard Currency System in China, together with a Report
in Support Thereof, Submitted to the Minister of Finance by the Gammis©Ion of Financial Experts on Nov"."IT, 1929, p•~T3l*
**rbid#, p# 130.
p. 71*
4SIbid
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expenditures for the same service in January, 1929."4:6

(6 ) All im

portant countries in the v<orld ha to adopted the gold standards so the
problem of stabilizing the iralue of gold is "the subject of serious
and widespread consideration, while there is little or no international
concern as to the stabilization of the value of silver."
He advocated and gave a thorough-going discussion of the advantages
of the direct plan (i.e., China directly adopting the gold standard)*
Ee listed the following under the direct plan;

(1) there was no need

for a large loan because of the adequate seigniorage profits j (2 ) there
would be an immediate introduction of the gold standard} (S) there would
be less disturbance to business ("it proposes to measure values with a
yardstick of approximately the same length as that at present used in a
large part of the Republicdifferent material"

A?

5

The yardstick will, however, be made of a

(4) there would be less injustice to debtors}

(5 ) the re would be less social and political discontent and. opposition
bee&UBe of lees disturbance to prices, wages, and outstanding debts}
and (6 ) ths re would be less speculation.

48

On the other hand, the disadvantage® of the indirect plan (i.e.,
first set up a uniform silver standard system? second, from a silver
standard change to a gold standard), according to him, ares

(1 ) the

advantages of gold would be delayed} (2 ) currency deflation would be
necessary before a gold standard could be adopted} and (3) there would
be a logs of seigniorage profits.

49

4&Ibid., p. 72.
*7 Ibid., p. 82.
48IbidT
^According to his estimate, "under the direct plan the margin be
tween the bullion and the money values of the dollar coins would b©
0 *1 2 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 and the margin between the bullion and th© money values of
the fractional coins would be 0^144,000,000, making a total of G|264,000,000 on the 1,200,000,000 dollars of new silver coins. Under the indirect
plan* the Government would receive of this vast sum only $$24,000,000."
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Us sis © considered "the situation that; during the period of improve—
®®st» changes in the gold price of silver would result in fluctuations
in the values of the existinc silver-standard currencies in terns of the
new gold standard unit.

But his own answer to this situation is that

**among people so familiar with multiple currency systems as are the
Chinese, the addition of one more system would not be a very serious
50
inconvenienoe, if it were only a temporary one *u
Dr. Kemmerer*s plan can be briefly summarised under the following
items s
a. The standard and unit of value— The unit of the gold standard
will be called the KSuan (a new meaning invented for this term by Dr.
Keaaaerer), consisting of 60.1866 centigrams of fine gold.

Therefore

the new gold currency unit will have & value equivalent to forty cents
in United States currency; to Is. 7.7265d. in Sterling; and to 0.3025
yen in Japanese gold yen.
1 Sun - 100 cents

1 cent * 10 mills

As to the provision for the unit, ha explained?
This unit was selected largely because it is of practically
the sase value, in terms of gold, as the silver dollars now cur
rent in most parts of China....The shift should involve little if
any disturbance to prices, wages end the relationship of debtors
and creditors.®^
The coins are to be minted exclusively by the National Government
as follows»

^ I b i d .. p. 97.
6*Ibld.. p. 40.

Denominatf on

Weight

Fine metal oontent

Fineness

Silver
1 Sun
SO cente

20 grams

16 grama
7.20 tt
2.88 *

10

*

20

4

*

10 cents
5
*

Pure Nickel
4.5 grain®
3.5
w

.800
.720
.720

Copper ($5$ fine)
5 grams
3
n

The project does not provide for the minting of gold coins and
mints the smallest copper coin only under an urgent need for such a coin.
He indicated the function of the coinss

”Al 1 of the coins* includ

ing the silver sun* are to be fiduciary* and maintained at a parity with
geld by means of unlimited redemption in drafts on gold-standard eountries, or in gold bars..•-But it is expected that this form of redenipCn
tion will be rarely if ever ub ed. ”
He gave three advantages of the nickel coins over silver ones:
(1) they are more durable* (2) they are more difficult to counterfeit*
because of the hardness* (3) thay are much cheaper than silver coins*

53

How did Dr. Ksmmerer decide the weight of currency unit for his
plan?

For this important point he gave th© following five Important re

quirements to be met* namely:

(1) the coins should be good coins as

money* from the standpoint of appearance* durability* and convenience
in physical sizes (2) their silver content should be such that the
margins between the ir bullion value and their value as money would be
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large enough ho give th© coins ad@qua.te projection from the danger of
being driven to uh.© melting pot by future advances in the gold price
®f silver;

(s)

the margins mentioned above should be sufficiently large

to yield, the government a good seigniorage profit to he used as a con
tribution to the required gold reserve fund & j (4 ) these margins should
not be

00

great as to encourage unduly the counterfeiting of coins of

full legal weight and legal fineness! (5) the margins should not be so
much below the money value of the coins as to create too great on ©bCl
st&ola to the acceptance of the coins by the public.
The silver coins proposed in the project by his commission, in his
opinion, will meet these requirements}
The price of fine silver in Hew York at this writing (October
24, 1929) is 50 cents an ©unco which would give th© pure silver
content of the proposed sun a value of 25.7 cents gold, and which
would therefore maks the bullion value of the sun 33 per cent less
than its money value»
He cited the Philippine gold-standard peso authorized by the United
States Gaverment in 1903 as an example to prove the thirty-three per
gg
east* suitable*
The higher percentage of alloy he proposed for the fractional
silver coins in his plan is due to th© foHawing two reasons s

(l) the

half-sun »nA twenty-cent piece will probably circulate more actively
than the sun, so it will get harder wear; (2) th© desire for increased
seigniorage profit for th© needs of the gold reserve fund*

57

b« The legal status of gold-standard currenoy— In his plan, the
Minister of Finance shall announce, for each province, three different

S4xbld.Y~p» 109.
5gIbid., pp. 110-111*
S^Ibld., pp* 110-111*
57Ibl d*, p. 114.
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dates, i.e*, the gold-standard currency circulation date, the goldstandard legal tender date, and the debt adjustment date*

In each

province, after the gold standard currency circulation date the goldstandard curenoy shall circulate legal Xy, and shall be accepted in
all payments to the Government at rates in relation to the silver dollar
and other non—gold standard currency fixed by the Minister of Finance*
After idie gold-standard legal tender date which will not be earlier
than a year after the go Id-stand ard currency date, all payments by the
Government shall be fixed and .paid in gold-stand ard currency, and all
contracts made thereafter shall be in the gold— standard currency (except
for special provision)*

After the debt adjustment date, which shall not

be earlier than the gold-standard legal tender date, all debts and other
obligations previously or thereafter made, calling for payment in
Chinese non-go Id-stand ard currency, shall become payable in gold—standard
currency *t the official rates fixed by the Minister of Finance.
c* The organization and function of the administration of the gold
stand ard— Dr • Kemmsrer proposed the following organization and opera
tions i
(1) L Curreucy Department in the Ministry of Finance is charged
with the administration of the gold-standard fund and with other matters
relating to the establishmont and maintenance of the gold-standard coin—
,

age system.
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(2) A gold-standard fund for establishing and maintaining th© gold
staid ard shall be set up and never be less than thirty-five per cunt • of
the total amount of gold-standard coins in circulation and shall com©

58Ibid *7 P* 33*
p* 34.

m
^rom

resources of (a) seigniorage from new coins, (b) premia frosi

®al# of exchange» (©) interest frcxa part of funds deposited abroad*
(d) loans for currency stabilisation# ©to*60
This fund shall be divided into two parts*
includes*

Part I of the fund

(a) gold bullion and ooin held in China or abroad* (b) gold

deposits abroad* (e) high grade bankers* acceptances drawn on banks or
bankers in foreign centers where th® gold standard fund is kept*
©f the food includes*

Part II

(a) gold-standard coins of China* (b) metals

purchased for coinage purposes*
Gold—standard coins shall b® redeemed in one of the following forms
at the option of the Director of th© Currency*

(a) gold tars of a value

between about 15*090 to 25*000 suns at a rate of 60*1366 centigrams of
pure geld per sun* (b) cable transfers on a foreign depository of th©
gold—stand aid fund, (c) defraud drafts on any foreign depository of the
fund, (d) sixty-day sight drafts on any foreign depository of th© fund
(the drafts are to be for amounts of not less tie it 2,000 suns and a
x 61
premium shall be ©barged corresponding to th© gold export point)*
Gold-standard coins when presented for rodempti on for gold bar,
draft, ©to*# shall be withdrawn from circulation (Just as th© coins
had actually loft the country, as would b© the case in a country on th©
gold standard with gold in circulation), and paid out again only against
drafts sold abroad upon the fund in China*

62

Xh© important point in his plan is that th© Chines© coins in th®
gold-standard fund must bo kept out of circulation in China*

Therefor®
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under no cireumstanees shall any portion of ths gold-standard fund bo
placed on deposit in any bank in China * nor in any foreign branch of
a Chineee bank, nor shall any part of the fund be invested in China.65
d* Dr. Kfflamerer offered a detailed scheme for gradual substitution
of gold* standard currency for the non-go Id-standard currency and stated
that after the announcement of a gold-standard currency circulation date
fcr one or more provinces, exchange office® will convert the old money
into geld standard money at official rates fixed by the Minister of
Finance (these rates may be different for different provinces and may
be changed from time to time).

The 10-cash or one-cent copper coins

new in circulation are to be withdrawn from circulation until they are
circulating at a rate of 200 to th® sun (at that time the current rate
varied in different parts Of China and in the neighborhood of 300 coppers
to the silver dollar.

The copper in these 10-cash oopper coins is worth

more than the value of the coins as money).

Then the Minister of Finance

shall announce a oopper coin stabilisation date for each province, and
after this date these coppers shall be redeemed at the rat© of 200 to
the sun.
After a.certain date, each province or municipality shall make
provisions for the retirement at par or leas than par of whatever notes
it may have outstanding or any notes that it may have guaranteed.

Every

bask, business concern, or private individual shall retire hotes at par
64
or less before the final note retirement date fixed by th© Government.
The final note retirement date for each province, which is not to be

Ibid., p. 142.
^ I b i d ., p . 44 .
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earlier "than the debt adjustment data, is ho b© announced at least oh®
year in advance,
e.

As to the rights of foreigners, Nothing in this law shall

impair the rights of foreigners under existing treaties*”65
These five points are the main proposals in M s plan*

Besides

he maintained that th© National Currency Commission, assisted by a
foreign currency expert and by a Provincial Currency Commission in
every province of the Republic, should study and recommend to the
Minister of Finance from time to time matters regarding the currency
reform*
After the publication of Professor Kemmerer's plant, there cssse
much oriticiss*

Same critics attacked the technicalities of th® plan

itself* and others based th®ir criticisms on circumstances current
in China*

As far as tbs latter are concerned, there was still poli

tical chaos to be straightened out before China could hope to adopt
such a plan.

It is largely true that

Before the Chinese Government can carry out Professor Kemmererfs recommendati ons it must be powerful enough to enforce
the etse of the new money and th© withdrawal of the existing
money after a reasonable time limit* It must be able to pre
vent counterfeitIng; and if the gold price of silver should
rise considerably it should be able to prevent melting and ex
portation of the coins, It must bo able to Insist that all
bank notes have adequate backing of the new gold-standard
money.***It crust bo able to close provincial mints end keep
all coinage operations under its exclusive control, so that
the profits arising from the issue of the fiduciary coins shall
be free from th® depredations of local war-lords and officials*
These were the reasons why China’s Government did not immediately
put his pl«i into effect after accepting it*

As far as th© plan itself

Sbjbid., p. 47.
6 % . W* Pinnick, Silver and China* Shanghai, 1930, p. 72*
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was concerned* It was still th© old story as to how th© Grovermient
would he able to prevent th® smuggling of counterfeited coin from
foreign, lease areas*

How would th® Goversmeixt induce th® people, who

had become habituated to the use of coins at bullion values, to change
their habit within a very short time?

"It is difficult to conceive how,

with the present low price of silver, it would be possible for China to
aocraul&te a sufficient reserve from the sales of surplus silver to
gn
maintain a gold exchange standard*"
In the following years, after the completion of the report, th®
whole situation of foreign countries changed*

After Britain and Japan

went off tbs gold standard, nation after nation abandoned gold for paper*
China's Government, however, adopted one recommendation from Professor
Xemmerer's plan to establish the gold unit of Maritime Customs (i.e.,
C. G. U*} with 60.1866 centigrams of fin® gold suggested by Ksmmerer for
the new currency -system*

The balance of his proposal was he Id In abeyance

pending a changed internal or external situation, but up to the present
ib has not yet received serious cons id©rat ion because of th© Manchurian
and Shanghai incidents, the undeclared war with Japan, and th® present
war of the Pacific*

^ Y . S* Leong, Silver, an Analysis of Factors Affecting Its Price,
Washington, E* G*, 1&53, p. US*

CHAPTER V
THE MONETARY REFORM AFTER 1928 AND THE
MANAGED CURRENCY SYSTEM

After the Rational Govermiant of China had been established at
Banking in 1928 by China's revolutionary party, th© Chinese Kuomingtang, war lords still occupied th© old Capital, Peking, and th© northern
provinces*

Because of the political and economic circumstance® ©listing

Inside and outside the country, the Rational Government in Ranking could
not undertake the policy of one—for—all in every political and economic
refora*

However, in spite of the difficult situation, th® Rational

Government did its best xor th® currency reform movement*

In this

paper, the apace and time allow us only to pick up th© significant en
actment s concern!ng the currency reform of the Rational Government before
Hie adoption of the managed currency system in 1935 which was as follows*
I* The monetary policies and currency reform of the Rational Govern
ment before 1955*
A* The creation of the Central Bank of China— Th« establishment in
1928 of the Central Bank of China was th© beginning of real government
control over banking and currency in the Republic*
China, the

The Central Bank of

first real government bank in China, was established in 1928

by the national Government, with th© head office of the Bank at Shanghai„
ihe financial center of the country.

This bank, founded with twenty

million dollars of state capital, was chartered in 1928*

According to

the inauguration speech of Hi© Minister of Finance, the duties of the
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Sank shall to® ntoo unify currency, too consol! dato© the banking system# and
to maintain staoiliiy in th® domestic financial situation,1*1

During th®

twenty-third Fiscal Year of the Republic (July 1., 1933-June 30, 1934),
the capital of the Bank had been increased to the amount of 1100,000,000®
(Chines® currency), largely out of reserves and accumulated profits.
On Hovejaber 4, 1936, regarding the managed omrrency, the Ministry of
Finance announced its intention to r©organ!a® the Central Hank of China,
originally opened by the government as a central reserve bank, to to© owned
principally by the banks end th® general public so as too become an inde
pendent institution devoting itself mainly to maintaining the stability
Of Hie nation's currency*

In order to facilitate the early carrying out

of that program, Article VII was revised as follows*
When necessary, the Central Beak may, with the decision of the
Board of Directors and the approval of tbs hoard of Control, pro
pose too the National Government for approval an increase in the
total amount of capital, and may solicit commercial capital, but
th® total commercial capital shall not exceed 60 per cent of the
total capital®
This reorganisation plan of th® Central Bank, proposed by th®
Ministry of* Finance, was approved February 4, 19S6 toy the lia&eeutiv© Yuan®
In the proposed new capitalisation of $100,000,000, the 1,000,000 shares
of $100 each were to be of four kindss

400,000 ”AW shares, subscribed toy

the Sat!onal Governments 50,000 ltBn shares, to to© subscribed toy the vari
ous provincial and munic ipal governments % 350,000 wGn shares, too be sub
scribed by the various Chinese banks and money exchangesj and 800,000
*’B® shares, to bb subscribed toy private individuals*
According to th® reorganisation plan, the Board of Directors of

^The~ Chinese Year Book, 193 5-36, p. 1430®
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the Central Bank should consist of nine members appointed by the National
Government, and eight elected from stockholders holding more than 100
shares*

Its Board of Supervisors should consist of four members appointed

by the national Government * and five elected from the holder© at more than
100 shares*
The Central Bank shall enjoy the special governmental privileges of
issuing lotal tender notes, Customs Gold Unit notes,^ and standard sub
sidiary coins s of acting as the national depository, and of underwriting
domestic and foreign loans*

(Because of th© war which began in 1937, the

year iollowing approval of the plan, the reorganiaation plan of the Central
Bank was not completely executed until 1941*)
Before the attempt at a reorganisation of tin Central Bank, the two
semi-governmental banking institutions, the Bank of China and the Bank
of Communieati ons, were reorganised*

As stated in the notice issued by

the Minister of Finance on October 10, 1935*
For the purpose of strengthening th© control of the Government
over the banking structure of the nation, so os to be in a better
position to cope with the impending financial crisis, the capital
of the Central Bank was in Miarch of this year considerably in
creased while the Government1s share in the capital of the Bank of
China and the Bank of Communications was also augmented, thus bring
ing these two leading banks into a community ofinterest with the
Central Bank* Although these three leading banks still function
as separate institutions, they act with a unified front to meet
emergencies* This centralisation of financial power has consider
ably strengthened the position of the Central Bank in th© money
market, which has proved to be a veritable power of support to the
Government and thus has been enabled to render invaluable help in
assisting to tide over the crisis*
To 1928 the Bank of China had been a seml-governmexrtal concern, with

2V. infra, p* 184*
®Tang Leang—le, China*s Hew Currency System, Shanghai, 1936, p* 77•

in
its

offie s at Sianghfti instead of Peiping*

Th® Bati onal Govsrsmest

subscribed $5,000,000 of th© bank’s paid-up capital of 125,000,000 and
appointed three of the ten directors and one of the fir© auditors, while
the Chairman of Director s <had to be approved by the Minister of Finance*
In the same year the Bsnk of Communications had been nad© a semi—govern—
mental concern, also with its head office at Shanghai*

Th® National

Government in 1923 subsoribed $2,000,000 of the reorganised bank’s
$10,000,000 authorised capital, end appointed three of its fifteen
directors and one of its five auditors*
The reorganization of the Sank of China in 1935 w&s accomplished
by increasing the government shares from 15,000,000 to $20,000,000, out
of a new capitalization of $40,000,000*

After th© reorganisation of

1955 the Sank of CorxiuziicatI on s was mostly government-owned, the National
Government holding $12,000,000 out of a total capital of $20,000,000*
The special function of this bank is the financing of Industrial enter
prises, particularly means of communication, such as railways*
The Central Bazik of China, since 1933, has established branches and
agencies extending as far inland as Kwciyang, Sian, and Lanchow*

It

has scm© twenty-seven branches and offices throughout the country*

The

BanV of c*Hw_ fra# by far the largest number of branches, some 120 in
all*

Agencies of the Bank exist in almost all provinces of the Republic,

except sow© of the Western border areas*

The Bank of Ccmmimications has

forty-four branch©s throughout the country*
In addition to the governmental effort to put th© banking business
of the country on a regular and sound basis, the banks had improved
themselves a great deal*

For instance, the Bankers* Associations of

Shanghai (for the modern banks), organised early in 1915, had developed
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froa six members in 1915 to thirty-thro® members in June , 19SS * Similar
organisations were also found in practically all Ihrg© cities in th®
country*

The Joint Reserve Board of Chino so banks in Shanghai, inaugurated

in tbs early part of 1932, had boon supported by over three-fourths of the
Chinese banks in Shanghai.
in existence since 1933 •
Hangchow and Chungking*

The Bills Clearing House in Shanghai has been
Similar organisations have also been founded in

The Credit Information Services in Shanghai have

bee n supported by a large number of local banks*

Th© Institute of Bank

ing was organised with the object of making a scientific research into
the various ramifications of the banking business*

With regard to the

native banks, the Union of h&tive Banks was organised and consisted prin
cipally of the first-class native banks of Ch&ngh®i*

the Bills Clearing

House in Shanghai has been in existence since January, 1933*

Similar

organisations have also been founded in other large oities*

The Joint

Reserve Board of Shanghai native banks and the Research Institute of
M&hive Banks are of the sesas nature as the m o d e m banks* These develop
ments, of course, are tha steps necessary for a sound banking system*
They also pave the way for facilitating th© operation of unifying the
currency system.
B.

Central 1-Int at Shanghai— After the armies of th© Chinese Revolu

tion Party, Kuomingtang, reached banking and Shanghai in 1927 , the Shang
hai ISint (with the Hangchow I int) started to turn out th© Sun-Y&t-seii
4
dollars with a weight of 2<5*902h grams of pure silver*
After th©
Rational Government was moved to Rankings in 1928, the Shanghai Mint
continued to coin the Sun-Yat-sen dollars.

In five yours, from 1927 to

^V* supra, p* 129 of Chapter IV said p. 160 of Chapter IV•
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1932* over 500 million of* those Sun—Y&t—sen dollars w©r@ minted .■for th©
account of tli® National Ooversment*
were gradually melted down

The existing Tuan Shib~kai dollars

after the appearance of the Sun Tat-sen

dollars*
As to the establishment of th® Contra Mint of 1933 in Shanghai*
it say to said that after the decision of 1928 to abolish the taels
e
reached inShe Bconomic Conference in Nanking* the Central Government in
Ranking began preparations for the opening of the new governmental
Central Hint at Shanghai* which succeeded the original Shanghai Mint*
The whole equipment of the Shanghai Hint as a Central Mint m s
completed, and early in March* 1933 there began the minting of a new
standard national dollar according to the now law regarding China’s
Standard dollar* passed March 5* 1933 (this law is shown in detail in
Hie following pages)*

By th© end of 1935 about $100*000,000 of the new

standard dollars «wd th© 11,000 bars* worth of about 150*000,000 had
been minted by the Central Hint in Shanghai • These dollars were coined
only by the Central Mint in Shanghai and were distributed over th© country
by the banking facilities of th® new Central Bank and tie two s®Ri-govem«*
mental banks*
Although the Central Hint started work in Shanghai in 1933, for
specific reasons (certain war lords still controlled 3am© provincial
mints and the civil war still raged in some provinces) until 1936 th®
provincial mints wore ordered to ship to Nanking th© dies for mint!ng
the old copper and silver coins* no that th© uniform policy of th® mint
mi$it be Insured*

supra, p. 163 of Chapter IV.
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C.

The abolishment of "likin”— Th© existence of th© "likia” is an

exouse by which the He stern Powers and Japan prevented China frcm ob**
tainlng control over her own tariff policy♦
After th© Opium ftar (1842), under the pressure

of force China was

driven to accept a oust oris rate based upon a uniform five per cent* ad
valorem, both fo r imports and ©sports, as part of the Banking Treaty
of 1843, which marked the beginning oi Chinars woonv®ntional tariff”
system*

Immediately upon the heels of Great Britain, other powers

stepped in and made China include a "most favored nation” clause in
their treaties with her*

Consequently, the

tariff was applied to the goods of America,

unifora five per cent*
franco, and other countries*

By the same Hanking Treaty China was also obliged to exempt British goods
from all internal dues en route (this treaty was available even to the
"11 kin11 which was created by the Chinese Government after XS52), when
British subjects had once paid a light duty*

By operation of the same

"most favored nation" clause, China was made to extend th® obligation
to other powers*
Since the beginning of th® "conventional tariff” in 1843, to the crea
tion of China*s National Government In 1928 (a period of some eighty-five
years), only four revisions had been made in the conventional tariff
owing to the difficulties of obtaining the unanimous consent of the
treaty powers, which was required for any revision.
In November, 1925 the Special Tariff Conferanoe provided for by
the Nine-Power Customs Treaty of 1922 unanimously adopted th© following
Resolution on the subjects of tariff autonomy and "likin” abolitions
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Th© Contracting Power* other than China hereby reoognim China's
right to enjoy tariff autonomy! agree to remove the tariff restric
tions which are oontaiuod in existing treaties betwean themselves
respectively and China % and consent to the going into effect of th®
Chinese National Tariff Law on January 1, 1929.
Th® Government of the Republic of China declares that nlikin.M
shall be abolished simultaneously with the enforcement of th©
Chines® National Tariff Lawj and further declares that the aboli
tion of *likinn shall be effectively carried out by the First Day
of the First Month of th© Eighteenth Year of the Republic of
China (Jan. 1, 1S29).
In December 1923 , China's National Government put into fore® a new
import tariff,

^ith a u and ate in February, 1930 and a subsequent on®

on January 1, 1931 the abolition of wlikin" and other internal transit
duties was effectively car red out first in -th© six provinces of Kiangsu,
Chekiang, Anwei, Fukien, Kiangsi and Kwang-tung.

Gradually the aboli

tion was soon effective over all of the provinces.
The policy providing, for the abolitbn of th© Mli3cinn by China's
Central Government is a double—edge tool designed to meet th© financial
difficulty in that confusion of circumstances*

By the abolition of th©

"likin* the Central Government ©an automatically control th© Customs
duties in such a manner as to provide considerable revenue, and some
protection as well,

t'ith adequate revenue the Central Government can

treat the national currency frocz a monet^ry point oi view rather than
as a means of raising revenue.

By th© abolition of th© wlikin,which

was th© main source of financial revenue of provincial war lords, the
Central Government can centralize the financial power in order to in
crease the centralisation of th© political power.

From past ©xporieno©

the provincial mints, th© mother of the confusion in th® recent record

% b s Chinese Year Book, 1935-36, p. 12*91,
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of China*s ourramy, wore abused by the military leaders in th© provinces*
Th®refer© It is safe to say that the abolition of the wlikin" directly
weakened the financial strength of’ the provincial warlords and indirectly
contributed to the uniformity of the national currency*

it is also true

that if the financial strength of the provincial warlords is weakened*
their power will be destroyed*
Furthermore* if th© tariff autonomy of China had not been recognised
by the Western Powers and Japan, it would have been impossible for her
to set up the Custom Gold Unit,

7

the significant step in the reform

of China9s currency*
D* The establishment of th© Custom Gold Unit (1930) and the abolish
ment of the haikwan tael (1933)— The Chinese Government has contracted
foreign loans sinoe 1865 to a huge amount*

The foreign loans added to

th© indemnities, turned into foreign loans, were in a very large measure
gold debts*

Around 1925, the foreign debt of the Chinese Government was

approximately 1,205,000,000, or #1,947,000,000 in Chinese currency.^
Q
According to the debt contracts most of the foreign loans call for pay
ment to foreign banks in Peking, Shanghai or other Chines© centers with

fry* infra, p. i?«f,
®A* G* Coons, The Foreign Public Debts of China, Philadelphia, 1930,
P * 102•

§Xn the Tariff Commission agreements of 1858 and 1908, the Inspectorgeneral of the Chines© Customs had to be a British subject as long as
British trad© exceeded that of any other stab© and the Chines® Government
would appoint any British subject considered fit to administer th© customs
revenue azxd a number of other matters connscted with ooKiiaerc© and naviga
tion* When in 1911 th© involution interrupted th© repayment of certain
foreign loans, th© fb reign diplomatic corps demanded, on the protext of
safeguarding the®® loans, that thereafter all customs revenues should b©
deposited with th© Inspect©r-gener&l e»X Customs, who wats to have charge
Of the appropriation of the s© funds for th© service of foreign loam® •
?h© result was that th© Inspector-general withheld from th© Customs suf
ficient receipts to meet th© principal and interest payments of foreign
loan® and remitted to the Chinas© Government only what was loft ovor*

im

exchange rates to be arranged on or near the day of payment.

When a

large payment of interest or amortisation is doe, the demand for foreign
exchange beoua.es strong.

The rate of foreign exchange rises and more

silver or Chinese currency must be given fox* the same amount of foreign
money•

Furthermore, "the foreign banks have been known to change their

10
rates arbitrarily on a day when a large payment was to be made.”

The

financial burden of the Chinese Government was increased still more by
the sharp decline of the price of the silver in terms of gold in the
world market, for instance, in 1930 and 1931.
The gold payments made by the Government are over nine million
pounds sterling (i*9,000,000) yearly..».The foil owing table show®
the cost of remitting £7,850,000 at the average rates of exchange
obtained in various yearst ^
Rate, I local currency,
per “t approximate
1925 Average
1929
"
1930
"
1931
*
1932
"

$ 8.90
11.70
16.66
21.30
15.50

Approximate cost in
$ load currency
$ 70,000,000
92,000,000
131,000,000
166,000,000
121,678,000

Because of the continued decline of silver after 1329, China*®
financial situation went from bad to worse.

It v/as necessary for the

Government to take raeasires to safeguard itself against furtlier losses.
In China, import duties in most oases were specifics that is, so many
h&ikwan taels of silver per picul (133 pounds) or other unit of' quantity
of goods imported, but were intended to yield a certain percentage on
normal prices.

**'Alien the price of si Ivor declined, fchs silver price of

imported commodities rose, while hli® duty yielded th© saxa© amount of
silver currency, and thus represented . decreasing percentage of the
t
price."12
>A. G* Coons, The Foreign Publio Debts of China,, p. 105.
llfhe Chinese Year Book. 1935*36. p. 1271.
1^Dickson H* Leavens, Silver lioney, i>1oomington, 1933, p. 001»
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For the double purpose of increasing the revenue ard of remedying;
the decreasing percentage rate of import duties on account of th© do—
d i m n g price

01

silver in tones of ^old, China1s Government set up the

system of Customs Gold Unit (known as £?♦ G» C. or Q, 0«).

On February 1,

1930 it began to collect import duties in terns of the n©wly«cre&b©d
C* G. U*, & theoretical token consisting of a gold content of 60*1866

centigrams of fine gold

and with a fixed equivalent in terns of the

existing, foreign gold currencies, as required by the order of the
existing Ministry of Finance of China’s Governments
On and after February 1, 1930, the U&ikwan tael will he dis
continued as the unit of calculation of duties on imports from
abroad* instead a new gp Id unit will be used* This unit will be
equal to 60*1866 centigrammes of pure gold end will, 'therefore,
be equivalent to gold dollar 0*40 or 19*7265 pence sterling, or
0*8025 gold yen* From February 1 to Farch 15, 1930, inclusive,
specific duties on imports from abroad now expressed in Haikwan
taels will be converted into the now unit on the basis of Haikw&n
tael one equal to 1*50 of the new unit 5 and beginning with March
16, 1930, on the basis of Kaikwan tael one equal to 1*76 of the
new unit*
As heretofore, dollars, taels and other currencies will be re
ceived in payment of duties* The rates at which such, currencies
will be accepted in payment of duties expressed in the new unit
will be officially announced from time to time . At least three
days' public notice will be given in the ©vent of change in rates*
chile for obvious reasons no attempt will be made to folio?;- daily
exchange fluctuations, these rates will closely approximate market
rates between the respective local currency and goId-standard cur
rencies*
In subsequent tariff revisions, import duties war© set directly in
gold units (C. G. U*)*

Beginning in 193£ statistics of imports -ere

reported in gold units

(C. Cr* U.)» while exports continued to be reported

Intaels, or in Chinese standard dollars after the

abolition of

the tael is 1933*

The Chinese Year Book, 1935-56, Shanghai, pp. 1270-71.
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It Is a matter of record that a considerable part of th© Customs
revenue mas earmarked for th® service of foreign loans In gold ourroii™
oies, and because of the continued decline in the price of silver in
terns of gold, 14m

collection of import duties in the new go Id unit was

of great importance*

But th® import duties assessed in gold units

(C* G. U*) were actually paid In silver currency at the rate of the
day,

which was set and noted by theCentral Bank of China on th© basis

of th© exchange rates with gold-standard countries*

For the convenience

of importers, the bank undertook to sell oashier3s check® in t o m ® of
gold units, to open current accounts in th© gold units, to make forward
contracts in the same units, and to sell ths units for gold or sterling
telegraphic transfers at parity, plus a small charge*
issued bank notes in gold units*

Th© Bank also

14

In ajzoardance with instruction received from the Ministry of
Finance through th© Inspector-General of Customs the public is
hereby notified that beginning May 1, 1931, the Central. Bank of
China will bo prepared to sell Customs Gold Unit notes, in de
nominations of C* G. tf. 10*00, C* G. U* 5*00, C. G* U* 1*00, 20
cents and 10 cents, at rates ascertainable from the Central Bank
of China upon application* Such bank-notes, the issuance of which
is by Government order confined to th© Central Benk of China, will
be accepted in duty end other charges payable in Customs Gold
Gaits.
It was reported that in 1930, th© first year of’ the creation of
the new gold units (C. G* Tj.), only 12*18 per cent, of the total import
duty of China was received by the Ouetoroo in such notes and drafts*
The figure in 1931 rose to 63*02 psr cent*, in 1932 to 75*27 par cent*,
and in 1933 to 07.82 per cent*

Owing to the fact that ths gold units

received exceeded the requirements of the foreign loan and Indemnity
services, tin® Government had a surplus of the 0. G* ii**s to b© sold for

14Ibid*, p. 1272
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loeal dollar currency for -the purpose of covering tha domestic obliga
tion* •

During 1955 thi» kind of soiling reached an average of 6,000,000

C* fi* U* monthly on the looal market*^**
On March 10* 1983, the h&lkwan tael need for the account unit by
China*a customs for ninety year* was abolished and duties on exports
began to be collected in t e r m of the new standard silver dollar con
st etlag of 53*495448 grans of pure silver*

The haikwam tael was fixed

at one halkwaa tael to 1*558 silver dollars*16
B* The abolishment of the *tael‘’— The taels* the indefinite and
un-uniform units of silver in China* bad added more confusion to China’s
wrreney system for centuries*

The fall (in 1911) of the Menohu Empire

brought an end to the kuping tael formally* and the Republican regime
established the dollar as official currency* but in both the interior
and in the sea-ports the system of taels existed until 1988*

For in

stance* in the interior some local tax-collectors (the land tax and
"likin,8 etc.) still kept the local taels and In the trade ports all for
eign exchange transactions took place via the tael*

Almost all foreign

currencies first were converted into Shanghai taels* and then Into
silver dollars if so desired*

Both the rate between taels and silver

dollars and tha rate between taels and foreign currencies fluctuated
daily*

Furthermore* there was a spread between the bankfs selling and

buying rates* so that an extra profit oould be made for banks on their
exebange transactions.
The attempts to abolish the complicated tael system and tc adopt
Instead of it the dollar for the purpose of a money unit had occurred

15lbld*I~p. 1272*
l^Ibid ** pp* 1272-75.

from tis» to tia«• On “
th® Gqvercment sId®, the regulations of currency
is 1910 and 1914 had directly provided the dollar, yuan* as the unit o f
standard mossy*

On the public si do, asms petitions to the Government

had occurred, urging the abolishment of the taels*

For instmce, in

1921, a petition frma several Chinese banking groups eud another one
on October 5, 1921 put the abolishment of the tael as the most important
of the petitioned items*

However, until 1928 the situation still had

not been improved*
Of course, there were other reasons for the active existence of
the tael*

As the following summary of Mr* Leavens showst

(1) The sycee prepared and assayed by private organisations
with no Governmental control, has been found to be entirely re
liable* (2) The record of Chinese Mints has not been so good*
(5) In the ease of provincial dollars, small silver, and copper,
there have been many instances where the content of the coins has
been reduced to the profit of the mint officials* (4) About ten
years ago the foreign banks agreed that they would change from the
t a d to the dollar if the provincial mints were closed, and if all
dollars were coined in a national mint in Shanghai with a few
foreign-officials to cheek and certify the work* Chinese opposi
tion to foreign control* (&) The continued civil war prevented the
carrying out of this plan, although a mint was built in Shanghai
and machinery obtained*
Under the National Government of China, the first step to?/ard
abolishment of the tael system was the provision for abolishing the
Inylqg tael at the Economic Conference of 1928*

At that conference

it was decided to abolish the tael and replace it with the dollar*
Contracts, taxes and payments of all kinds, government and private,
expressed in taels, were to be converted to a dollar basis at the rate
of 0*65693 kuping tael to one dollar*

On February 1, 1930 the first

^ D * H* Leavens, "Chinese Money and Banking,” Annals, Sov* 1930,
pp* 207-208*
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*t*p in the elimination of* the tael by the National Government was ac
tually taken*

The haikwan tael was replaced by the newly-established

Customs Gold Unit •

In 1932 the plan of abolishing the tael and unify

ing the dollar currency was enacted*

This policy of abolishing the

tael was announced definitely on December 30 of the same year*

Mean

while in March* 1933 the new type of Chinese standard dollar was started
in the mint (the coinage was actually begun in Hay* 1033) * The Chinese
Government suddenly announced on April 5* 1933 that the tael would be
abolished as of April 3*
at once.

Chinese bonks and merchants perforce obeyed

The foreign banks and merchants at first ignored the order of

China** Government, but at last accepted the situation*

From April 10

the foreign exchange bank* began quoting exchange rates in terms of the
Chinese standard dollar instead of the old Shanghai tael*

Bank accounts*

contracts* securities* and outstanding accounts expressed in taels were
converted into standard dollars at the regular rate of Shanghai taels*
71*30 per $100*
F* The new law of China's stanfiard dollar— On March 3, 1933 a new
law was passed which established a new monetary unit* the standard dollar
with 36*6971 grams gross weight* eighty-eight per cent* pure silver and
twelve per cent* copper alloy* or 23.493443 grams fine silver*

This

lor (see Appendix A) la the last relatively complete on© in the history
of China* s currency*

It included the following important points a

1. The Standard Silver Unit (or yuan) shall be exclusively coined
by the Central Mint in Shanghai*
2. The Standard Silver Unit shall be legal tender in all transactions*
S* The old one-yuan silver pieces of good appearance may be used in
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the sana manner as the standard Silver Unit within a certain period
fixed by the Ministry of Finance*

4* Fare silver of 23*493448 grams may ho presented in exchange
for each Standard Silver Unit plus a minting charge of 2.25

per

cant,

from the mint*
S* ^he Central Mint may produce *mint bare** with a finen©ss of
999 thousandths for people by charging the 2,25 per cent* minting fee*
6* The rate of exchange for a Standard Silver Unit is fixed at
0*716 Shanghai tael*
Some distinctive features in this act* which are different from
the preceding regulations, ares
a* An official rate between the new currency unit and the Shanghai
tael was declared in order to pave the way for the effective execution
of the policy of the abandoment of the Shanghai tael, the last of the
surviving taels*
b. Prior to 1933 China was on a silver standard with quasi*free
coinage (smelting shops for a small charge transformed bar silver im
ported into syeee f o r the purpose of circulation)*

By the new act,

China was on a silver standard with free coinage of silver by the
Government only.

MTh© 2^—per—cent coinage fee was more properly

brassage than seigniorage*

IS

c* The Z \ p e r cent• fee is charged in order to widen the distance
between the silver import and export points*

The new dollars weighing

26*3971 grams or 412 grains eighty-eight per cent* fine silver is onehalf grain lifter and contains about 2*33 per cent* less silver than
the American dollar*

The silver import point is about 3^ per cent.

XBp. h * Leavens, Silver Money, p. 206.
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above this parity (the cost of importing siIvor combining with the
fcj-per-oent• coinage fee}*

The export lit about five or

per cent

below parity. thus the total spread is eight or nine per eent* as
compared with & spread of about fire per cent, for the tael .1S
the existing silver bullion, the Government took another step*

As to
mien the

tael was declared abolished, the Government imposed a 2£-per-cent ♦ export
tax on shipment a abroad of bar silver, sycee, and other forms of silver
bullion, except the bare manufactured by the Shanghai Central Mint at a
chfrge of 2• 26-par cent.
Like the other old acts, the new law had its defects*

One of

them was its failure to settle the serious problem of disorder and
the excess ire varieties of subsidiary coins in circulation which needed
immediate readjustment*
Coinage of the new dollar began in May, 1932 and continued steadily*
By the end of 1935 about #100,000,000 of the new coins had been minted,
and in addition the mint had manufactured over #50,000,000 In #1,000
bars, to be used for bank reserves*

20

II* China's fiationallzation of Silver (1935) and the managed cur
rency system i
A* The silver situation in China and Shanghai in 1934— It was well
Viiafw that China was one of the most important consumers of silver in
the world, but China had not imported silver continually or in any con
siderable amount until after 1918*

Generally speaking, the low price of

silver in the world market had a tendency to stimulate the demand for

19Ibid*, p* 204.
20ibld., p* 203*

in
silver.

T h e re fo r# except f o r a few oases, nin the m ain Chinese s e t

imports and exports of silver move is the opposite direction to the
price of silver*

21

There does exist some correlation between the

import of silver into ^hina and her merchandise balance•

But this cor

relation is always modified by influences of other items in China’s
balance of payment •

It can only be said that when exports increase

for two consecutive y i ars relative to imports, more mid more silver
tends to be imported, and that when exports decrease continuously for
22
two years, more and more silver is exported*
The silver that has
been imported into China is largely located in the coastal cities and
treaty ports*

In China, silver gradually came to serve the functions

of money from the coastal cities to the interior and for wholesale and
retail transactions*

Silver became the standard of value, the medium

of exchange, and the store of value*

Furthermore before 1936, China*s

exchange with foreign monies is dictated by the price of silver*

There*

form the fluctuation of the price of silver directly influences the
movement of silver from or into China and indirectly influences China*s
currency system and the whole economic life of the country*

If the

price of silver in the world market goes up or if currencies are de*
valued in the foreign countries with which China trades, it is believed
tint China *s imports from foreign countries will be stimulated and
exports of merchandise

the imports of silver will be discouraged*

Unfortunately there are no available statistics on hand to be cited*

21 y . S. Leong, Silver (an Analysis of Factors Affecting Its Price),
Washington, 1933, p* £4*
22Ibi&*, p. SO.
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If this ease continues long enough., th © excess-lmport of merchandise
fbr a long period may rasa It is an unfavorable b&lBnoo of payment*
This is especially true in the case of China which already had unfavor
able balaaoes in normal years*

If China’s internal development of ooia-

®*ro® •39^ industry grows rapidly, the stopping of an appreciable emount
®f imports

of silver may indues China to a formal deflation of its cur

rency •

the rise in the pries ©f silver in the world market comes

If

very suddenly and in a higi degree, the import of silver Into China m y
not only be stopped, but it may also be exported to a great extent.
Onder these cireusietajaees a sudden and deep deflation of China’s currenay may threaten China's whole economic life.

If the prise of silver

in the world market goes down, the fbreipt exchange will be against
China,

theadvantage of her increasing exports, stimulated

decline in

by the

foreign exchange, cannot offset the disadvantage of the in*

creasing burden from the heavy foreign loans in terns ©f foreign cur
rency*

Thus in the case of China, both the public and the Govensnefit

emphasise the need for stabilisation of the price of silver in order to
avoid, as far as may be possible, silver fluctuations, especially arti
ficial fluctuation.
In order to understand China's nationalisation of silver in 1936,
it is also necessary to understand China *s situation at that time with
regard to silver wtkI currency and the world economic situation which
has inflnemeed China’s economic life*
1* World economic oris is— He acting to the world economic crisis
(1929), every country began to resort to various forms of monetary
policy designed to reduce imports and stimulate self-sufficiency.
Among these monetary policies there were the management of currency,
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th® policy of devaluing money, control of foreign exohange, tariff*
policy, quotas and other limitations.

The not result of these policies

adopted by numerous countries was a great increase of economic disloca
tion and® continued decline in international comm©roe#

From the point

of view of China, these monetary policies of foreign countries raised
doubt as to the merit of the gold standard which had been proposed as
the final goal for Chinese currency reform ever since the latest years
of the last century*
2* The influence of the priee of silver on China--During the past
half-century (from about 1884 to 1931) prices of commodities in China
rose steadily (except in & few cases}*

The rising prices of goods have

undoubtedly stimulated many lines of production*

23

After 1925, the rapidly declining value of silver in the world
market following the World War improved the opportunity for Chinese
exporters, by creating a favorable exchange*

This process reached its

maximum in 1931, in spite of the world economic crisis which broke in
1929*

The depreciation of silver, on one hand, increased the export

total of China,
of Chinese exports.

on the other hand led to a change in the nature
The favorable exchange stimulated manufacture for

export, and some raw materials began to be increasingly utilised by
Chinese manufacturers instead of being exported in their raw state*

24

Daring the period of depredating silver and increasing exports,
the amount of silver that was imported into China from abroad is a con
siderable figure*
23^ang Leang-le, China*s Hew Currency System, 1986, Shanghai, p* 44.
Ibid*, p. 45.

196

6* China1a silver centralized in Shanghai— The most important de
velopments in the situation of" the Chinese silver "were the oontinua—
tioaa of large annual imports of silver and the slow but steady increase
1b the stock of silver held by the Shanghai banks.

From 1925 until

1954 this flowing from the inland into Shanghai increased abnormally
owing to both domestic and international conditions.

From the estimated

figures of one source, the accumulations of silver in Shanghai are as
follows*^6
Dec.,
Oct.,
June,
June,
Dec.,

1925
1926
1928
1954
1954

44,850,000 ounces
134,270,000 "
102,680,000 *
449,840,000 n
522,590,000 *

Among the factors leading to centralisation of China’s silver in
Shanghai, an important one was the depression of prices for agricultural
products, as compared with the greater success of industrialists in
maintaining the prices of industrial products*

(Before 1928 China1®

government took almost no steps to take care of the faming and indus
trial policies and let the farmers and industrialists take care of
themselves.)

Under this circumstance the relatively organised indus

trialists found it easier to obtain their own benefits than did the
farmers.

Shanghai had a favorable balance of inter-region trade with

the interior.
Year
1926
1927
1928
1929
1030
1931
1932
1953
~

The following table shows this tendency*
Prices received by farmers
100
93
98
122
126
118
117
57

26

Prices paid by them
100
104
11|
136
142
152
154
108

25prask Whitson Fetter, "China and the Flow of Silver," Geographical
t £ 5 « 19o¥'3ifoJL*i. ThaBe fl6Ur9B
only ?ho atoot
2 % a » g teaag-le,
IfiS Currency System, p. 107.
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Th» rapidly growing disparity between agricultural and industrial
prices after 1930 especially was the main cause of the aeoumul&tion of
silver in Shanghai, because Shanghai was tbs center of China*® industries*

It paid the interior for the price of raw material less than

the fund received from the Interior for the price of the manufacturing

Furthermore, because of the political disorder in the interior,

a considerable amount of funds also cams to Shanghai, the largest center
of China’s commerce and industry, for local investment*

Of the oversea

remittances to South China, a large amount had come to Shanghai both in
payment for purchases of goods and for purposes of investment.
The following figures show the movements of silver between Sh&nghai end the interior: 27
Tear

To Shanghai
from interior

From Shanghai
to interior

Excess (-) from
Shanghai, (-f)
to Shanghai

1929

$123,796,000
109.062.000
111.404.000
162.844.000
99.607.000

#181,906,000
141.178.000
164.446.000
19.949.000
17.619.000

-# 58,110,000
- 32,116,000
- 53,042,000
4*142,894,000
-4 81,889,000

40.039.000

10.349.000

-4 29,691,000

4,570,000

93.543.000

-

1930
1931
1932
1953
1934 (Jan*
to dug*)
1934 (Sept.
to Deo.)

88,972,000*

*The sudden shift in August 1934 was due not to internal condi
tions, but mainly to external ones* Most of the silver shipped
from Shanghai to the interior found its way out of the country, and
was ultimately purchased by the United States Ooverament*
The silver flowing from the interior to the Chinese banks in
Shanghai was very largely cover for the increasing volume of bank note
issues circulating atftre widely than ever before in the Interior as well
I f Ibid*, p. 109*

im
as is Shanghai.

The silver is the stock of the foreign basks was sot a

baeking for bank notes, but rather for deposits.

Many of these deposits

represented funds tfeioh were being kept in China by foreigners and
Chinese, who waited for a favorable chance to send it abroad.^

The

stocks of silver in Shanghai reached $272,000,000 in Chinese banks
and $276,000,000 in foreign banks at the end of 1933.29
4* The banks* condition in China— Before the reorganisation of the
Central Bank in 1935, China*s Central Bank, either from the viewpoint
of financial resources or from that of the art of central banking, was
net in & position to assume the financial leadership in the money market
as well as is usually expected of it in the modern countries.

The

foreign banks still ignored the requirements provided by China's banking
law for the basis of a policy of sound banking.

As a matter of fact,

commercial banks were still permitted to increase their liabilities la
ihe form of deposits without at the same time increasing their capital.
The average ratio of banks1 capital to their deposit liabilities in
Shanghai, was 19.2 per Oont., 12.3 per cent, 7.7 per cent., 7.6 per
seat., 7*1 per cent, in 1921, 1926, 1931, 1932, and 1933 respectively,
awd the ratio declined to 7.0 per cent, in 1934.

30

The native banks,

particularly those in Shanghai, always served as the "bi11-brokers”
in investing the surplus funds for the commercial banks.

The average

cash ratio of banks declined from 13.3 per cent* in 1926 to 10.2 per
cent, in 193*.31

The average fixed loans made by banks have increased

both absolutely and relatively.
h. Leaven*, Silver Money. p. 217*
29|bid., p. 217.
SOwTy. Lin, The Mem Monetary System of China. 1936, p. 50.
31Ibid.
^Xbld> i p* 63*

Before 1932 the circusBtnness in Shanghai encouraged* the commercial
banks to offer their funds far long-term industrial capita! and longtorn loans*

The rapid decline of the prices of real estate led to bank-

ruptcy of the real estate companies and then the closing of some banka*
Because of the easy money, the founding of real estate companies
to promote the flotation of land shares and the sale of real es
tate •..making possible the provision of long-term industrial capital
from the commercial banks rather than from the capital market***
with the Sine-Japanese conflict in early 1932, the real estate
prices began to fall, at first slowly but later mors precipitately
.**.It had become necessary for banks to adjust their portfolios by
calling in their outstanding credits, restricting their advances,
etc• •••Consoquently, the rapid decline of prices* Many factories
were farced to shut down* Many business concerns have: failed or
were reorganised* The price of shares has fallen, and the volume
of shares transactions has fallen too* the volume of bank clear
ings has naturally fallen since 1932*
Furthermore, the banks supplied their funds to China's Government
as a means of balancing the budget apart from the flotation of governmental bonds*

The following figures show the amount which the Central

Government borrowed from the banks from 1929 to 1934s

Fiscal
year
1929-30
1930-31
1931-32
1932-33
1933—34
The

In millions of dollars
Total amount
Total amount
liquidated
borrowed
106.6
111.7
152.6
165*6
105*0
108.1
138*1
225*8
303.7
396*1

3d

Set borrovr*3L
5.1
32*9
5*1
87.7
91*4

took the governmental issues as a reserve against note

Issues and was more particularly attracted by the high yields on these
obligations averaging between twelve and fifteen per cent* per annum*
The purchasing of the governmental bonds and treasury notes and tie loans

SSlbld., pp* 57-36.
^*Ibid*, pp* 45-46*
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to the Government began steadily to increase.

thus tha liquidity of

the banks became to a U r g e extent dependant upon tha public credit
end tha general confidence in the stability of the Government*
rapid accumulation of deposits of banka on the one hand and*
on tha other, tha lack of oorpor&tiie securities eed oommereial paper
1b which to invest* pressed the banks to seek employment for their
surplus funds in nays which wars not always free from criticism.
B* The causes which led to the nationalisation of 1955— China* s
nationalisation silver in 19S6 was the inevitable policy for China’s
Government to meet the emergency situation involving the external drain
of silver*

The serious drain of silver was then due to the sudden rise

of silver prices in the world market*

In August, 1234 the Gaverment

of the United States, beginning the nationalisation, of silver held in
the United States and purchasing the additional silver from abroad at
a higher priee than the current market quotation, influenced the rising
prioe la the world market a great deal*

It is necessary then to trace

the silver policy of the Government of the United States and the inter*
national silver situation*
la Ueeomber, 1931 the Young Plan Advisory Committee, because many
countries were feeling the world crisis, besides its main objects, paid
more attention to the unparalleled economic die location.

The Lausanne

Conference which followed was to have dealt not only with reparations,
but also with ^measures to solve th@ other economic and financial dif»
ficulties which are responsible for the world crisis.* Owing to no
delegates sent from the Government of the United States and other
reasons, there were me visible measures reached by the Conference.
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The World Economic Conference called at London in July, 1933, vae intoad ad to deal with various effects of the world crisis,

the positive

result of the Conference regarding the- silver problem was the agreement
®

silver| with an aim to increase t b value and purchasing power of the

white racial•

This proposal, mainly to the advantage of silver mining

interests, was brought forward by the American delegation.

The general

resolution on silver was adopted by the silver subcommittee on July 20
and approved by the Conference on July 27 which was, briefly?
It recommended that? (a) an agreement be sought between the
ohief silver producing countries and those countries which are
the largest holders or users of silver with a view to mitigating
fluctuations in the price of silver***.(b) th© Governments*
parties to this conference shall refrain from new legislative
measures which would involve further debasement of their silver
coinage below a fineness of SQO/lQOO.*.*(c) that they shall sub
stitute silver coins for low value paper currency insofar aath©
budgetary and local conditions will perait. (d) ...The require
ment of such provisions shall lapse on April 1st, 1954, if the
agreement recommended in paragraph (a) does not come into force
by that date, and in no ease shall extend beyond Jan. 1st, 1958*
Meanwhile, on July 22 and 26, agreements were signed between the
delegates of the countries with large holdings of silver, and tbs prin
cipal countries producing silver.

India agreed not to sell more than

an average of 35,000,000 fine ounces of silver per year; Spain, net
more than an average of 5,000,000 fine ounces per year; and China,
none.

On the

other hand, the producing countries (the United States,

Canada, and others) agreed to purchase or otherwise withdraw from the
market 36,000,000 fine ounces per year, and make use of it for currency
purposes——either coinage or reserves— or otherwise keep it off the

^ ^ emorandum of Agreement between the United States of America,
Au stralia. Canada,~~UhTna, India, Mexico, Peru, and Spain,Executive

Agreersa’nt Series, So. 63, Washington,1931, P • TT~
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market,56
Th* chines© Gcvernmenfc, in ratifying th© London Agreancnt oa
March 21* I9SifSadi th® following reservation*
In ratifying this agreement* the National Government of China
declares that as silver is the basis monetary standard of China*
th© National Government will consider itself at liberty to take
whatever action it may deem appropriate, if, in its opinion* changes
in the relative values of gold and silver adversely affect the eco
nomic condition of the Chinese people* contrary to the spirit of
stabilising the price of silver as embodied in this Agreement*
the agreement was ratified ia effect by the United States by the
President’s siIver-purchase proclamation, December 21* 1933.

further-*

more ia this proclamation he gave the unique may by which the silver
mined ia the United States mould be treated*5^
The mists should receive for coinage into silver dollars any
silver thereafter mined in the United States; that with the con
sent of the owner t&e mint should retain 50 per cent of the sliver
as seigniorage* and should coin the other 50 per oent into silver
dollars to be delivered to the depositor...*
The method adopted by this proclamation can be looked at in the
following way t
The 50-per cant seigniorage meant in effect that for every two
ounces of fine silver which the producer deposited at the mint* he
got beck one ounce in the form of standard silver dollars; that is*
he was paid $1.29-^ for one ounce; but as he got nothing back for
the ether ounce* his net return was 64*5-4-cents per fine ounce.
...The cost of the measure to the Government was worth consider*lag. from one point of view* the cost was nil. The Gove rum©nt
would we rely place its dollar stamp on & piece of silver worth* at
the market value on December 21* about 35 cents* and turn it back
to the depositor* »«d at the same time tha Government would receive
another S3 cents9 worth of silver* or about @0 per cent above the
ctrrent market. Thus 34 cents profit for the miner, and a poten
tial #1.00 profit for the Government were created on the basis of
every 66 cents' worth of silver to be mined in America*

3Up. H. leavens* Sliver Money* p. 250.
s7Ibid.» p. 252.
^Ibid* * p . 253.
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For many m s o s s , but especially influenced by tha result of the
London -Agreestent* the price of silver can be sho^n to have gone up, ah
idle end of 1951*

Ihe price of silver bed risen from 24^ cents in

January* 1953 to a high ©f 4S dents per ounce in Bovsmiber*

The Sold

Be serve Act of 1934 did not affect in any manner "the weight of th©
silver dollar in the United States*
of silver legislation were active*

During February* 1934 the advocates
The ideas of two schools of thought

an the price of silver have circulated among the people of the United
States who are interested in the problem of silver*

One is that an in

creased price tor silver will mean increase in the purchasing power of
silver*

China and India both using silver money* in this case* will

buy more goods from America than they usually buy*

The other is that

if tlieprico of silver is increased, China end India may* by every
possible way* protect themselves by curtailing their imports from the
Baited States*

The Government of the United States sent a mission

wader the leadership of Professor James Harvey Bog era of Tale Uni
versity* eas of the Presidentre monetary advisers in the United States*
to China to study the silver situation there in March* 1934*
Rogers also visited Japan and India*

Professor

Although his report of this in

vestigation has not been made public * it was very clear that the general
opinion in China was against any artificial rise in the price of silver*
Tbs silver purchase act of June* 1934 of the United States providedt
The proportion ©f silver in the monetary stocks should be imcreased with the ultimate objective of reaching one-fourth of the
total of silver end gold together* To reach this end th© Secre
tary of the Treasury was 'directed to purchase silver until it made
up one-fourth of the total* with discretion as to times and terns
of purchase, but with the limitation that no silver was to be pur
chased for more than Its monetary value and that no silver situated
ia the continental Unltsd States on May 1* 1934 was to be purchased
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for more them 50 cents per fine ounce* If the market price of
silver should exceed it® monetary value, or if the monetary value
of the stock of silver should exceed 26 per oent of the total
stock of silver and gold, the Secretary of t)» Treasury oould sell
silver* fie was authorised end directed to issue silver certificates
to an amount not less than the cost of the silver purchased; a re*
serve of silver coin or bullion of equivalent monetary value was
to be maintained against the certificates. He also was given
authority to regulate the movement of silver* The President was
authorised to nationalise silver, that is, to require its delivery
to the mint In return fbr the payment of its fair value ia any
United States currency* Profits made on sales of silver were to
be taxed 50 per cent.
As to the purchase of the silver* the act provided these words* *at
hone and abroad” and "for present or future delivery*®

By the terms of

the Act of 1954* silver in the United States on Slay 1 would be purchased
at net over 50 certs per ounce and subject to a fifty per cent* tax on
profits* and might be national! asd if the President should

bo

order*

Therefore the

holders of silver in the

United States might considerIt

worthwhile to

send their silver abroad and wait for good selling terms*

To fit this ease* on June 28 th© Secretary of the Treasury issued an
order placing
the Treasury.

an embargo on exports of silver* except under license from
On August 9, 1954 the President of the United States

issued a proclamation and an executive order requiring the delivery of
all silver held in the United States to th© government, according to the
provision of the Silver Purchase Act*

The price paid for th© Silver

thus delivered was equivalent to a net price of 60*01 cents per fine
eunee.^

After the nationalisation of silver in th© United States the

movement of the price of silver in the Hew York market showed th® fol—
lowing fluctuations

39lbid«, pp- 265-264.
pid*, p. 268.
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First half of 1934— fluctuat ing in th® general neighborhood of
46/ per outetj
The price of silver nationalised August 9— 49.96/ for silver at
0*999 fine| 50.01/ for silver at 100 fine#
Mar feet price of August 9— 49/)
August-September— neighborhood of SO/*
October— ever 55/j
Sovombe r-December— b rtween 55/ and 56/.^
(The market price of silver in the world ma rket was fb 11owing the
trace of the price of foreign silver ia the United States.)
At beginning of 1956— rising to 95/ per ounce;
About the aiddle of February began to rise and on April 10 reached
64 1/Q/j
After the President's proclamation of April 10 to reduce the
seigniorage from 50$ to 45$, reached 71 5/8/ (April 24) j
After the next proc lamati on to reduce the seigniorage from 45$ to
40$, jwped to 77/ (next day), and to 81/ (the day after).
After the flurry in April and when it became apparent that the
government of the United States was not going to follow the original
polioyfurther, the price of silver remained above 70 cent s per ounce.
At the end of Jane, it began to fall again.
It fluctuated around 67 6/4 cents per ounce.
fied American policy was inaugurated.
its buying prlea for silver.

From July 15 to August 12
In December, 1955 a modi

The American Government reduced

Consequently the white metal dropped at

Sew York from 60 3/4 to 51 3/4 cents per ounce In oh* week (from Decem
ber 14 to 21).

In the meanwhile the American Government reduced its

purchases from London and started to buy from China's Government directly.

41ibid.
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C* The process of nationalisation of silver ia Chine.— As to the
silver situation in China since 1921, it may be summarised that the
oontlanatioa of largo annual imports of silver and th© slow but steady
increase In the stock of silver held by the Shanghai banks has been
going «a*

In 1933 and early is 1954 the flow of silver from the interior

still ocatinued, but beginning in April, 1953 there was an export of
silver from Shanghai to foreign countrie a*

After the Silver Purchase

Act of the United States was passed in June, 1934, these silver exports
continued sad were operated on a much larger scale*
As to the price of silver, opinion in China by the end of 1933
generally was against any artificial rise*

At the beginning of 1934

when the argument of the silver problem went up sky-high in the United
States Congress, there was serious concern in China over the prospects
of American legislation on the subject*

The arriml of Professor Rogers

to study the silver situation was thought by tha Chinese people to be a
sigh that tbs American Government would consider the interests of China
in this matter*

But in order to be prepared is the event of American

silver legislation which might tend to draw silver out of Chine, China*s
Government on April 29, 1934 announced that special permits should be
required from China's Government for the shipment of silwr from Shang
hai to foreign countries or to foreign ports*

Rumors arose from time

to time that the Government was considering an embargo on the export
of silver and also a reduction of the silver content ©f China's dollar*
Tbs Govermnent of China denied these rumors and gave
mits freely bo the applicants*

these special per
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In June, 1934 th# exports of* silver from China amounted to C• S*
(Chinese standard) $13,000,000 and in July to C. S. #24,000,000*

In

August of the sane year the exports rose to C. s. $79,000,000*42
On August 19, 1934 China* s Government sent a message to the Presi
dent of the United States which stated?
In order that China may properly safeguard her currency (China),
which has recently been flowing out of the country to a degree that
is potentially alarming, China would appreciate an indication of
the probable policy of the United States in the future purchase of
silver.
The United States Government, on September 22, 1934, replied and
eoneluded that
The Government of the United States appreciates that the great
est care must be exercised in carrying out the policy. *. .Should
the Government of China at any time find it necessary, in order to
protect its coinage, to adopt a policy of di soouraging the export
of silver, this Government will be glad to receive the view of the
Chinese Government of the manner in whiob the purchasing program
may be carried forward .in co-ordination with such policy of the
Chinese Government...•
This answer was not received until October 2.
On September 8 the Ministry of Finance of China issued this order#
Until further notice purchases or sales of foreign exchange shall
be prohibited except for the purpose of financing
1. legitimate and normal business requirements*
2. Contracts entered Into on or before September 8, 1934.
3* Reasonable travelling or other personal requirements*
On September 23, 1934 the Chinese Government communicated with the
United States and pointed out that
Since 1931 the rising value of silver in terms of foreign cur
rencies has involved severe deflation and economic losses to China
and has dislocated China's balance of payments in part at least by
hampering exports* Recently stimulation of the silver price abroad,
to which exchanges have not fully responded, has caused a serious

dglbld.. p. 296.
d^Prese Release* of the Deoartment of State of the United States.
Ko. eeiTScf- W; " O T 4 , p. 26o*
**Ibid., PP* 260-261.
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drain of silver creating great alarm* Silver exports of this year
to date have been over three times greater than in any previous
full year* A further material silver price increase would cause
very serious injury to China, possibly severe panic****
China*•.would appreciate assurance that th© American Government
will refrain from any action that might cause continuation of th©
present silver drain from China and accordingly would co-operate to
prevent further rise and to maintain stability of silver which the
London Agreement contemplated* Indeed, from China *s viewpoint, the
stabilization level should be somewhat lower than the present
price.45
In the same message the Chinese proposed a practical solution as
fellows*
The Sational Government feels obliged actively to seek means of
avoiding further hardships of silver fluctuations. It considers
that China should not alone maintain the silver standard, and is
considering gradual introduction of a gold-basis currency which
would necessitate acquiring gold* Sine© the American Government
desires as increasing proportion of silver in monetary reserves,
the National Government desires also to ascertain in principle
whether the American Government would be willing to exchange with
the Chinese Government gold for silver*
On October 12 Secretary of the United States replied:
This Government is desirous of so carrying out the programme as
to produce the general benefit that would result from enhancement
and stabilization of the price of silver, and to avoid, so far as
may be possible, disturbances to the econca&y and public finances
of China*
To China’s proposal to exchange silver for gold, th© reply read as
follows (in the answer of October 12. 1954):
Free markets in which gold or silver
chases arermfw open to all nations, and
governmental transactions have not been
bility of such markets in the future is
sion*

could be acquired by pur
therefor © direct inter
undertaken* The availa
open to friendly di scus -

After receiving the answer of the United States Government, the

4SIbid*. p* 261
46Ibid*, p. 263
471bid.
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Chino se i»ov©rument a w had no other recourse except independent action.
On Ootober 14 , 1954* the Chinese Government announced a tax on th© export
of silver from China by the following, orders
In view of the undue rise of silver out of relation to the level
of general commodity prices, the National Government, in order to
safeguard China's economic Interests and protect its currency* ha®
fixed the customs duty on exports of silver, effective Ootober15,
as fbllowst
On silver dollars and mint bars* 10 per cent, less
per cent
minting charges paid* i.e.* 7 3/4 per cent net.
On other forms of silver 10 per cent (in lieu of
per cent) •
In addition* an equalisation charge will be
imposed on exports of silver* equal to th© deficiency* if any,
existing between thee theoretical parity of London silver and a
rate of exchange officially fixed by the Central Bank of China*
after making allowance fbr the export duty.
Keanwhile the Government decided to restrict the free movements
of

silver by requiring a license on coastal shipments of silver and by

limiting the smouat of

silver carried in person while traveling* in

order to out the extension of organized smuggling of silver. The export
duty on silver may be said to havetaken China off the silver standard*
The laek of a free movement of silver between China and the rest of the
world divorced the value of the Chinese dollar from the world prices
of silver.

A few days after the export duty was levied the rat© of

exchange went below the parity with the London and Hew York prices of
silver.

It Is obvious that the levy of the export duty on silver and

the equalisation charge48 is only a transitory arrangement, and will
enable the Government to gain time to work out a more permanent solution.
As a matter of fact, the equalisation oharge did not give much help to
the serious situation* owing to the absence of its intended flexibility
in foreign markets.

For examplet

4b"Equal!sation oharge is a device which* in effect, puts the export
of silver dollars on the same basis as If the exchange rate were always
exactly at parity with the silver price in the foreign market j such a basis
made the export of silver unprofitable to the extent of the cost® involved.
Xa the case of silver in fpirns other than standard silver dollars (of China)
there was the additional 2^-per-oont duty." (For an example see pp. 300-301
of D. H. Leavens* Silver Money.)

210

The market opening rates of exchange on London were about 22
per cent below parity during tha last week in October, which would
have Indio atad an equalisation oharge of about 14 per cent* Ac
tually it was set at about 8 per oentj this left a 8 per cent
margin, Just about sufficient to cover shipping and other costs*
Severtheless, after the imposition of the duty and the equalisation
oharge, exports of silver fell off sharply.

In October the exports

amounted to C. S, (Chinese standard) #87,000,000 but dropped to about
C. S. $12,000,000 per month in November and December.
The year 1S34 ended with a recorded net total of 0. S* 1260,000,000
(the figure does not include the twenty million dollars of silver smug
gled from China) exported from China.

Of this figure, some C* S. #221,-

000,000 omee from foreign banka.
Since the Chinese exchange rate was divorced by duty on its export
and by equalisation charge from the price of silver in the world market,
the spread between the rates and bullion parity has been large*

For

exasple, on December 1, 1934 when the bullion parity of the Chinese
dollar, based on the price of silver ia Sew York, was forty-two Costs,
the Shanghai dollar was quoted on the exchange at only thirty-four cents*
Bv April 26, 193S this difference had risen to twenty cents* that is,
the bullion parity was sixty—two cents and th© actual exchange rate
fofty-two cents*

This difference made it highly profitable to smuggle

the white metal out of China*

Southward from Hong Kong and northward

from Menehoukuo estimates of silver smuggled from China during 1934 and
1936 were put at about twenty and 230 millions of Chines© dollars respecto prevent smuggling, China9s Government took various measures*

4®B. H. Leavens, Silver Money, p. 302.
50Ibid., p. 303.
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But tha difficulties in the way of effective control were several* such
an tha operation of foreign banks under tha protection of extraterri
torial Jurisdiction* the Japanese military influenoe Xu certain parts
of northeast China* the war lords in certain provinces* the matter of
foreign settlements in several sea ports* and others*
The immediate result of the loss of a tremendous quantity of
silver through exports and smuggling was reflected in the following
factst
1* Monetary stringency in Shanghai — The great drain of silver from
Shanghai left the financial center of Shins with an inadequate supply
of cash upon which to base its oredit structure*

For example, in the

latter part of 1934 interest rates rose rapidly and bank loans were dif
ficult to secure at almost any price*

During the summer of 1933 the

Shanghai exchange market showed uncertainty, which was reflected in the
wider difference between rates f o r cash and for forward delivery, or
the equivalent of very high interest rates for funds employed in legitimate
operations in the course of ordinary business*

Th© Central Bank

at one time attempted to out down this spread, but found its resources
insuffic lent •
2* Speculation in foreign e xohange— Humors in current circulation
resulted in the fligit of silver dollars abroad and the purchase of
foreign exchange for speculation purposes*

In the latter part of

October 1935 there was heavy speculative buyirig of foreign currencies*
Everyone was buying foreign exchange* few wanted to sell*
worse*

This situation

Humors circulated widely that the Government would soon

2X2

tata* *©tion to promote a l o m r exchange level independant of the world
prloo of silver and to abandon the expensive and

difficult struggle to

maintain a striot silver standard within the country.
The differences between the cash and forward exchange rates were
equivalent to as high A® thirty-five per cent* per anmsa some of the
time in 1935.

The exchange rates in Sew York dropped from 37 5/l6 cents

an October 1 to 30^ cents on October 31 and in London from Is* 6^d* to
Is* 2 3/4d* during the same period*

The following table^* shows tbs

fluctuating exohange rates
Prioe of Silver, Exchange Rate in Shanghai
Date

1934
Jan*-July
dug*
Sept*
Get*
Bov*
Gee.

Price of Silver
U* S. Cents
per os*

Exchange Hate
C* S. Cents

46*1 (average)
49*0
49*6
62*4
54*3
64*4

33.6
34.7
35.3
34.4
33.0
33.7

54*4
64*6
69.0
67.8
74*4
71.9
68.2
66*4
66.6 (average)
68*4

34*5
56*1
38.0
38*6
41.0
40.4
38.8
36*5
36.9 Sept., 35.5 Oct., 29.6 Bov*
29*6

47.3
44*8 (average)
46.4
46*4

29.5
29.8 (average)
29.5
29.4

1936
Jan*
Feb.
Mar*
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug*
Sept*-Bov*
Gee*
1936
Jan.
Feb*—Oct*
BovDee*

p. H* Leavens, Silver Money, p* 306*

21$

5* The falling price of general eosunodities— All Chines© pries index
ambers had declined fro*r about th© middle of 1931 to about th© middle
©f 1934* by an average of around twenty-five per ©eat*

In the next year

th© pries© did not show any decided movement, but fluctuated in the
neighborhood of the 1954 average*
4* Bankruptcies of several banka— It le a habit in Shanghai,
especially among foreigners, to think of the prices of real estate in
terms of American dollars or sterling*

The increase and the expected

further increase in the exchange value of the Chinese dollar acted to
lessen the value of Shanghai real estate*
on real estate•

Most banks had loaned heavily

In this ease they were anxious to reduce old loans and

checking to make new leans*

Since there were no purchasers, banks and

individuals found themselves with fro sen assets on their hands*

In

the spring of 1955 several Chin©se banks and real-astate companies
closed*

It increased unrest in the stringent financial market In

Shanghai.
In this ease o f economic emergency, first In Shanghai, and then
in other ports

inland, the rumors such as th© nationalisation of

silver or the devaluation of the silver dollar, led to official denials
from time to time*

But China's Government never lessened its untiring

attention to the development of the silver situation, both internal and
external*

(hi February 2, 1935 th© Government appointed a Monetary

Advisory Cossmittee of some fifteen prominent bankers Hto study end devise
meastxes for the Improvement of the our re® y situation and th# readjustmemt of monetary affairs In various parts of the country."

ezTaag leang—la, China*a Sew Currency, p. 75*

This Committee
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advise the Government on the stabilisation of exchange, the improve

ment of international payments of China’s balance, the financing of in
ternal trade and industry, and other matters*
In karoh rumors hinted that some negotiations between China and
other governments had been in progress*

In April the Grovemment took

steps for the reorganization of the three principal banksi

the Central

Sank of China, the Bank of China, and the Bank of Communications*^
These changes to increase tha Government's shares in the capital of
the latter two banks were intended to insure the fullest cooperation
between the Government and the banks*
Towards the end of April; a gentleman's agreement was reached by
the Bank of China with the local foreign bankers with the view of re
fraining from making shipment 8 of silver abroad by placing a virtual
but voluntary embargo on the export of silver*

In addition, the smug

gling of silver was made an offense punishable In accordance with the
Emergency Law governing the punishment of crimes endangering the Republic
by the Government • At the seme time the native banks found themselves
in embarrassing difficulties, end began to limit withdrawals from the
deposit accounts at the beginning of June to 500 dollars on each ao count *
On the Government side a Native Banks Supervisory Committee was set up
in order to examine the balance-sheets of the fifty—five native banks
and to assess the value of securities held by the banks*

The severance

of foreign exchange from the price of silver since Ootober, 1934, and
the voluntary embargo on silver exports between the Bank of China and
the local and foreign bankers since April, 19S6 have as a matter of fact

supra, p. 178.
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already impaired tha silver standard*
In

1956 it was sanouaoed in London that Sir Frederick Leith*

Rose , chi« f Economic Adviso r to the British Go veram© nt, would leave for
China to inquire into all relevant quest ions affecting the Chinese
financial situation.

Ho arrived in Shanghai on September 21*

In the

eloud of r w o r t regarding his conclusion ho only said that China needed
peace, stability, sad trade, and that an efficient administration would
restore prosperity to the country.^
When in the summer of 1956 the Shanghai exchange market showed un
certainty, a political group of speculators came to play cards with
foreign exchange for their o m benefit*

A speech by the Minister of

finance on October 10 gave the impression that the Government was work*
lag toward some plan of lowering the rate of foreign exchange*
exchange rates continued to drop, with minor reactions.

Thus the

While rumors of

Government plane increased, the situation of exchange rates showed more
abnormality*
(ha the eve of the nationalisation of silver in China the serious
situation concerning the Chinese dollar is shown in the followings
The uncertainty as regards the future of the currency and the
crops of rumors to which it gave rise led in the middle of October
to a renedwed and more vigorous attack on the dollar* The specu
lative operations in gold bar and foreign exchanges and feverish
purchases of standardised commodities bore witness to the extensive
flight from the currency that endangered the stability of the entire
financial structure* The value of the do Her began to weaken ir
resistibly in terms, first, of foreign exchange and gold bar and,
later, of the more sensitive commodities*
from the following table, it is apparent that the exchange and
related market were dominated by feverish speculations®®

B4p* H* leavens. Silver Mousy, p. 311.
s5ff* Y* bin, The lew Monetary System of China* 1936, p. 76*
s*Ibid., p. 77*
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Index no. of the retea of exchange on London, the prices of
gold bar and other sensitive commodities in Sh&nghai (Oct. 14, 1035 = 100)
Bate

T * T* Rate
on London

Gold Bar

Oct. 14
16
16
IT
18
19
21
22
25
24
25
26
28
29
50
31

100
99.3
98.9
98.6
97.2
96.6
96.5
96.5
92.4
89.6
88.2
88.2
89.6
88.9
84.8
81.3

100
99.6
101.8
103.4
104.3
103.7
104.4
106.6
109*1
116.8
120.9
126.8
125.3
129*2
127.6
—

82.0
82.0

128.7
127.9

lev.

1
2

Cotton

Wheat

100
99*6
100.6
100.1
101.3
100.8
100.5
101.4
102.6
105.5
106.8
tm
em
m

100
101.9
101.2
100.2
100.8
101.4
100. 8
100.5
101*2
102*5
103.2
106.9

—
112*0
—
115.3

110.2
112.7
ee«*.

m.i
115*3

111.6
113.2

Bean oil
100
100*7
98.1
97*7
98.7
98.4
100
100
101*3
101*5
103.6
109*7
114.8
112.9
118.1
113.4
118.4

III. The Managed Currency:
At last, on S o m b e r 3, 1935, the Chinese Coverament announced the
nav currency policy— the abandonment of the silver standard and the adop
tion of a managed currency.

The provisions are as follows (see Appendix

6 for complete text)*
A* BfpV notes exclusively issued by the three Government banks shall
be fbll legal tender, and the reverves of these bank notes shall he placed.
loader a unified control#
B. Created a Currency Reserve Board to hold reserves of banks.
C. All

debts expressed in terms of silver shall be discharged by

the payment in legal tender notes.
p. To prohibit the use of silver dollars and bullion for currency
purposes in China all holders of silver were required to exchange their
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silver for Idgal tender motes.
s*

exchange value of the Chinos© dollar was to b« kapt stable

1^"® existing level* and for this purpose tho Government banks would
buy and sell foreign exchange in unlimited quantities.
5h© Gove nament-owned Central Bank would be reorganised as the
Central Reserve Bank of China.

It would hold the reserves of, the bank*

lag aystea and act as depository of all public funds and would provide
centralised rediscount facilities for the other banks,

the Central

Reserve Bank of China was not to undertake general ©oaaBereial business*
and after a period of two pears was to enjoy the sole right of note
issues.
According to the regulations* banka* firms* and all other public
and private parties holding silver dollars or bullion were required to
hand it over to the Currency Reserve Board (see Appendix 0)* (It was
specially created in Hovember, 193b by the Ministry of Finance of China
for the purpose of centralising the issue and retirement of legal tender
notes

to keep custody of reserves against outstanding notes) or its

agent banks* for legal tender notes.
ones at their face value*

Silver dollars exchange

for paper

The Currency Reserve Board consisted of

eighteen, members* ion.lndS.ng the representatives of the Government and banks
ether ccmmercial organisations*

The Governor of the Central Bank of China

Is concurrent 1y the Chairman of the Board*

This Board designated the

three Government banks as depositories for the custody of reserves*
wader control of the Board* against legal tender notes.

A special regu

lation governing the exchange of silver for legal tender notes (see
Appendix I>) end others governing the use of the metal for silverware,
w e r e provided*

With regard to subsidiary silver and copper coins, no
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national decree was issued at that time, this matter being complicated

by the fast that various silver and copper co ins of widely varying ex**
change rates were circulating in various provinces and districts•
Provincial and looal government s and local banking associations tem
porarily dealt with these matters*

For both foreign and domestic

reasons, it was announced on November 13 that the Government had decided
to establish a branch of the Currency Re serve Board in Tientsin*

Other

branch beards were set up at Hankow and Canton to exercise jurisdiction
ever their respective areas and the silver isserves there.
As to the foreign exchange, under the new currency system, a kind
of managed currency, the Chinese dollar unit no longer was based on
silver, but was kept fixed in terms of foreign currencies.

The rate

anaouaeed from the Central Bank of China on Sovember 4 wasi
14^ pesee sterling - C. 5. (Chinese Standard) $1.00 or
29.5 cents United States currency s C. S. $1*00 ”
The

Central Bank of China on the same day stated its willingness to peg

the price of the Chinese Standard dollar by selling in any amounts at
the fixed price of Is. 2 6/8d. or thirty cents of the United States
dollar, and buying the Chinese Standard dollar at the fixed price of
la. 2 3/8 d. or 29^ cents.

But it was not mdde clear whether the

Chinese dollar was to be pegged to sterling or the American dollar.
Fortunately, *tbe cross rate between Hew York and London fluctuated
within limits narrow enough So that the Chinese Government did not have

58
to decide which currency to follow•"
After the nationalization of silver, the Government was able to

STyorelga Affairs, Vol. 18, 1939, p. 350.
B00# s. Leavens, Silver Money, p. 315.
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collect & siseable hoard of the white metal *

For instame, in Shanghai

alone the bank stocks on Eovamber 1 amount©d to 326,640,000 yuan, or
about 250,000,000 ounces*

With this stock the Government wi 11 have some

funds for management of the yuan on the foreign exchange market*

After

tfae nationalisation of silver, the Central Bank took over large amounts
foreiga exchange which had been overbought by the speculators during
October, end so accumulated a fund of around €10,000,000 in foreign our*
rensies, against which it could sell exchange*
To keep the exchange value of the currency down to the fixed
rate, the banks had only to be ready to buy foreign exchange
when it was offered* This could always be done by the issuance
ef new notes, since the exchange itself would be ample reserve*
The notes of the government banks had been backed by a reserve
of 60 per east in silver and 40 per cent in securities* The cur*
rent price of silver was 65 S/8 cents U* S* currency per ounce,
a level which had been maintained since August and which had come
to be looked on as fairly stable; at least there was little expec
tation that the American treasury could allow it to drop without
vigorous protests from the silver bloo* At that price, the Chinese
silver dollar of about 0*76 fine ounces had a bullion value of about
SO cents U. S* currency* The 60-per~c©nt metallic reserve against
a #1*00 note was, therefore, worth 0*60 x SO cents s SO cent a 0* S.
currency, or approximately the level at which exchange was pegged*
Thus the metallic reserve was raised automatically from 60 per cent
to 100 per cent, while the remaining 40*per*confe reserve in seouri*
ties was an extra safeguard* China, in effect, made a considerable
book profit in the revaluation of her currency, just as the United
States did in reducing 'the gold content of the do liar *^®
For the purpose of maintaining the fixed rate,
started selling silver to America*

China's Government

On December SO, 1635 not less than

10,000,000 euzmes of silver were shipped by the “President Lincoln,"
sad on Deesmber 25 another 10,000,000 by the "President McKinley1' by
the Chinese government banks to the Chase Bank and the National City
Bank of Kew York in order to provide additional reserves ibr exchange
stabilisation*

This gave the "managed currency* of China a backing of
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seme 118,000,000 or about $500*000,000 (Chinese Standard) ifi foreign
exchange (particularly sterling and American dollars) in addition to

grt
its silver and other reserves.

the sailing of silver by China to

ths l M i i e & Government kept on*

According to the report of the

United States Government on February 13, 1956, wthe total silver purabases of the United States Treasury from China amounted to 50,000,000
eunoes at the priee of 65 cents per ounoe •“
The priee of silver fell about thirty per cent • between December 9,
1955 and January 20, 1956*

This depreciation, of the silver priee in

the world aarket means that the Chinese Government, controlling some
500,000,000 ounces of silver, lost about $100,000,000 (United States
Currency) on the value of the silver reserve behind the bank notes,
which was the result of China's large sales in the short period*
To nationalise silver in China, where more then half of the silver
was in circulation and seme of.lt hoarded, was much more difficult than
to nationalise gold in the United States, vhere most of the gold was
in the banks and in the Treasury*

Furthermore, for reasons such as

the favoring of hard silver for hoarding purposes, lack of confidence
in the Government by the people, come difficulty was experienced in
the way of reaehix^ the expected goal of governmental policy*
Another difficulty came from the foreign banks*

Since American,

British, Japanese, and several other nationalities in China are still
under the extraterritorial Jurisdiction of their own officials and
subject to their own national laws. It was a question whether the

Chinese order concerning nationalisation of’ silver on November 3, 1955
would be obeyed by these foreign banks, firms and people.
°Tang Leang-le, China*a 8«w Currency System, p* 91.

On November 4
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the British regulations forbade a British subject to make payments in
silver, under penalty of imprisonment for a period of not exceeding,
three months, or a fine not exceeding £20, or both.

But these regula

tions did not extend to requiring delivery of silver to the Chinese
Government.

British banks oontinned for a time to hold th? ir stocks*

Other foreign governments having extraterritorial Jurisdiction in China
did not even immediately fellow the British example to forbid their
people in China to make payments in silver.

But later on foreign wil

lingness to co-operate with the Chinese Government was almost unpre
cedented in the relationship between China and foreign countries.

Only

the rirfcitude of Japan, -which saw the closer relationship in finance
between Great Britain and China— engendered by Sir Frederick leith*
Bose— as a potential threat against her interests in China, was the
exception.

However an importedit progress was made in January, 1936.

The foreign banks in Shanghai, with the exception of the Japanese ones,
agreed to tuna over their silver holdings to the Government banks.

This

was done under an arrangement by which the Chinese Government banks
would pay interest to the foreign banks for two years.

In Maroh, 1937,

the Japanese banks, at last, consented to a similar arrangement *
Six and a half monts after the starting of the new system, the
Government made public the following statement (on Kay 17, 1936) which
throws some ligfet on the governmental policy regarding the new system*
1.

61

It will continue to be the governmental policy at all times to

maintain adequate reserves against note Issues consisting of gold,

S. Teao, "Currency Hefora in China, w Info m a t ion Bulletin,
Yol* I*
August 11, 1936, Council of International Affairs,"
Hanking, p* 16*
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foreign exchange, and silver, and the silver portion of the reserved
to hove o value equivalent to at least twenty—fiv& per cent• of the
note circulation.
2* The Government will issue silver coins of fifty cents an** one
dollar denominations, for the purpose of completing the reform of the
Chinese coinage system.
S. For the purpose of further strengthening the position of the
Chinese currency, definite arrangements have teen made to Increase the
gold and foreign exchange portions of the note issue reserve*
The silver coins of fifty cents and one dollar denominations men
tioned above had not been put in circulation before the outbreak of the
China-Jap an War.

Only some information about it is available t

The Sinister (of the Department of Finance of China) stated
that silver coins of §0/ and $1.00 denominations would be issued
with a silver content below that of the former standard. •*.Nothing
more was heard of it for two years, until a Treasury press release
announced that the San Francisco Mint had coined 345,032 one-dollar
silver pieces and 3,240,000 half-dollar silver pieces for China
during May, 1930. So information was given as to the weight and
fineness of these coins. It seems unlikely that they will come
into circulation under war conditions.
IV.

The Sew Subsidiary Coins— Rumors of replacing the old un-uniform

and depreciated silver and copper' subsidiary coins had been circulated
from time to time.

fhlly set up.

For several reasons a new system was never suoooss-

After the event of the nationalisation of silver on

Movanber 3, 1935 it was announced (on December 3) that a new subsidiary
coin was under way.

Later on the dies for minting the old copper and

silver coins in all provincial mints were ordered to be shipped to
the Centre! Government so that no more of the old coinage shell be

62D. H. Leavens, Silver Money, p. 320.
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issued*

On January 9, 1936 Kdraft11 regulations (see Appendix B) con

cerning subsidiary oo inage irere aooepted by the Finance Commit toe of
the Legislative Tuan*

63

These provided for the minting by the Central

Government and issuance by the Central Bank of China of nickel and copper
coins *

The nickel coins are in denominations of 20, 10, and 5 cents,

neighing respectively 6, 4*5 and 3 grams, and containing nickel of XQ0
per oent fineness} they are legal tender for payments up to C. S* (Chinese
Standard) $20*

The copper coins are in denominations of one and one-half

cent (respectively, 6*6 grams, of 95 per cent- copper and 5 per cent*
tin-xinc alloy) and are legal tender far payments up to $5«

The "draft*

regulations also provided for the withdrawal of subsidiary silver coins
from circulation*

This was confirmed by a mandate issued by the National

Government on January 19*
The new coins were placed in circulation in Shanghai on February 10,
1936*

Down to the end of June, 1937 the Central Mint produced and de

livered to the Central Bank 814,770,000 pieees of th® new coins of a
total value of nearly C* S* (Chinese Standard) $26,190,000*^
V.

Summary— A bird's-eye view of China’s new system, the managed

ourreney, oen be presented as follows*
A* All silver in China, the silver coins, syoee, and others, is
nationalised and no silver coins are circulated for the purpose of cur
rency*
B # The banknotes Issued by the Central Bank of China, the Bank of
China,

the Bank of Ccnmuni cations were full legal tender*

Other

65it is one of the five Tuans constituting the Chinese National
Its function is to pass laws*
64D. H. Leavens, Silver Money, p* 320.

government*
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banknotes were permitted to remain in circulation, but the total amount
outstanding was not to exceed the total for each bank of November 3,
1936.

After a period of too years, the Central Bank of China (after

reorganisation it was to be known as the Central It®serve Bank of China}
will be the only institution having the sole right to issue bank notes*
0* The Cwrrenoy Reserve Board controls the issue and retirement of
legal tender notes and is to keep custody of reserves against outstand*
lag notes.

(It began functioning on bovembar 4, 1936*)

IX* The Central Bank of China peggs the priee of the Chinese Standard
Seller by selling the Chinese Standard Dollar at the fixed price of Is*
2 $/8d* or thirty cents of the United States dollar* and buying the
Chins so Standard Dollar at the fixed priee of Is. 2 3/sd. or 29*6 cents.
5* The new and uniform subsidiary coins, nickel and copper cents*
take the place of the existing un-uni form copper cants.

The depreciated

*i 1ver-ooIns, the old subsidiazy coins, have been withdrawn.
In order to maintain the fixed exchange rate, up to 1936 the Chinese
Central Government sold fifty million ounces of silver or more to the
United States Government to add further strength to China's adequate
holdings of foreign currency.

The exchange-rate fixed by the Central

Bank was the average rate of exchange for the Chinese Standard Dollar
for the period from 1930 to 1934.

With the stability of exchange,

the gambling nature of international trade in the past many years of
China's record can be improved, the speculation of foreign exchange can
be cut, the budget of the payment for the heavy foreign loans can be
controlled, the Internetlonal movement of short-tem credits owi be
expected to |3ay its normal role in case of a temporary dislocation of
China's International equilibrium, and other benefits which result from
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stability ia foreign, exchange oan be expected •
la order to facilitate th© functions of the Currency Reserve Board
and then consolidate the credit of the national currency, some regional
branch beards have been created in Tientsin, Hankow, Canton, Tsinan,
aad Tsingt&o*

Severthe less a virtual centralis ati on was kept in Bhang-

hai, the greatest commercial center of China.
In order to complete the refom of the banking system, in addition
to the reorganisation of the Central Bank, the immediate establishment
ef an institute to deal exclusively with mortgage business was put into
effect, and a Banker's Acceptance House under the auspices of the Joint
Reserve Board of the Shanghai Bankers' Association was started In the
middle of March, 1956.
It is apparent that after the abandonment of the silver standard
and the establishment of the new managed currency by pegging China's
money unit to sterling or the American dollar, the dishamony between
the internal prices

the world prices ceased to exist with “
the more

sensitive reaction of the internal prices to the world prices.
Changes in the level of world prices will be more rapidly and
more fhlly reflected in our (China's) price structure, otherwise
the disequilibrium between the internal and external prices, if
permitted to continue, would make the existing rate of exchange
artificial and difficult to maintain.

Y* Lin, The Mey Monetary System of China, 1936, p. 88.

CHAPt m

VI

StHKAKT AND CONCLUSION

Ffosi tla Tiwpolnt of th© deve lopment of thd siQBet&ry syston in
China, the whole currency history may well be divided into four periods*
The first period will include the years fro® the unrecorded age to the
beginning of the Chow dynasty; the second from the Chow dynasty to the
Tang dynasty; the third from the Tang dynasty to the eve of the crea
tion of the new managed currency system of 1935; and the fourth from
the establishment of the new system to the beginning of the war (1957)*
During the first period the spade-shaped money (chan), the bell
shaped money (pu), the knife-shaped money (tao), and the round money
were used as the media of exchange, the standard of value, and the
storage

of value*

Meanwhile, the use of cowries, tortoise-shells,

pearls, gems and tin for the purpose of currency continued side by side
with the metal money of different shapes*

The political boundaries

resulting from feudalism, the accompanying limitations upon interregional
trade, the fact that there was no adequate supply of a suitable substance
Bfta»ftn to all regions that could be used as a common medium of exchange,
may all be advanced as causes for the adoption of different shapes and
kinds of money by different regions.
During the second period, the round ooins with engraved inscrip
tions gradually spread over all the country and took the place of other
media of exchange.

The Chow dynasty was the first to turn out coins
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with an inscription.

Later, the Tsin dynasty prohibited the use of

cowries, tortoise-shells, pearls, gems and tin as currency,

improved

the more convenient bronse coinage, the "Ban-liang* (meaning half a tael
in weight) •

Then c erne another improvement of the copper coinage during

the Tang dynasty, in A* B* 618, which is sued the new copper coin with
'Use modern square character s.

The Tang coin remained as the standard

of coinage for many succeeding centuries#

During this period paper

money was invested to function as the medium of exchange, hut it was
not used to any considerable extent*

The importation of silver through

the channels of foreign trade started to add to the supply of China's
silver*

But owing to the inadequate quantity in storage, silver was

not able to play an important part in the monetary system*
The third period can be further divided into two partss

the first

part from the Tang dynasty to the beginning of the Taiping Rebellion
(1851-1864) during the Tsing dynasty, and the second part from the
Taiping Rebellion to the establishment of the new managed currency
system in 1985*

During the first half of this period a considerable

amount of silver continued to be imported into China through the channel
of foreign trade*

By the accumulation of huge amounts of silver, the

shite smtel gradually spread throughout the country and was widely
employed for ths purpose of money*

The copper coins, however, still

maintained their dominant position 4s the main medium of exchange in
both the interior and the coast ports*

As far as the quantity and

quality of the copper coins are concerned, the copper money was fully
controlled by the Central Government •

They were relatively good and
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uniform in appearance.

They were turned out quite uniformly according

to the regulation* of the Government both as to the amount and the
fineness of the coins•
After the outbreak of the Taiping Hebe Ilion, a wholesale and sudden
change occurred affecting every phase of the life of the Chinese people*
old systems, political, economic, social, and. moral, were all upset•
People lost confidence in the monarchy and triad to break it.

They

began to reeogni*e the weakness of the guilds, the old-family system,
and the handicraft syetmn.
weaknesses.

They attempted to do something about those

People were enticed by the lovely machine-ibade merchandise

ani rapidly expanded thsdr list of wants.

This sudden expansion in

some respects amounted almost to a social revolution.

China’s social

system, based upon & philosophy inherited through generations, and
laboriously built up by scholars over the centuries, was violently
disturbed*

Because of the vast amount of territory, the great number

of people affected and the oonfliot with deep*rooted tradition, the
Chinese people had no opportunity to plan for the change; in fact they
eeuld net even rationally follow the tide.

They doubted, broke, and

threw away the old systems and mores without any hesitation.

But on

the other hand, they never had the chance to build and consolidate the
new ones*
Furthermore, during the transition period of reform in China, the
Western Powers, wad later on Japan, became obsessed with their policy
of eolonial expansion and were looking at China fiercely as a tiger
does at fat meat*

Their activities in the direction of political in

vasion, economic invasion, end culture invasion, added directly and
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indirectly a great daal of trouble to the already serious situation in
China.
It is a logical and inevitable result that the money system of
China during this unusual period was made more abnormal end chaotic *
The depreciated and counterfeit copper coins circulating, throughout
the country were nob'uniform is quality and appearance*

The provincial

mints, ignoring the regulations of the Central Government, looked at the
issue of eurrency as an important moans of raising revenue for the provimeial warlords*

Several kinds of the non-uni form silver dollars,

silver subsidiary coins, and copper-cont pieces turned out from the
provincial mints were circulating in different provinces and In dif
ferent sections of the same province, at different discounts on dif
ferent days or at different hours of even the seme day!

The uncoined

silver, ayeee, and the pieces of silver, with different shapes and dif
ferent fineness were used as the medium of exchange, the standard of
value *»d the storage

of value*

Different scales in different

places, sad even in the seme place, were used as the weight standards
of the uncoined silver*

Foreign coins, bank notes issued by foreign

according to different foreign regulations circulated everywhere
1b the sea ports

trade centers side by side with the domestic coins

and paper money*

In short, during the second part of the third period,

the whole Chinese currency system, reacting to the whole situation of
the country, fell into a most dark, confused, and complex situation*
After the third period came a new era which has added a new record
aad a new page to the history of China's currency system*

That was the

saw managed currency systoa established in 1935 by China’s National
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Government •

In this paper this now era was treated as the fourth period

An the course of the development of China’s currency system*
Unfortunately, having been established for o n ly a short time, the
a n system has not given us final proof of its ability to stabilise
either the internal price level or the rates of foreign exchange*

In

the first place, this war, beginning in 1937, killed the infant moaetaiy systma at two years of age and gave it no chance to grow up*
Secondly* the managed currency system was a new invention of the
countries in the world after the abandonment ©f the International gold
standard in 1931*

The success or failure of a managed currency system

is not the concern of China alone, but Is a problem of many other coun
tries as well*

However, it is apparent that by means of the new system

some of the previously existing confusion has been gradually eliminated#
buring the period of some eighty-five years (from 1851 to 1935)
immediately preceding the establishment of the row managed currency
system, the currency problem in China was not a pure monetary problem,
but a produst of many complex factors, such as political, social, and
financial, as well as the difficulties from foreign invasion*

As to

the political angle, from 1851 to 1911 a series of wars against both
internal rebellions and foreign invasions kept the Central Government
so busy that there was left no time for it to plan other things*
formal govemaental functions, among them the administration of a
monetary system, were allowed to lapse*

Afterwards (from 1911 to 1935),

unfortunately, came a succession of civil wars which broke the whole
political machine*

The war lords played the war game between provinces

or the different sections of the some province just as collegiate teams
play the game of foot-ball In the United States*

Each year the game
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sttst be repeated*

Someone loses and someone wins*

may become the winner*

Next time the loser

Under this terrible situation, it is sot sur

prising that a permanent and uniform system of currency, issued only by
order from the weakest kind of a Central Government, could not be put
into offset*

Furthermore, many thinking that the ”uni form” system might

be a bad thing for them, the local military leaders did their best to
break the existing system*

For instance, one warlord who controlled

ease whole rioh province for many years was afraid that some day some
ether warlord might come from another province much more easily if the
transportation facilities were good enough*

With this worry in his

mind, he built the railroads in that province, but adopted a special
plan with a special narrow track in order to make it different from
other railroads in other provinces*

He expected that the special narrow

tr&ok would not be usable by the trains and the locomotives of other
provinces, ***d therefore other warlords from other provinces could not
easily invade his territory*

This condition is ^ust one example*

As a result of the political confusion, each provincial mint tended
to follow its own policy an3 issued its own special forms of currency*
Sane time one province prohibited or put some restrictions on the cur
rency issued by other provinces*

Also, with the outbreak of civil war,

the eoncgueror always flooded the conquered province with bad money*
Sometimes oxse provincial mint sent by either public or secret ways token
messy issued at a discount to another province in order to make profits*
It was not uswoannon for the succeeding warlords to refuse or depreciate
tbs money issued by the former warlords*

In short, the long civil war

ftnA the political disorder were among the most important causes leading
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to the serious situation of* China's currency system.
In addition to the currency problem in this period there was also
a fiscal problem*

The series of civil wars and wars with foreign coun—

tries had exhausted the wealth of the nation*

furthermore, owing to

the abandonment of* the old finanoial arrangements and the lack of* new,
direct taxation, the provincial governments were forced to look at the
ourrenoy policy as the easy and possible means of raising the funds
which they needed badly for their war expenditures and the increasing
ordinary expenditures.
During this time the Central Government was almost wholly depend
ent on foreign borrowing to finance its war expenditures, the repayments
of its old foreign loans, and even for ordinary expenditures*

The ao-

eweulation of the heavy gold loans really formed a very difficult and
serious problem for the Central Government to finance*

The Central

Government which found no new financial resources, had already lost
almost all of the important revenues originally raised through the
provincial «***? local governments*

The Central Government could not get

help from the issue of domestic loans*

By reason of the conventional

tariff and the fact that the administrative authority of customs duties
was in the foreigners' hands, it could not control either the customs
duties or the revenues from the sale tax (the two main financial re*
sources of the Central Government)*

In this kind of finanoial strait,

how could it adopt any monetary reform without hesitancy?

It seems to

h e obvious that the ereatlon of either the gold standard or the gold

exchange standard would have to be financed by foreign loans, if China's
Government was to expect its plan to be successful*

It is true, too, that the ourrenoy problem la China was also a
social problem*

Local guilds, local collectors of taxes and the

various institutions handling foreign exchange, covetous of small
gains "which the confusion of the various tael systems made possible,
wasted to maintain the old non—unifona tael system in China*

China*a

poor m o d e m —banking system could not assist society and the nation to
settle and smooth out the difficulty occurring from the creation of a
new ourrenoy grstem.

China did not have adequate means of transporta

tion sad ccmmvaaioation for the distribution and moving of coins to
various parts of the country in response to changes in demand and supply
for funds*

la China there were no available statistics or economic

records ia either public offices or private organisations which could
bo used as a just guide for both the adjustment of existing systems
sad the creation of a sew system*

This lack of records makes it dif

ficult to throw sufficient light on the following problems:

how many

new colas, legal tender, and subsidiary coins, China should have and
what should be the ratio between the standard coins and the subsidiary
coins Mid between the several kinds of the subsidiary coins*

Ho one

could guess how many more coins, both newly Issued and re—issued, China
would need to finance the development of industry and ocsameroe, and to
keep the existing system in good shape*

China needed many economic

experts and well-trained officers to run the new monetary system, to
watch the existij^ system, mad to save it both from internal crisis and
from external attack*

The masses of people in China lacked the minimum

knowledge of banking and money to understand the various steps in the
governmental money policy*

A wide knowledge of money and banking prin

ciples Is necessary to install and make effective a new system*
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^bis lack of understanding was unfortunate.

Fraudulent practices could

bo carried on in the name of progressive change.

Furthermore those

with advanced knowledge or more complete information were able to take
advantage of those less well infonned.

Questionable practices oarried

on during the transition period tended to b© translated into criticsm
of the new system itself.

The distances involved and the lack of com

munication facilities prolonged the transition period so that for a
time the various sections of the country were in different stages of
the transition process.

From 1851 to 1935 this gradual transition

was underway, but by the latter date the process was about finished.
Unfortunately, China was not as favorably situated for changing
over to gold as were a number of other countries when they reformed
their monetary system.

China did not possess any large stocks of gold.

Also* she did not receive any considerable amount of funds through pay
ments of indemnities or through payment for shipments of merchandise
to foreign countries.

By way of contrast it can be shorn that the

adoption of the gold standard in other countries tended to be made at
a time when considerable quantities of gold were available from mining
operations, as for example the United States.

Britain was receiving

funds from her colonies and from other foreign countries; Germany and
Japan ware in possession of funds received as war indemnities after
the Franco—Prussian war and the Sino—Japanese war, respectively.
The chenge in India and the Philippines was supported by the British
aw*?

American

government s.

Furthermore, the movement for reform of

Chinese currency took place in the very period when the price of silver
in

terms of gold fluctuated very muoh, and when the monetary systems

255

O’ch^r countries were rapidly changing*
The ourrenoy problem in ^hina m s also a problem of foreign affairs#*
Under the system of extra-territorial jurisdiction, the Chinese govern
ment cannot control or prohibit the counterfeiting of coins in foreign
settlements at the trade ports*

Unless the government could efficiently

control or prohibit the counterfeiting of coins, the system of token
coins could not .-e maintained aocording to the governmental plan*
ms

This

one of the sain handicaps of China in establishing a gold exchange

standard*

Counterfeiting also added further confusion to the existing

©Id copper cash and the subsidiary silver coins*

The paper notes issued

by foreign banks in accordance with the regulations of their mother
country and circulated in the trade centers, even in the interior, had
destroyed the control of the Chinese government regarding the issue of
bank notes*

The competition between foreign countries in supplying

funds to finance the re/orm always increased the difficulty of monetary
reform*

The potential pc-itlcal ambitions of the Western Powers and

Japan have made the Chines© people hesitant to accept the necessary
assistance from foreign experts*

It even has influenced unfavorably

some useful plans which were made on the basis of pur© eoonomio co
operation and pure mutual benefits by foreign experts or foreign
financial institution*
The serious confusion of the monetary situation in China had been
existing since 1851 and became worse and worse from year to year*

But

China’s government never gave much attention to tie steps necessary for
general reform until the year 1895, when China was beator by Japan.
From 1895 to 1957, the eve of the present war, the movement for monetary
reform and the legislative creations of China’s government can be briefly

Z36
atara&Skrigdd a* t o llowst
I* The period around 1895— After the Sino-Japanese War in 1895,
with the modern reform movement of the governmental administration,
•one preliminary monet&iy proposals were offered by a group of the
offleers in the Central Government, such as Mr, Hu Chu—fen’s uniform
coinage syst«n in 1895, Mr. Wang Pan-yuan’s coinage of silver in 1893,
Hr. Sheag Esuan-huai’s Chingping tael unit in 1896, Mr. Chan Chi-ohang's
m o d e m cash machinery in 1897, and Mr. Yang Y l - o M ’s English go Id-pound
unit in 1897*

In this period, in reaction to these proposals, the

Central Government did not provide any valuable creations of monetary
reform.
II.

The period around 1904— After 1900 same factors (such as the

Increasing foreign gold loans, the declining priee of silver, the
urgency for China’s currency reform from foreign countries, the de
preciating nee copper cents, the example of currency reform given by
neighbor Ing countries, and the over-product ion of the local subsidiary
silver coinage) led to the following governmental action:

A* the

edict of depress Dowager in 1901 to elose the provincial mints j 8. the
Joining of China, Mexico and the United States in an international
inquiry into the silver question; C. the acceptance of the monetary
reform plan proposed by Professor J. W. denies.

During this period,

la reaction to the plan drawn up by J. W. Jenks, there came some
criticism and new proposals, such as Mr. Jamiession’s criticism in
1903, Sir Hobert Hart’s silver coinage on a gold basis In 1903, Mr.
H u Wei-tl’s gold coinage.

In 1905 the Central Government issued the

"Ten Regulations," the Act of "coinage of taels” and the Act of "frac
tions ©f the tael in silver*”
III* The period around 1908— la 1908 the monetary reform movement
started by Mr* Tong Shao-yi *e proposal for silver tael coins*
earns the proposal for the
the same year*

go

Then

In of $1*80 from Mr* Sheng Henan—hwai in

Prince Tsai Tse suggested the establishing of the

Bureau of Currency Reform and tbs one "yuan" silver coin.

The Board

of Pinance of China* s Government suggested the national silver coins
and silver notes*
IV# The period 1910-13— The "Regulations for the Rational Coinage"
consisted of eleven articles, and thirteen supplementary articles were
created in 1910*

On April IB, 1911 the monetary reform loan from

foreign countries was signed*

Dr* Vissering's plan for a gold-exohange

standard for China was proposed In 1912*

Mr* Hsu Un-yuan1s suggestion

ef a "huan" unit and Mr* S. EL. Wagel's proposal for a silver tael unit
were given in 1913*
V# The period 1914-28— In January, 1914 the "Rational Currency
Regulations" and the "Regulations for the Enforcement of the Currency
Law" were passed*
were granted*

In 1916 the "Regulations of Gold Currency Rotes"

From 1918 to 1928, a long period of almost ten years,

either government creation or reform movement entered into a silence
period#
VI* The period 1928-35— In 1928 the Economic Conference in Ranking
recommended

some fundamental principles for the later monetary reform

of the Central Government • In 1929 Dr* Kemmerer proposed a compara
tively complete plan for a gold exchange standard for China*

Curing

this period China*e Government really devoted its time to preparing
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to reach the goal of monetary reform.

For instance, in 1923 the Central

Bank was set up, in 1930 the system of ’’custom gold unit1* was established,
the abolishment of the haikman tael began in 1930 and was completed in
1933, the abolishment of the taels system occurred on April 6, 1933, the
Central Mint was created at Shanghai in 1933, the abolishment of the
"likin* system was completed in 1931, an£ China's standard dollar law
was passed cm March 3, 1933.

These were the necessary steps for the

completion of a uniform national monetary system.
VII. The period 1935-37— In April, 1935 the reorganization of the
three banks, the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the Bank
of Communications was initiated by China's Government*

On Movsmber 3,

1955 the Chinese Government announced the new ourrenoy policy, abandon*
want of the silver standard, and set up the managed currency system.
In January, 1936 the regulations concerning subsidiary coinage were
accepted by the Legislative Yuan.

A new monetary system suitable to

both the internal and external circumstances of China was just begin
ning sod then oams the war in 1957 between China and Japan.
In addition to

the reforms of China's monetary system mentioned

above, it is wise to summarise briefly the most important proposals
as being the silver standard, the gold standard, and the gold exchange
standard.
The proposals for China's ourrenoy reform, drawn up by both
Chinese

foreign individuals end governmental officers, accumulated

into a pile mountaln-high.

Among them were some doirmon featurees

they

pointed out some partial truths in the whole picture, but none indloated
that they understood thoroughly the uhole situation at the time the plans
were made.

For many reasons these proposals had been filed without getting
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a ehaoee to be put into effect*
Among the proposals for a uniform silver standard, the ones drawn
up by Mr, Chang Chi-tung, Tong Shao-yi (Chinese) , Mr, Wagel, and Sir
S» Bart (foreigners) might be accepted as representative*

Among those

advocating a geld standard were Mr. Hu Wei-te and Tsao Ju-lin (both
(kinase)* Among the group of advocates of a gold exchange standard.
Professor dunks', Dr* Viesering' s and Professor Kemmcrerfs plans (all of
these men are foreigners and Chinese Governmental advisers for the
reform of Chinese ourrenoy) made the

only proposals which China re

ceived*
The silver standard group emphasised ChinaTs internal situation
and held one general idea; that is, that before China could adopt a
gold standard, she would first have to settle her existing troubles
sad unify her existing currency system*
eases*

They pointed out the following

The copper-using area in China is many times larger than the

silver-using area from the viewpoint of ourrenoy*

In the ease of the

collection of the governmental taxes, the fractions are carried to a
millionth part of a tael*
ficult to enforce in China*

The gold-exchange standard would be dif
The token coins would be continually

fluctuating in terms of silver bullion again*

Under the goId-exchange

standard, coins might depreciate through over-issue for the seignior
age*

China has not even had a silver money with & uniform weight and

appearance*

People were accustomed to the use of the tael system.

needed a silver currency of a uniform weight and fineness, and
in quantities sufficient to meet the needs of the whole Emptfce.
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Uniformity in eopper currencie 8 was also needed immediately*

Owing to

the enormous extent of territory, the looseness of the political system
and the existence of the leased territories, the government could not
successfully prevert the counterfeiting operations in Chinese terri
tory*

A Central Mint and a Central National Bank ware at once neoes-

eaiy is China*

Among this group, there was a common idea that any

reform in China *s ourrency system must start from the establishment
of a uniform ooin first*
All proposals in this group failed to mention the effeet on the
stabilisation of the Internal prioe level that might be brought about
by the fluctuation of the price of silver*
Another omission for which this group should be held responsible
is that they furnished no solution for the problems of the stabilisa
tion of China4s foreign exchange rate and the fluctuating burden caused
by China*s foreign loans in terms of gold money*
Regarding the unit of silver coins, some different opinions have
been existing among them*

Some, from the viewpoint of tradition, main

tained that the tael system, either kuping tael or Shanghai tael, should
be made the uniform unit of money in the new system*

Some, from the

viewpoint of the low living level of the masses of Chinese people,
held that the unit of a dollar which is about 0*72 of a kuping tael
tad is about the same weight as a Mexican dollar, should be much more
eonvenient for the purpose of circulation*

Still one of them recom

mended a new silver unit of MHuan° with a weight about 0*56 of a kuping
tael, because it would be worth exactly 1,000 cash of the existing
copper cash at the market price*

Among this group Mr* Chang Cbih-tung
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k*d contributed * detailed surrey regarding the practical situation
in China*

Among this group, basing his ideas on the theories of

hanking and money accepted by the economists in Europe and America,
Mr* Ifagel had offered a pains talcing discussion of the practical facte
of China*
Among the group insisting on & gold standard for China immediately,
®®ly

* Tsao Ju—lin recommended a relatively detailed plan#

his plan on these reasons:

H© based

(1) China's foreign loan in terms of gold

la very heavy; (2) the fluctuation of China's foreign exchange is a
serious hindrance to China's foreign trade; and (3) all nations in the
world have adopted the gold standard*
above, he drew the following plan*

Based on the reasons mentioned

Gold dollars 11Chin Tuan* contain

ing 0*732318 kungfun (it may mean the ngrsmn) of pure gold or 0*0201668
kuping tael of pure go Id and gold currency notes should be issued*
The subsidiary coin in the National Coinage Law of 1914 shall be used as
fiduciary coins in the gold currency system*

The Bank of China and the

Bank of Communications should perform the functions of a Central Bank
with which the reserve for the gold notes shall be deposited**
specified date taels will be changed into dollars*

After a

Banks with notes

then outstanding should withdraw them within a fixed period, after which
period their reserve should be set aside for retirement of the still
outstanding notes#

The Central Mint shall be at Tientsin with the

policy that the one-dollar coins should be coined less and less by em
phasising the half dollar*
for the currency reform*

Some foreign advisers shall be seleoted
Of course, his plan left many points to be

eriticised, but from both technique and practice it was a relatively
reasonable plan in comparison with the other gold-standard plans
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proposed for China*

Unfortunately, the plan had connected itself with

the political foreign loans arranged by Japan for which the Chinese
people had no liking*
people*

The plan was killed by the opposition of the

However, if we understand what the following paragraph means,

we sight get some idea about the difficulty surrounding the creation of
a gold standard in the case of Chinas
The gold standard means more than a legal undertaking to redeem
the currency and credit of a nation in gold***the gold standard
means a set of practices, a system of procedure, never formulated,
never consciously thought out, not invented by anybody, but the
growth of experience of the great commercial countrie s of the
world, rather than merely the employment of gold to redeem all
fonas of obligations. 3It was said that the currency reform by Britain in 1816 was from
a weight of silver to a value of gold, (that is the Mint price of gold
at i>3 17s* lO^d* per ounce), end it was apparent that the success of
the British ourrsncy policy was due to her ability to maintain the
"value of gold."
Of the three proposals for the gold exchange standard, the one which
was recommended by Professor Jenks concluded the main points as follows:
The standard unit of value will consist of ♦** grains of gold and will
be worth presumably the gold value of a tael*

A standard gold coin

will be at a ratio of about 32 to 1 to the silver coins*

Prom time to

tine the government will declare that in various provinces the new coins
will be legal tender for debts incurred after a fixed date*

The govern

ment shall open credit accounts in foreign trade centers and may draw
geld bills at a fixed rate under the direction of the foreign comptroller
of the currency who, appointed by China*s Government, shall have general

3-Sir Charles Mor gam-Webb, The Hi so and Fall of the Gold Standard,
yew York, Macmillan Co*, 1934, p. 16.
'
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charge of the monetary system for China*

Loans may be made for the

establishment of adequate exchange funds, and seigniorage profit from
eoin&ge must be kept as a separate fund*
After Professor Jenka, Dr. Vis soring drew a different plan for
China•

He held that silver does not procure any stability of prices

for commodities, etc*

For the purpose of stability of prices and

foreign exchange the gold exchange standard is the best one for a
transitional period from the viewpoint of the existing circumstances
in China*

In his plan the ratio of the gold coin and silver subsidiary

coin will be It 21 and the gold unit 0*3644633 grams of pure gold and the
silver unit with 7*66 grams of pure silver*

He divided the whole period

in the movement of currency reform into three parts*
period the following steps will be completed*

Within the first

(1) the adoption of a

future gold unit as a foundation, (2) organization of the Bank of
Issue, (3) the new gold unit as & money of account for book credits,
(4) the issue of bank notes of new gold units, (6) accumulation of a
gold reserve against the bank notes, (6) to declare the bank notes the
legal tender*

Within the second period, (1) the establishment and

issue of the token coins end new subsidiary coinage, (2) accumulation
of gold reserve against the token coins, (3) the coinage and issue {if
desirable) of gold coins, (4) to deolare unlimited legal tender of
silver token coins of 1 unit and 2 units, and the gold coins and then
the gold certificates.

Within the last period, the old silver dollars,

old syoee, and the copper cash must be gradually withdrawn*
the last foreign expert who proposed a plan of gold exchange
standard for China is Professor kemmerer from America*

his plan a standard unit (gold

According to
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fine gold sad have a money value of 40 cent* of the United States
dollar*

The value of the gold sun as bullion is 25.7 cents and its

value as money is 40 cants.

The margin is about 35 per cent.

The

silver sun with 16 grams of pur© silver, th© piece of 50 cents with
7.20 grams, and the piece of €0 cents with 2*88 grams of silver shall
be Issued} three steps shall be taken, first, a gold standard currency
circulation date for each province} second, a gold standard legal tender
dates third, a debt adjustment date for each province after which all
debt before aad after must be In gold standard currency.

A fund shall

be set up and be never less than 35 per cs&. of the total amount of
■fee gold standard coins in circulation*

The gold coins when presented

for redemption for gold bar, drafts, eto., shall be witMraim from
circulation, and paid cut again only against the drafts sold abroad
upon the fund in China*

Bo portion of the gold standard fund may be

placed on deposit in any bonk: in China, nor shall it be invested in
China for the reason that tbs fund shall be kept out of circulation*
Professcr Hammerer also proposed conversion steps in detail to withdraw
the existing coins.

Among the plans drawn by these three foreign ex

perts, the one by Professor Hammerer is relatively complete and much
mere detailed.

Unfortunately, both the internal and the international

situation permitted no opportunity for putting the plan into effect.
In China it is still the old story Involving the political situation,
financial difficulty, and all the social problems.

Outside of China,

the situation of tie gold standard was quite different from what it
was before 1914.

24$
The w i M Inflations ©f European currencies after the -war, de
stroyed confidence on both investments and paper currenoies# an**
greatly stimulated the hoarding of gold and silver which was a
legacy from the war# The Central Banks of France and the United
States# by aooemulating and hoarding enormous and unnecessary
stocks of gold# were our tailing the supply of currency and increas
ing the demand for gold to sn extent that greatly affected the
stability of its value«•##
The Currency policies of France and the United States. ..greatly
stimulated hoarding in another manner. They forced the debtor
nations to employ exchange restrictions, gold protection tariffs
and quotas# and other restrictive measures# in defence of their
diminished stores of gold#**.
The stabilisation of gold value# the free flow of gold between
countries# and a free trade policy are the requirements for the main
tenance of the gold standard*

Under the oases described by the above

quotation# the situation of the gold standard became as follows:
The past seventeen years (1914-1931) had effected a transform
ation from a commercial world and an investing world# into a hoard
ing world....On the one hand were frozen credits# frozen accumula
tions of gold# a frantic greed for gold# not for the purposes of
currency and trade# but for hoarding....On the other hand were
frozen hoards of commodities# unsaleable at anything like their
cost of production# Gold had practically ceased to funstion as a
currency over the greater part of the world**..®
The goal of abandonment of the silver standard# talked about for
many years#

planned by Jenks# Vissering# Kesnmarer, and others# was

finally brought about as a result of th© changing situation of the in
ternational standard# tte intensified world depression and the critical
situation caused by the American policy of raising the price of the
white metal*
Since 193$# China adopted the managed currency system, under whioh
system all silver in China was nationalized and no silver coins were

Zjbid*# pp. 111-112.
®Jbid»# p. 149.
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oireulated for the purpose of currency.

For the purpose of a medium,

of internal exchange, the bank notes of the three Gov©mm©nt banks were
full legal tender within the first two years after the beginning of the
new system.

After a period of two years, the Central Bank of China was

the only Inst itition haring the sole right to issue hank notes, the
fall legal tender*

Under the supervision of the Central Government

the Gurreney Reserve Board oontrolled the issue and retirement of the
legal tender notes to keep oustody of 1h© reserves against the outstand
ing notes*

For the purpose of the foreign exchange, the Central Bank of

China pegged the price of the Chinese Standard Dollar by selling the
Chinese Standard Dollar in any amount at the fixed price of Is* 2 5/8d. of
BritlA sterling, or 30 oents of the American dollar, and buying the
Chinese Standard Dollar at the fixed prioe of Is* 2 3/8d., or 29^ cents*
Under the managed currency system "it can work with full confidence
in the adjustment of its new national currency to the requirements of
China's economy.

From the viewpoint of the development of the currency

system In China and the international tendency, the new system may be
judged from the angle that "for the first time in history, China has
adopted a truly national monetary polioy*

This policy is in accordance

with the trends of the economic world today,n and ”it brings China into

g
elo aer end mo is intimate contact with the m o d e m economic world."

*Tang Leang-le, China's Hew Currency System, Shanghai, 1913, p. 96*
5Ibid., p. 97*
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APPENDIX A
REGULATIONS GOVERNING COINAGE OF THE NSW STANDARD SILVER BOLLA1—
EFFECTIVE MARCH, 1S55— (from Chines© Tear Book, 1925-26*
pp * 1484-86)
*“

Article 1* Coinage of the Standard Silver Unit shall be carried
out exclusively by the Central Mint*
Article 2 • The Standard Silver Unit shall b® known as th© Yuan*
Its total weight shall be 26*6971 grams, and be composed of BE per ojanb
silver and 12 per cent oopperi that is, it shall contain 28*495448 grams
of pur© silver*
Article 8* Th© design of the Standard Silver Unit shall be pre
pared by the linistjy of Finance and submitted to th® National Govern
ment for promulgation by official Mandate*
Article 4* One Yuan of the Standard Silver currency shall be
equivalent to 100 cents (Fen), and one cent shall be equivalent to 10
Li*
Article 5*
The difference between the actual weight of the Yuan
©f the StandardSilver Unit and the legally fixed weight must not in
any case exceed three-thousandths (S/l,000ths)»
Article 6* The difference between the aggregate weight of 1,000
Than and the legally fixed weight (for 1,000 Yuan) must not in any ©as©
exceed 5^0,000ths*
Article 7*
The difference between the actual fineness of each
Standard Silver
Yuan and the legally fixed fineness must not in any case
exceed three-thousandths (3/L,000ths^ •
Article 8* The Standard Silver Unit shall be tendered and accep
ted in payments to the government or to private persons as well as in
all transactions# The amount that may be tendered at any time shall be
unlimited* (That is, it shall be considered as legal tender in all
circumstances)•
Article 9* All the old one-yuan silver pieces, which conform to
the weight and fineness originally fixed may be used, within a certain
specified period, in the same manner as the Standard Silver Unit* Th®
said period shall be specified In an order of the Ministry of Finance*
Article 10* The Standard coins, if used for too long, may be pre
sented to the Central Mint In exchange for new coins of the same amount,
provided, however, that their weight and fineness shall conform with
Articles 2, 6, 6 and 7 of these regulations*
Article 11* T*w following provisions shall govern cases in which
silver or similar matters which may b© used for the minting of coins, or
old coins, are presented to th© Central Mint for th® ooinag© of th©
Standard Silver coins*
1 * Whore the silver bullion offered has a fineness of 999 thousandths*
22 #495448 grams of pure silver shall be presented for each Yuan plus a
minting charge of 2*25 per cent*
2. Old ©ne-yuan silver pieces which conform with the weight and fine
ness originally fixed may be exchanged for an equal amount of the

£49
Standard Silver coins without payment of minting charge*
5.- Where the fineness of th© silver bullion offered is less than
999 thousandths, or where the old one-yuan silver pieces do not conform
with the weight and fineness originally fixed, they shall be converted
to th© actual amount of pur© silver they contain* A minting charge of
2*25 per cent must be paid for each Yuan coined* Where the composition
of the silver bullion or old coins mentioned above is too complicated,
an appropriate assay and/or refining fee may be charged in addition to
the minting charge*
Article 12* The Central Mint may produce "mint bars «w Bach bar
shall have a fineness of 999 thousandths, and a fin® silver content
equivalent to the fine silver content contained in 1,000 dollars, both
of which shall be recorded on the face of the bar*
Article IS* Where silver bullion is offered to th® Central Mint
for the minting of "mint bars," the foil owing provisions shall governs
1* Where the silver bullion has a fineness of 999 thousandths, a
minting charge of the 2*25 per cent shall b© paid*
2* Where the fineness of the silver is less than 999 thousandths,
it shall be commuted to the amount of pure silver it contains* Be
sides a minting charge of 2*25 per cent each bar, an appropriate assay
end/or refining fee may be charged*
Article 14* Where "mint bars" of the Central Mint are presented in
exchange for Standard Silver coins, the Mint, if satisfied that the bar
offered retains ita original weight and fineness, must exchange it for
Standard Silver coins of an amount equivalent to that recorded on the
bar* If the bar has lost in weight of fineness, it shall be exchanged
alth Standard Silver coins equivalent to th© actual amount of silver it
contains*
Article 15* These regulations shall be put into effect from the
date of promulgation thereof•
& t i a between the Standard Dollar and Shanghai Tael
On© Standard Yuan equals 23*4955448 grams of pure silver*
One Shanghai Tael equals 35*599 grams of pure silver*
23*495448 divided by 33*599 equals 0*6992305 *
Hence one Standard Yuan equals 0*6992505 plus 0*0157327 equals
0.715 approximately; therefore the rate of exchange for a Yuan has been
fixed at 0*715 Shanghai Tael*
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APPENDIX B
THE MTIOHALIZATION OF SILVER*

On November 3, 19155 & decree was issued by th© Ministry of*
Finairo©— effect iv© from th© following day, Monday, November 4—
announcing the new changes in financial and currency policy, aimed at
effecting stabilisation of the national currency* The decree was issued
following a series of conferences between representatives of the Ministry
of Finance and leading Chinese bankers«
In order to conserve the currency reserves of the country and to
effect lasting measures of currency and banking reform, the Government,
following the precedent of many countries in recent years, has decreed,
with effect from November 4, 1935, as follows*
1* The banknotes Issued by the three Government banks % that is,
the Central Bank of China, Bank of China, and Bank of G©mmunications,
shall be full legal tender, and the banknote reserves of th© three banks
shall be placed under a unified control* The notes of all other issuing
banks will continue in circulation, but will gradually be withdrawn and
replaced by notes of the Central Bank * No new notes are to be issued by
these banks and all their unissued notes as well as their banknote reserves are to be deposited with the Central Bank*
2* All debts expressed in terms of silver shall be discharged by
the payment in legal tender notes of th© nominal amount due*
3* All holders of silver are required to exchange their silver for
legal tender notes*
4* The exchange value of th© Chines© dollar will b© kept stable
at its present level, and for this purpose the government banks will buy
and sell foreign exchange in unlimited quantities*
The Government-owned Central Bank is to be reorganized as the
Central Reserve Bank of China, and will be owned principally by banks
and the general public9 thus becoming an independent institution, de
voting itself chiefly to maintaining the stability of th® nation* s
currency* The Central Reserve Bank of China will hold the reserve of
the banking system and act as depository of all public funds and will
provide centralized re-discount facilities for the other banks* Th©
Central Reserve Bank of China will not undertake general commercial
business, and after a period of two years will enjoy the sol© right of
note-issue*
Measures have also been prepared for strengthening th© eommeroial
banking system and giving increased liquidity under sound conditions to
the cormereial banks so that they may have resource® available to fineice
the legitimate requirements of trade and industry* These measures will
include the creation of a special institution to deal exclusively with
mortgage business, and steps will be taken to amend th© present legal

*Tang,Leang-lo, China*s New Currency System, Shanghai, 1938,
Appendix B*
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Codes so as to improve the security of mortgage deeds*
Plains have been completed by •which the National Budget will be
Balanced within a period of eighteen months® The Government is deter
mined th avoid inflation, and will take ©nergetio measures to deal with
speculation and attempts to bring about unwarranted increase in prices *
Shis constructive program for the rehabilitation of the financial
' and economic Condition of th© country will be inaugurated immediately
sad carried through as rapidly as possible® The government is confi
dent that tfeej nation will wholeheartedly support it in these measures to
relieve depression and promote national prosperity®
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APPENDIX C
r e g u l a t i o n s g o v e r n i n g t h e c u s p k n c t r everts

BOARD (To b© promulgated on Nov* 8, 1935)*

Article 1# Th© Currency Reserve Board is specially created by
the Ministry of Finance for the purpose of centralizing the issue and
consolidating the credit of legal tender notes* Branches shall he
established in the various commercial carters at the discretion of th®
Board*
Article 2* In accordance with the order of th© government, the
Board shall have custody of the reserves against legal tender notes,
and shall control the issue and retirement of such notes*
Article 8* The Board shall be composed of th© following members*
(1) Five representatives appointed by the Ministry of Finance*
(2) Two representatives each appointed by the Central Bpnk of China,
the Bank of China, and the Bank of Corranunications•
(5) Two representatives appointed by the Native Bankers} Guild*
(4) Two representatives appointed by the Native Bankers*Association*
(5) Two representatives appointed by the Chamber of Commerce*
(6; Five representatives of other banks of issue, specially de
signated by the Minister of Finance*
Article 4* The Governor of the Central Bank of China shall be
ex-officio Chairman of th© Board and the Board shall elect a standing
Conanittee of five to seven of its members for the execution of routine
SDlt*

Article 5* The Board may invite leading financiers, both Chinese
and foreign, to serve as advisers*
Article 6* The Board shall designate the Central Bank* the Bank
of China, and the Bank of Communications as depositories for the custody
of the reserve funds* The apportionment of the funds to be deposited
in eaoh shall be determined by tha Board and reported to the Ministry
of Finance for record*
Article 7* The Board shall inspect the reserve depositories once
a month and announce to the public and amounts of note—issue, as well
ae the kinds and amounts of the reserves, and shall report to the
Ministry of Finance for record*
Article 8* The Board is authorised to employ a staff in order to
carry on its work *
Article 9* The Board may draw up its rules and regulations, sub
ject to the approval by the Ministry of Finance*
Article 10* These regulations shall become effective from th©
date of promulgation thereof*

*The Chinese Year Book» 1936-37, Distributed by th© Commercial
Press, M m l ted, Shanghai, China, p* 815*
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APPENDIX D
EXCHANGE OF LEGAL TEHEES NOTES*

Following the decree for the netion&Xization of stiver, regula—
tions governing the exchange of legal tender notes (fa—pi) were issued
fey the Ministry of Finance, approved fey the Executive Yuan, and com
municated to the various Provincial and Municipal Governments for en
forcement* Following is a translations —
EXCHANGE OF LEGAL TENDER NOTES
Article 1* All banks (both m o d e m and native), shops, business
houses, public organ!sations and individuals throughout th© country
having in their possession silver coins, mint bars, raw silver, silver
ingots, silver bullion, and all other forms of silver and/or silver
articles, shall turn them over to the nearest local exchange office in
exchange for legal tender notes (fa~pi) within three months, beginning
from November 4 of th© 24th Year of the Hepubli© (1935), with the
exemptions enumerated below*—
(1) Silver absolutely indispensable as raw material for industrial,
artistic or other lawful purposes, the use of which has been authorised
fey the government in accordance with the regulations governing th© us©
of silver in the manufacture of silver articles»
(Z ) Ancient coins, rare coins, or ancient silver relics having
cultural value*
(3) Silver utensils and ornaments manufactured and in possession
of owners prior to the promulgation of these regulations*
Arfciel© 2* The offices for the exchange of legal tender notes
consist of the followings —
(1) The Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the Bank of
Coreamieations, their branches and authorized agents.
(2) Banks (modern and native), pawnshops, post-offices, railway
offices, steamship offices, telegraph offices, and other public organs
or organizations authorized by the above-mentioned three banks (th©
Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the Bank of Communications)*
(3) Offices for the collection of national and local revenues
throughout the country*
(4) The District (Hsien) Governments.
Article 3. ?dien exchanged for legal tender notes, all silver
articles, other than silver coins or mint bars in current circulation,
shall be evaluated on the basis of the degree of their fineness (per
centage of silver content) .
Article 4. In districts where no legal tender note© are in circu
lation, persons in possession of silver dollars, silver bars, raw
silver ingots, silver bullion or other forms of silver and/or other sil
ver articles shall have them exchanged for legal tender notes in the
offices stipulated in sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article 2*

*Tang Leang—le, China*a New Currency System, Shanghai, 1936,
Appendix C.
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Article 5* Th® offices ©numerated in Sections 2, S and 4 of
Article 2, after receiving silver do lars, silver bars, raw silver,
silver ingots, silver bullion, or other forms of silver and/or other
silver articles (in exchange for legal tender notes), shall immediately
turn them over to the nearest branch or authorised agent of any one of
the three banks, vis*, the Central Bank of China, th© Bank of China,
and the Bank of Communications, in exchange for legal tender notes *
hoarding, concealirg or using the above-mentioned silver for other pur
poses shall be construed as criminal acts*
Article 6* Acts of extortion by threat, committed during the
period of exchange (of legal tender notes for silver), against persons
in possession of silver dollars, silver bars, raw silver, silver in
gots, silver bullion or other forms of silver and/or other silver arti
cles, shall be construed as acts of obtaining goods of value under
false pretences*
Article ?« In the exchange of silver dollars in current circu
lation for legal tender notes, no difference whatsoever shall be per
missible; that is, the exchange shall be dollar for dollar* In case of
violation of this provision, in accordance with th© degree of the offence
committed, the legal tender notes or th© silver dollars Involved, or
both the legal tender notes and the silver dollars involved, ©hall be
confiscated. Persons receiving, purchasing or exchanging silver coins
or silver articles at a premium with or without Intent to smuggle the
same shall be dealt with In accordance with Article 2 and 6 of th© Pro
visional Hegulations governing Punishment for Interference with the
national Currency.
Article 8. These regulations, having been referred by this
Ministry to the Executive Tuan and circulated, shall be observed by all
persons end organisations, and shall be in effect from th© day of pro
mulgation*
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APPENDIX 13

SBGULATIONS GOVERNING SUBSIDIARY COINS
(To be passed on dan* 10, 1956 and promulgated th© next day)*

Article 1# Subsidiary ooias (fu-pi) are t< b® minted exclusively
at the Central Mint, and circulated by th© Central Bank of China#
Article 2# Subsidiary coins shall b© classified as follows*
Value
Nickel coins:
20 cents
10 cents
5 cents
Copper coins:
1 cent
sf cent

Weight
6 grams
4*5 grams
5 grams

6*5

grams

5*5 grams

Fineness
'
100^ nickel
10Q% nickel
lOf# nickel

95$> copper
tin-sin®
95$ copper
tin-sino

and &%
alloy
and 5%
alloy

Article 5* Subsidiary coins shall be calculated on a decimal
basis* A #1*00 legal tender note (fa-pi) shall be equivalent to:
five 20-eent niekel coins, ten 10-cent nickel coins, twenty 5-cent
nickel coins, one hundred l-cent copper coins or two hundred §--oent
copper coins*
Article 4* The designs of the subsidiary coins shall be determined
by the Ministry of Finance, and submitted, through the Executive Tuan,
to the National Government for promulgation*
Article 5* The niekel coins shall be legal tender for payments up
to the amount of #20, and the copper coins up to the ©mount of #5
National Currency* This provision, however, shall not apply in th® pay
ment and collection of taxes or in currency exchange at th© Central Bank
of China*
Article 6* Existing subsidiary coins shall be withdrawn from
circulation by the Ministry of Finance, and shall b@ destroyed by melt
ing and recast* However, during a specific period they shall still be
permitted to circulate at their respective market value* The detailed
measures for the enforcement of this provision as well as th© aforesaid
time-limit shall be determined by order of the Ministry of Finance*
Article 7* Subsidiary coins, which through wsar and tear over a
long period, have lost 5 per cent of their legal weight, may be ex
changed for new coins at the Central Bank of China*
However, if the coins are intentionally damaged or debased through
heavy stamping of seals or otherwise, resulting in th© loss of weight
or the alteration of their original form, they shall become null and

*The Chinese Year Book, 1956-57, Distributed by The Commercial
Press, Limited, Shanghai, China, p* 816*

zm
^cid, bo prohibited from circulation, and shall not be exchangeable for
new c o in s *
A r t i c l e 8* Any person 'who counterfeits subsidiary coins or iss*p a ir s the c r e d it thereof* shall b® punished in accordance with law*
Article 9* These regulations shall come into force from the date
c f promulgation thereof*
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